biiss
journal

Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies

Volume 41
Number 2
2020

biiss

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Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)

Dhaka

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Abu Salah Md. Yousuf

SECURITIZATION AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE: MILITARY, MONKS AND ROHINGYA MINORITIES IN MYANMAR

Abstract

While most of the studies used a top-down approach of the Copenhagen School to understand securitization process against the Rohingya community, this paper argues that there is a horizontal and bottom-up securitization active against ethnic and religious minorities in Myanmar. A nexus between the military and the radical monks helped to develop different securitization narratives identifying Rohingyas as a security threat to the national integrity, social harmony and economic stability of the country. In this respect, the paper explains the structure and motives of the alliance between the military and the radical monks as well as focuses on the consequences of the securitization measures against the Rohingya community. The paper finds that the longstanding securitization of ethnic minorities helped military regimes in Myanmar to legitimize their stronghold in the state power and concurrently it led the country towards adopting unscrupulous policy, which instigated an unending conflict with the ethnic minorities. Moreover, the development of a horizontal and bottom-up securitization process deepened the division in the society and complicated any reconciliation process among the conflicting groups in Myanmar.

Keywords: Horizontal and Bottom-up Securitization, Ethnic Violence, Myanmar, Military, Monks and Rohingya Minorities.

1.   Introduction

The Copenhagen School's securitization process is an inter-subjective bargaining between 'security actors' and 'audiences' where security actors justify the necessity of securitization by their "speech act" and the audiences' acceptance and consent allow the authority to adopt 'emergency measures' for the security of a particular 'referent object'. In this process, securitization is a top-down approach where security actors play pivotal role in the process of securitization. The School's "widening and deepening" agenda denotes that the state is not the only 'referent object' in the security study, rather societal, political, military and environmental issues can be also 'referent objects' in the securitization process. Nevertheless, the contemporary securitization scholarship suggests that securitization is not always a top-down approach, rather it can also be horizontal or bottom-up, where security

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actors and audiences can act together and the securitization process can follow a bottom-up approach with multiple referent objects. On the other hand, in almost all ethnic violence, there is a securitization narrative. The security actors promulgate existential threat to their respective audience to justify the rationale of actions against some of the ethnic groups by "speech act". The measures of securitization by the security actors sometimes become violent and, in many cases, military actions are adopted. As a result, retaliation from the victim groups leads a state towards an unscrupulous and longstanding ethnic violence. Therefore, a connection between securitization and ethnic violence is a recognized phenomenon in the existing literature.

Since independence in 1948, the issue of ethnic identity was a concern in the political space of Myanmar. Under the iconic leadership of General Aung San, Myanmar desired to be a multi-ethnic and multi-racial country where the founding leaders of the country expressed their commitment to ensure equal rights for all ethnic minorities.[2] The assassination of General Aung San in 1947 changed the trajectory of the country. His successor U Nu declared the supremacy of Buddhism and the idea of Myanmar as a multi-ethnic country was diminished. General Ne Win's coup of 1962 led the country towards a longstanding military rule. His draconian measures to suppress ethnic identity of minority groups started a new political history and intensified ethnic conflicts in different regions of the country. General Ne Win adopted a securitization agenda on the issue of ethnic identity. He promulgated a linguistic nationalism in the country and enforced all the ethnic communities to learn Burmese language as part of socialistic agenda. His securitization narrative was that without establishing supremacy of Bamar identity, the unity and integrity of the country would be threatened. After Ne Win, successive military regimes also developed narratives to identify ethnic minorities as a threat to Myanmar's nationalism, ethnic identity and Buddhism. The Rohingyas remained at the centre of this marginalization process. General Ne Win started suppressive measures against the Rohingyas by denying their citizenship of the country. Moreover, he nationalized personal properties of many non-Bamar people identifying them as threat to national integrity.

After the military coup of 1962, some Buddhist supremacists supported Ne Win considering his policies as resurrection of the "kingship", what existed in Myanmar before colonial rule. Later, Ne Win's policies were conflicting with the interests of the religious groups and the distance between the military regime and the monks were deepening. The 1988 uprising against military rule opened a new era for the democratic forces and the formation of the National League for Democracy (NLD)

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[2] General Aung San signed the Panglong Agreement with ethnic minorities on 12 February 1947, where he agreed to protect the racial and religious identity of all the ethnic communities in Myanmar.

raised new hope that the country might return to the principles of its independence movement adopted by General Aung San. But military's crackdown and denial to transfer power to Aung San Suu Kyi after the election of 1990 made the political scenario more complex. Almost all the ethnic minority groups were supporting Aung San Suu Kyi and expected that her accession to power might raise hope for them. The military installed a "divide and rule" policy and continued operations in many areas of Myanmar to suppress resurgent movements. The monks were mainly supporting the democratic forces. Though their support for democracy was not very open, the Saffron Revolution of 2007 unleashed the hidden grievances of religious monks against military rule. The monks had a respectable position in society and one kind of legitimacy[3] from the monasteries was necessary for any government who wanted to survive in the political power of Myanmar. Therefore, after Saffron Revolution, the military leadership understood the urgency to develop relations with monks and started communicating with the radical group of monks like movement 969[4] to accomplish military's legitimacy in power.[5] At the same time, the radical monks also found it as an opportunity to strengthen their position in the society by marginalizing the traditional monks. The military and the radical monks developed a common narrative against the ethnic minorities, particularly against the Rohingya community, by identifying them as a threat to state integrity, social stability and economic progress of the Bamar people of Myanmar. The nexus between the military and the radical monks helped both to enhance their political and social power in the country. In addition, the unrestricted "hate speeches" of the radical monks escalated ethnic violence in the country and deepened existing divisions in the society.

In this backdrop, the present study is an endeavour to understand why the military and the monks developed alliance as security actors in the securitization process of the Rohingya community in Myanmar and how the adopted securitization measures escalated ethnic violence in the country. By using a theoretical framework of horizontal and bottom-up securitization, the study takes the Rohingya community as a case to study and process tracing is used for data collation to explain the processes of securitization of the ethnic minorities in Myanmar. The paper is divided into six sections including introduction and conclusion. Introduction highlights the objectives

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[3] Peter G. Stillman, "The Concept of Legitimacy", *Polity*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1974, pp. 32-56.
[4] The number 969 has its ideological roots in a book written in the late 1990s by U Kyaw Lwin, a functionary in the ministry of religious affairs of Myanmar, and its precepts are rooted in a traditional belief in numerology. Muslims represent the phrase *bismillah-ir-rahman-ir-rahim,* or "In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate and Merciful", with the number 786, and some businesses in Myanmar display the number to indicate that they are Muslim-owned. 969's proponents see this as evidence of a Muslim plot to conquer Myanmar in the 21st century, based on the implausible premise that 7 plus 8 plus 6 is equal to 21. The number 969 is intended to be 786's cosmological opposite, and represents the "three jewels" the nine attributes of the Buddha, the six attributes of his teachings, and the nine attributes of the Sangha, or monastic order.
[5] Jonathan DeHart, "Ashin Wirathu: The Monk behind Burma's "Buddhist Terror", *The Diplomat*, 25 June 2013.

of the paper and briefly describes the methodological issues. Section two deals with the theoretical framework of the paper in which horizontal and bottom-up securitization process are discussed in relation to the securitization of the Rohingya community in Myanmar. Section three explains formation and transformation of political and social forces in Myanmar and focuses on the contemporary alliance between the military and the radical monks in developing securitization narratives. Section four highlights the securitization narratives and emergency measures adopted by the military and the radical monks against ethnic minorities and the Rohingya community of Myanmar. Section five identifies the consequences of the securitization of ethnic identity in Myanmar and explains how securitization process escalated ethnic violence in the country. In conclusion theoretical and analytical outcomes of the paper are summarized.

2.   Theoretical Framework

The idea of security is an expansive and contentious one. Prior to the 1980s, the concept of security mainly focused on the priorities of sovereignty of a state from any existential threat. However, sometimes internal threats like domestic revolution and civil wars were also considered as security threat to the state. In the 1960s, some scholars tried to expand the notion of security by analyzing the complexity of the subject matter. As Arnold Wolfers defined security as "the absence of threat to acquired values"[6]. This definition imagined security as something inherently more complex than physical threats to the state apparatus. The idea of security was mainly analyzed from three theoretical approaches: realist, liberalist and constructivist. The realists consider that the perception of security is based on principles of anarchy, survival, self-help and domination.[7] On the other hand, the liberals see the security as a potential realm of progress and change. In other words, liberals believe that the security can be based on trust and mutual interest with certain conditions.[8] Realist and liberalist theories argue that social and political phenomena can be explained in a way that scientists use for explaining natural world, whereby they argue that facts and values are two separated things. Therefore, they think actors and concepts are exogenously given, and the actors act in a pre-given world according to the demands of instrumental reason.[9]

While realists and liberalists consider security as a factor defined by the state, the constructivists consider it as a social construct between security and threat.

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[6] Arnold Wolfers, ""National Security" as an Ambiguous Security", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, 1952, pp. 481-502.
[7] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979.
[8] Martin Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, London: Routledge, 1999.
[9] Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 3.

They consider that "the discussion of security is a discussion of threats"[10] and the issue at hand having been securitized, merits emergency attention and extraordinary measures.[11] By following constructivist approach, the Copenhagen School's securitization theory opened a new understanding in the field of security studies. The proponents of securitization theory adopted a "widening and deepening" framework for security understanding where they analyzed that security is no more related with military only and referent object is not always 'the state'. Barry Buzan's "widening" agenda took security concept beyond the traditional military and political dimension, to include economic, societal and environmental dimensions, and "deepening" agenda expanded referent object beyond the nation state to new referents both the individual and human kind (human security), the communal and societal, as well as the international, regional and the global or planetary levels.[12] Buzan *et. al.* argued that "security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues"[13].

The process of securitization as presented by Buzan and Ole Wæver can be analyzed in four steps.[14] The first step is "speech act", where a credible authority presents an issue as an existential threat to a referent object. The "speech act" rests at the core of securitization theory. It is a performative act which "makes a security problem"[15]. The second step is the acceptance of this threat by a credible audience. The audience also serves as the "operative conduit through which the negotiations between who securitizes and who accepts such securitization perform"[16]. Buzan *et al*. emphasize, "successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act"[17]. The third step is deployment of extraordinary measures to address and combat this threat. Such extraordinary measures should accept the "breaking of rules", "beyond existing binding rules"[18] and that "some kind of emergency remedial action is legitimate in the face of an existential threat"[19].

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[10] Ole Wæver, "Politics, Security, Theory", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 42, Issue 4-5, 2011, pp. 465-480.
[11] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
[12] Hans Günter Brauch, "Conceptual Quartet: Security and its Linkages with Peace, Development and Environment", in Hans Günter Brauch *et al.* (eds.), *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, Vol. 3, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2008, pp. 65-98.
[13] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, op. cit., p. vii.
[14] Sabine Hirschauer, *The Securitization of Rape: Women, War and Sexual Violence*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 27.
[15] Rita Taureck, "Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2006, p. 57.
[16] Sabine Hirschauer, op cit., p. 28.
[17] Barry Buzan et al., op cit., p. 31.
[18] Ibid., p. 5.
[19] Jurgen Haacke and Paul D. Williams, "Regional Arrangements, Securitization, and Transnational Security Challenges: The African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Compared", *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, Issue. 4, 2008, p. 779.

And, fourth step is de-securitization. It is placing an issue out of emergency mode back "into the ordinary public sphere"[20] of political interaction: contestation, bargaining, negotiations, compromise and agreement.[21] Vuori identified four strands of securitization: a. to raise an issue on the agenda, b. to act as deterrence, c. to legitimize past acts or reproduce existing securitization and d. to acquire more control.[22]

There are a number of studies where the connections between securitization process and ethnic violence were explained. Vayrynen argued that any type of securitization in ethnic issues leads towards ethnic conflict.[23] He explained that securitization weakens social cosmos and escalates conflict in the society. Pia and Diez explained that the violation of human rights by securitization leads towards ethnic conflicts.[24] Fearon and Laitin argue that the social construction of ethnic identity in two ways can lead towards violence.[25] Firstly, the elites construct an antagonistic identity to maintain and increase their power and categorize people based on ethnic identity. Secondly, supra-individualistic discourse motivates some ethnic groups to use violence against other people. The Serbian ethnic violence was one of the brutal ethnic problems in the post-Cold War world. Roren used a framework of sociological securitization and identified different phases of securitization under Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia to marginalize Bosniaks and argued that continuous securitization process led to the ethnic violence.[26] Roychoudhury studied the securitization of Punjab crisis in India and concluded that the securitization of Punjab crisis was a consequence of missed political opportunities to settle genuine political, social, economic and cultural grievances of Sikhs. He argued that in the name of securitization "The assault on cultural and religious symbol of the Sikh community, excesses of political actions, and human rights abuses triggered a tangible communal

[20] Lene Hansen, "Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The Normative Political in Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply it", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2012, p. 531.

[21] Sabine Hirschauer, op cit., p. 40.

[22] Juha A. Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-democratic Political Orders", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2008, pp. 65-99.

[23] Tarja Vayrynen, "Securitised Ethnic Identities and Communal Conflicts", *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1997, available at https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1186&context=pcs, accessed on 22 March 2020.

[24] Emily Pia and Thomas Diez, "Conflict and Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework", *SHUR Working Paper No. 1/07*, University of Birmingham, January 2007.

[25] James D. Fearon and David D Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity", *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2000, pp. 845-877; James D. Fearon and David D Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil", *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003, pp. 75-90.

[26] Pål Roren, "The Securitization of Ethnicity in Serbia (1987-1991)", *E-International Relations*, 12 October 2013, available at https://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/12/the-securitisation-of-ethnicity-in-serbia-1987-1991/, accessed on 12 April 2020.

backlash"[27]. Tredaniel and Lee explained how Chinese security actors focused on the security threats and legitimized emergency measures in Xinjiang while dealing with the terrorist activities in the region.[28] Howe studied societal securitization in Myanmar and identified that the Movement 969 and the Ma Ba Tha contributed in the marginalization process of the Rohingya community in Myanmar.[29] Kyaw explained how a process of legal personhood and cultural personhood alienated and discriminated Muslim identity in Myanmar by constitutional amendments and legal provisions.[30] Foxes described the narratives by the security actors in Myanmar for defending Buddhism and Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar.[31]

The aforementioned studies on ethnic violence are based on the top-down approach of securitization process. Adamides used a horizontal and bottom-up securitization process to understand securitization and de-securitization for explaining the ethnic violence in Cyprus.[32] He defines horizontal and bottom-up securitization,

> "... the (horizontal) process essentially 'peer-to-peer securitization'. Bottom-up securitization refers to cases where the audiences either become securitizing actors themselves or they apply so much pressure to the 'mainstream' actors that the latter are 'forced' to develop or perpetuate securitizing acts even in cases where they do not necessarily feel strongly about it. The impact of the bottom-up pressure depends on how powerful the horizontal processes are, therefore making the two forms of securitization intertwined."[33]

In the process of horizontal securitization, all the peers may not enjoy equal power in a system. Some of them may be in lower power structure, but bear some social capital and capable of influencing state authority to accommodate their views. In the bottom-up securitization, security actors may be the part of the audience, but they enjoy one kind of autonomy to influence the power structure of the system.

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[27] Sreya Maitra Roychoudhury, "State Securitization and Internal Ethnic Conflict in India: Re-examining the Punjab Crisis", *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2014, p. 168.
[28] Marie Tredaniel and Pak K. Lee, "Explaining the Chinese Framing of the "Terrorist" Violence in Xinjiang: Insights from Securitization Theory", *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 46, Issue 1, 2018, pp. 177-195.
[29] Adam E. Howe, "Discourses of Exclusion: The Societal Securitization of Burma's Rohingya (2012-2018)", *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2018, pp. 1-22.
[30] Nyi Nyi Kyaw, "Alienation, Discrimination, and Securitization: Legal Personhood and Cultural Personhood of Muslims in Myanmar", *The Review of Faith and International Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2015, pp. 50-59.
[31] Niklas Foxeus, "The Buddha was a Devoted Nationalist: Buddhist Nationalism, Ressentiment, and Defending Buddhism in Myanmar", *Religion*, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2019, pp. 661-690.
[32] Constantinos Adamides, *Securitization and Desecuritization in Protracted Conflicts: The Case of Cyprus*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.
[33] Ibid., p. x.

Nevertheless, the horizontal and bottom-up securitization may happen concurrently and the political authority feel compulsion to communicate with the peers or audience cum actors in the process of adopting emergency measures.

This paper argues that the contemporary securitization of ethnic minorities in Myanmar can be analyzed by using horizontal and bottom-up securitization process because the emergence of radical Buddhist groups and their alliance with the military have made them an influential actor in the securitization of ethnic minorities. Since the monks have historic influence in the political space of Myanmar, the contemporary military regimes are very keen to obtain legitimacy from the Buddhist monks. On the one hand, military suppressed traditional monks and on the other hand, military developed a strong nexus with the radical monks. This horizontal and bottom-up securitization has unscrupulous consequences in the political and social arena, which are discussed in the next sections.

3.   Alliance between the Military and Monks

Throughout the history, Buddhism played a pivotal role in the formation of cultural and social institutions of Burma.[34] A western historian termed Buddhism as *The Soul of a People*[35] of Burma. Though there is no archaeological evidence, the oral traditions of Burma speak that Buddha visited the country for four times[36] and prophesized that Burma would be built as a Buddhist city within 2,400 years[37], after the foundation of Buddhist religion. This belief inspired the psyche of the monks and they still consider it as a religious responsibility to pursue and protect Buddhism in Myanmar. Therefore, in the political history of Myanmar, there was a symbiotic relation between the state power and religious monks of the country. In the pre-colonial era, kings confirmed their legitimacy by promoting and defending Buddhism in their kingdom.[38] Mikael Gravers defined the relations between Buddhism and political power of Burma as cosmological one.[39] The monastic order (Sangha) could not survive without the protection and gift of the political power. On the other hand, political authority could not retain power without the consent of religious monks.

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[34] The English name of Myanmar was changed from "Burma" to "Myanmar" in 1989. It was claimed by the government that the name "Myanmar" represented a time when the country was ruled by itself, rather than being under foreign colonial rule.

[35] H. Fielding Hall, *The Soul of a People*, London: MacMillan, 1889.

[36] "Collected Wheel Publications", Vol. XXVI, Numbers 394 to 411, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 2014, p. 119.

[37] Donald M. Seekins, *Historical Dictionary of Burma (*Myanmar), Toronto: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 2006, p. 280.

[38] Mikael Gravers, *Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma*, London: Curzon Press, 1999, p. 15 and Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 23.

[39] Ibid.

The monarchs of the country could use 'violence' for the protection of the country, where the consent of the monks was necessary. But, when the royals violated the principle of "Ahimsa", the monks delegitimized the political authority.

The British occupation was a shock for Burma's society and politics. The colonial state withdrew the donations for monasteries and disrupted the local economy which was an important source of income for Pagodas. Following the British conquest of upper Burma and the removal of King Thibaw from his palace in Mandalay in 1885, Buddhist monks dressed in their yellow and crimson robes led bands of armed rebels against the colonial power. As Donald Eugene Smith wrote in his study *Religion and Politics in Burma*: "In the anti-colonial struggle, the pongyis (monks) were the first nationalists"[40]. In fact, the monks led all kinds of resistance against British rule throughout the colonial period of Burma from 1852 to 1948. The first organized movement against British rule in Burma was started by the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) in 1898. The organization's core values were to protect Burma from the expansion of Christianity and safeguarding the purity of the society of Burma. For more than hundred years of British rule, the monasteries were the most organized force to protest and the monks never compromised with colonialism. Therefore, the monks enjoy a sacred place in the memoirs of Burmese people.

During the independent movement of Myanmar, General Aung San emerged as a unanimous leader of the country. All kinds of political forces rallied behind him to achieve the independence of the country. The religious forces, societal organizations, ethnic minorities, military and secularist forces altogether accepted the leadership of Aung San as the president of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) in 1946 with the stated purpose of achieving complete Burmese independence. However, General Aung San envisioned a united Burma, where all ethnic groups would enjoy equal rights. He wanted to accommodate all religious and ethnic minorities under the umbrella of secular nationalism. Therefore, he signed the Panglong Agreement in 1947 with major ethnic groups and drafted a secular constitution.[41] But his secular nationalism raised concern among the Buddhist nationalists. The monks were dreaming of a country where Buddhism will be promoted and protected. Though Aung San did not promulgate any extreme secularist principles, the monks feared that secularist agenda might undermine the supremacy of Buddhism. The assassination of General Aung San changed the trajectory of the country. The spirit of the Panglong Agreement was diminished and the government of U Nu declared a special position for Buddhism in the country. In the beginning, the monks were very much enthusiastic about the policies of U Nu,

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[40] Donald Eugene Smith, op. cit., p. 85.
[41] The ethnic leaders who signed the treaty were from Kachin, Chin and Shan.

but later when he could not take effective action to protect Buddhist supremacy, his popularity declined. In this stage of history, General Ne Win occupied the power of the country in 1962 and the long rule of military started in Myanmar.

General Ne Win's military coup was celebrated by many extremist Buddhists considering that his strong leadership would help to unite the country. He declared his political ideology, "The Burmese Way to Socialism"[42] in 1962, followed by "The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment"[43] in 1963. Both documents were based at least in part on a Buddhist interpretation.[44] Ne Win's policies to make Burma a unitary state was supported by many monks. Some of the scholars argue that Ne Win's military coup was considered by many monks as "resurrection", instead of a "revolution".[45] Because the monks identified Ne Win's government as a beginning of a strong leadership as it were during the 'kinghood' in the pre-colonial Burma. General Ne Win received a kingly image from many monks and monks were expecting that Ne Win's government would patronize Buddhism to flourish. Ne Win's declaration for Bamar supremacy and policies to uphold a linguistic nationality were praised by the Buddhist nationalists.[46] Many monks considered it as a model of the kingdom of pre-colonial Burma. But, when Ne Win failed to fulfil the expectations of the monks and tilted towards socialism, they started criticising Ne Win's rule. The government appeared eager to distance itself from Buddhism by declaring that the state was no longer the patron of the faith, eliminating religious holidays, lifting restrictions on animal slaughtering and halting the proselytizing of non-Buddhist minorities. Such policies of Ne Win weakened the relations between the military and the monks.[47]

Anthropologist Gustaaf Houtman worked on Burmese Buddhist politics under military rule and developed a framework to understand the relations between the military and the monks in the country.[48] He argued that a clash between the two distinctive manifestations of power is associated with two groups, *Ana* and *Azwa*. *Ana* is the idea of order, command, or authority, most commonly associated with

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[42] Fred R, von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way to Socialism", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1963, pp. 129–135.
[43] "The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment", The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), The Union of Burma, 17 January 1963, https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/docs/System-of-correlation.htm, accessed on 27 March 2020.
[44] Bruce Matthews, "Buddhism under A Military Regime: The Iron Heel in Burma", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1993, pp. 408-423.
[45] Michael Aung-Thwin, "The British 'Pacification' of Burma: Order without Meaning*", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1985, p. 256.
[46] Robert H. Taylor, *The State of Burma*, Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1987, p. 366.
[47] Bruce Matthews, op. cit., p. 414.
[48] Gustaaf Houtman, *Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy*, Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999.

the top-down disciplining power of the military. *Azwa* is more associated with self-purification through moral practice. The two are not complete opposites, as they are ideally combined in a model of righteous and ethical rule, but, as Houtman notes, the story of political authority throughout Burmese history is primarily *ana*-based, centralizing power and *azwa*-based moral opposition. The idea of *ana* is that it is limited by boundaries and frameworks–a domain and some kind of lifespan such as a period of government; *azwa*, however, is so fluid that it transcends the trickles through all boundaries of time and place. By using this framework, the evolutions of relations between and among the political forces of Myanmar under the military regimes can be explained in a better way.

Since the 1962 military coup, at least five political and social forces have been dominating the political space of Myanmar. The conflicts and alliances among these forces were determinants of the government's political decisions towards ethnic minorities. The first and most powerful political force in Myanmar is military, known as Tatmadaw. General Ne Win established military as almost unchallenged political force in the country. In the last six decades, military shaped the political order of the country in a way that no other political and social forces can compete with military. In fact, military and the state of Myanmar emerged almost synonymous to each other.[49] General Ne Win's coup of 1962 started a unitary system of government and denied any autonomous power to the ethnic communities. Ne Win's linguistic nationalism and "four cut" policy suppressed the existence of other forces.[50] He singlehandedly ruled the country till 1988 and emerged as a unique personality in the political space of Myanmar.[51] Though he left the power, but his legacies continued to strengthen military's stronghold in the politics of Myanmar.[52] After Ne Win, General Saw Maung took the control of power and established the State, Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). General Saw Maung promised for change and declared for reconciliation with ethnic groups.[53] But, the categorization of ethnic minorities instigated conflict among the ethnic communities of the country. In 1992, General Than Shew came to power and due to domestic resistance and international pressure, he took different initiatives to reform the power structure of the country and introduced a new constitution in 2008.[54] His policies were appreciated as a transition

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[49] Yoshihiro Nakanishi, *Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution: The State and Military in Burma, 1962–88*, Singapore and Kyoto: NUS Press in association with Kyoto University Press, 2013.
[50] The "four cut" policy was to cut off insurgents from food, fund, intelligence and recruits.
[51] Robert H. Taylor, op. cit., p. 367.
[52] Roger Lee Huang, "Re-thinking Myanmar's Political Regime: Military Rule in Myanmar and Implications for Current Reforms", *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 19, Issue 3, 2013 and Uta Gartner, "Legacies of Military Rule in Myanmar", *International Quarterly for Asian Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 3-4, 2017.
[53] Josef Silverstein, "Burma in an International Perspective", *Asian Survey,* Vol. 32, No. 10, 1992, pp. 951-963.
[54] Priscilla Clapp, "Burma's Long Road to Democracy", *Special Report No. 193*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, November 2007.

towards democracy, though military reserved 25 per cent of parliamentary seats for them. In the present system, no constitutional change is possible without the consent of military. To make any amendment in the constitution, the consent of 75 per cent of parliamentarians is necessary, which is not possible without the votes of military representatives in the parliament. Military dominates most of the political affairs of Myanmar. Military is still exerting strong influence on the incumbent elected government of Myanmar, particularly on the issues of national integrity and ethnic policies.[55]

The second influential political force in Myanmar is the National League for Democracy (NLD), the largest political party in the country under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, the incumbent State Counsellor of Myanmar. The party was established after the mass uprising against military in 1988. The uprising was mainly started by the students, but later the monks and all other social forces joined the protest. During the movement, Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as an iconic leader and the NLD was formed under her leadership. The party was mainly led by retired military officers who were demanding for democracy in the country.[56] Due to political pressure, the government declared a nationwide election in 1990, where the NLD won 392 out of 485 seats in the parliament. Military dismissed the results of the election and arrested most of the leaders of the NLD. It gave the NLD a unique acceptance among the people of the country and the party mobilized whole country to protest for democracy against military rule. The movements of the NLD forced the military regime to declare a roadmap for democracy in 2003 and accordingly military approved a constitution in 2008. Though the NLD was critical about the 2008 constitution of the country, it participated in the 2015 election under the constitution and won majority seats in the parliament. Since Aung San Suu Kyi married a foreign citizen, she could not be the president of the country according to the 2008 constitution adopted by the military.[57] Therefore, a new position naming State Counsellor was created and Suu Kyi became the executive head of the country in 2015. But, military enjoys enormous power to intervene in the government policies. On the other hand, Suu Kyi's failure to resolve the ethnic issues and her silence about the military's suppression on the Rohingya community raised a lot of questions about her iconic image in the country and abroad.

The third major force who has been dominating social and political space of Myanmar is the traditional religious monks of the country. As mentioned earlier, the monks were influential in Myanmar since pre-colonial era. General Aung San and U

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[55] "Myanmar", *BTI 2018 Country Report*, Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018.

[56] Mary P. Callahan, "Union o Myanmar", in Neil Schlager and Jayne Weisblatt (eds.), *World Encyclopaedia of Political System and Political Parties*, New York: Fact on Files Inc., Fourth Edition, 2006, p. 931.

[57] Article-59, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008.

Nu, both of them maintained a good relation with monks, though their policies were not always appreciated by the monks. Later, when Ne Win made military coup, the monks were expecting that he would patronise Buddhism. Nonetheless, Ne Win's socialist policies have created distance between the military and the monks.[58] On one hand, Ne Win was not fulfilling the demands of the monks to promote Buddhism. On the other hand, his suppressive policies were against the principles of Buddhist teachings. Therefore, the monks actively participated in the resistance of 1988 against military rule and later became closer to the NLD. The 2007 Saffron revolution was one of the major protests against military rule in Myanmar led by the monks.[59] After the Saffron revolution, military's crackdown against monks weakened the traditional Buddhist values in society. In fact, military took control over religion and politics of the country.[60] In contemporary times, the voice of traditional monks is almost silenced, particularly on the political issues.

The fourth force which has emerged in recent years is the radical Buddhist groups. Since British occupation of Myanmar, the resistance from the monks was common. Though all the monks were against British occupation, some of them were also focusing on the migrated Indians in Burma. They were claiming that the British rulers were patronising Indians.[61] The famous 1930 riots against Indians and 1938 riots against Muslims helped to organize anti-Muslim movements in Myanmar.[62] In 1997, a riot was held under the leadership of a group of monks. The government arrested at least 100 monks for this riot.[63] In 2001, Ashin Wirathu and his follower monks started preaching against Muslims, identifying them as a threat to the Burmese state, society and religion.[64] After 2007 Saffron revolution led by the traditional monks, military found these radical groups as an instrument to use against traditional monks. Military developed a relation with these groups and remained silent on the activities of the Movement 969, who were preaching hate speeches against Muslims.[65] Though the Ma Ba Tha did not take any side in 2015 election, the military and the NLD both tried to receive sympathy from these groups. They are the most powerful organized Buddhist movement nowadays, where traditionalists are suppressed and marginalized by the military.

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[58] Bruce Matthews, op. cit. p. 414.
[59] Benedict Rogers, "The Saffron Revolution: The Role of Religion in Burma's Movement for Peace and Democracy", *Totalitarian Movement and Political Religions*, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2008, pp. 115-118.
[60] Ashley South, *Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict*, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 139.
[61] Renaud Egreteau, "Burmese Indians in Contemporary Burma: Heritage, Influence and Perceptions since 1988", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 33-54.
[62] Ashley South, op. cit. p. 27.
[63] David Lea and Colette Milward (eds.), *A Political Chronology of South East Asia and Oceania*, London: Europa Publication, 2001, p. 122.
[64] Niklas Foxeus, op. cit.
[65] Andrew R. C. Marshall, "Special Report: Myanmar Gives Official Blessing to Anti-Muslim Monks", *Reuters*, 27 June 2013.

The fifth group is the ethnic armed groups (EAGs). Since 1962, they are fighting against military for their self-determination. Almost all of them have been supporting Aung San Suu Kyi, desiring that she would help them to ensure their self-determination after her arrival to power. They are now in negotiation with the government in a process known as 21st Century Panglong. But, the negotiation is facing obstacles due to longstanding mistrust between the military and the resurgent groups.

Ne Win government's relations became antagonistic with monks and ethnic minorities due to his policies towards religion and minorities. Though some of the policies of Ne Win were similar to the demands of monks, Ne Win government followed an *Ana* structure, which was contradictory with the *Azwa* structure of monks. After 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi adopted Buddhist values in her democratic movement and talked about "moral democracy" in addition to "right based democracy".[66] She received support from traditional monks. After Saffron revolution of 2007, military aligned with radical monks to gain legitimacy. Before 2015 elections, military passed at least four famous laws to appease radical monks.[67] Aung San Suu Ki remained silent about the radical monks fearing to lose support of religious people.[68] But after arrival to power, her traditional iconic position seems to be weakening due to her compromise with the military and the radical monks.[69] On the other hand, ethnic minorities are losing their confidence in her. The "Sangha Council" of the traditionalist monks seems to weaken and some of them are compromising with military for their survival.[70]

Though the radical monks never declared their allegiance to the military or to the NLD, but there is an undeclared alliance between the military and the radical monks on the issues of minorities, particularly regarding military's operations against the Rohingya community. The radical monks are silently providing legitimacy to the military operations against the Rohingya community and the military is also not taking any action against the "hate mongering" speeches of the radical monks.[71] Aung San Suu Kyi is silent about radical monks fearing that her voice for the rights of minorities may reduce support for her among the Buddhist people. It is evident that at least in last one decade, the military and the radical monks reached

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[66] Michal Lubina, *The Moral Democracy: The Political Thought of Aung San Suu Kyi*, Warsaw: Scholar Publishing House, 2019.
[67] The Population Control Law (May 2015), The Women's Special Marriage Law (August 2015), The Religious Conversion Law (August 2015) and The Monogamy Law (August 2015).
[68] Sara Perria, "Why is Aung San Suu Kyi silent on the plight of the Rohingya people?", *The Guardian*, 19 May 2015.
[69] Zoltan Barany, "Burma: Suu Kyi's Missteps", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 29, Issue. 1, 2018, p. 5.
[70] Bertil Lintner, *The Resistance of the Monks: Buddhism and Activism in Burma*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009.
[71] Htet Naing Zaw, "Ma Ba Tha is a Necessity: Military", *The Irrawaddy*, 19 June 2019.

in an informal alliance. Therefore, monks are supporting military's policy towards minorities in the name of security.[72] Any voice from the NLD that is critical to this alliance may weaken political position of the party.[73] However, the alliance between the military and the monks nowadays dominates Myanmar's policy towards the Rohingya minorities.

4.   The Securitization of Ethnic Minorities

The tension between Bamar people and other ethnic communities is rooted in the colonial history of Myanmar. As part of "divide and rule" policy, the colonial rulers instigated conflict among different communities.[74] Moreover, local communities also did not like the presence of migrants from India who were taking jobs in different sectors of Myanmar.[75] The colonial rule weakened social fabric of the country.[76] Nevertheless, when General Aung San emerged as a unanimous leader of the country and started national independence movement, he desired a united Myanmar and reached in the Panglong Agreement in 1947, where he agreed to ensure equal rights for all the ethnic minorities. After the assassination of General Aung San, U Nu became the prime minister and declared Buddhist supremacy in the country. But constitutionally he tried to secure equal rights for all the ethnic communities and took initiatives to resolve tensions with ethnic minorities. During his tenure, there were representations from the Rohingya community in the parliament as well as in the cabinet.[77] In 1961, he introduced Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA) in the Southern Rohingya region where most of the Rohingyas live. It created opportunities for the Rohingya community to participate in the government activities.[78]

The securitization of ethnic identity started under the Ne Win government, when he took initiatives to marginalize ethnic communities including the Rohingya people. After military coup of 1962, he declared Bamar supremacy and started nationalization process, where the properties of many immigrants were taken under the state ownership. A number of people whose forefathers migrated from India were

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[72] P. K. BalaChandran, "Why Action against Myanmar's Radical Monk is Unlikely", *Daily Express*, 31 May 2019, available at http://southasiajournal.net/why-action-against-myanmars-radical-monk-is-unlikely/, accessed on 28 May 2020.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Subhasish Ray, "Beyond Divide and Rule: Explaining the Link between British Colonialism and Ethnic Violence", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 24, Issue 4, 2018, pp. 367-388.

[75] James Warren, "The Rangoon Jail Riot of 1930 and the Prison Administration of British Burma", *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 10, Issue 1, 2002, pp. 5-29.

[76] Mary Patricia Callahan, *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 23.

[77] Maung Maung, *Burma's Constitution*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, p. 316.

[78] Moshe Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand and Western Burma/Myanmar*, New York: Lexington Books, 2002, p. 51.

compelled to leave Myanmar.[79] General Ne Win wanted to achieve multi-faceted objectives by securitizing ethnic minorities. When Ne Win observed that many ethnic groups were resisting about his policies, he became concerned about the integrity of the country.[80] Therefore, he declared a linguistic nationalism in the country and stopped teaching of other languages.[81] He thought that such processes would prevent disintegration of the country. While Panglong agreement of 1947 was based on a federal system of government, Ne Win government found that such federal structure was weakening the integrity of the state.[82] Therefore, he introduced unitary system of governance and took draconian initiatives to suppress the resurgent groups who were fighting against integrity of the state. Another objective of the securitization process was to establish dominance of the military in the power structure of the country.[83] Since his views were tilted towards socialist policies, he took policies to wipe out alternative opinions from the society. He declared the supremacy of Bamar people and adopted policies to eradicate who were against him.

Ne Win's strong policies against minorities were supported by the monks because they found that his policies could secure and strengthen the dominance of Bamar people. In last six decades, a continuous process of securitization has been continued where Rohingyas were one of the major victims of the process. Though initially military took the initiative to securitize Rohingyas, after 2001, radical Buddhist groups also contributed in the securitization process. The securitization process in Myanmar was held in two ways. First, by the "speech act", where the security actors raised concern about different referent objects and second, by adopting emergency security measures by which the government initiated to marginalize or eliminate ethnic communities. There were multiple referent objects in the securitization process: national, societal and economic security.

The narratives of securitization of the Rohingya minorities occurred in two ways. Firstly, some securitization narratives were developed, where Rohingyas were identified as threat to national security. Secondly, some of the narratives were promulgated locally to identify Rohingyas as a security threat for the local Buddhists in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. However, during the Japanese invasion in Burma in 1942, most of the Rohingya people were in favour of British army.[84]

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[79] Renaud Egreteau, op. cit.
[80] Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, *Beyond Armed Resistance: Ethnonational Politics in Burma (Myanmar)*, Honolulu: East-West Center, 2011.
[81] Paul Keenan, *By Force of Arms: Armed Ethnic Groups in Myanmar*, New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt. Ltd., 2008, p. 13.
[82] Nehginpao Kipgen, "The Quest for Federalism in Myanmar", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 42, No. 6, 2018, p. 615.
[83] Nicholas Farrelly, "Discipline without Democracy: Military Dominance in Post-Colonial Burma", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3, 2013, pp. 312-326.
[84] Harrison Akins, "The Two Faces of Democratisation in Myanmar: A Case Study of the Rohingya and Burmese Nationalism", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 38, Issue. 2, 2018.

Before independence, some of the Rohingya leaders communicated with the Muslim leaders of India to include Arakan[85] as part of Pakistan.[86] Moreover, after independence a radical Mujahedeen group of Arakan demanded a separate state for them.[87] Therefore, there is a narrative that Rohingyas are "others" in Myanmar society.[88] Ne Win identified them as a threat to national security. Ne Win's narratives were supported by many local people and legitimized him to take tough measures against the Rohingya people. Due to military's marginalization policies, a number of radical and terrorist groups have been trying to legitimize their clandestine activities against the state of Myanmar. On the other hand, the formation of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and their coalition with the northern alliance[89] helped radical Buddhists to narrate that all Rohingyas are terrorists.[90] After 9/11, when global initiatives intensified against terrorist groups, the military and the monks found it as an opportunity to legitimize their position that Muslims are perpetrating terrorism in Myanmar.[91] In this background, a fear of segregation of the Rohingya region emerged in Myanmar that if "Bengalis" remain in Myanmar, the integrity of the country will be threatened.[92] Ne Win government's securitization process continued for six decades and contemporary radical Buddhists intensified this process by projecting Rohingyas as national security threat to Myanmar.

In the societal level, some of the security threats originated from the colonial history of Myanmar. When the British expanded their colony in Myanmar, Christian missionaries found it an opportunity to preach Christianity in the country.[93] On the other hand, before British rule, the monasteries received funds from the monarchs.[94]

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[85] The previous name of Rakhine.

[86] T. Gibson, H. James and L. Falvey, *Rohingyas: Insecurity and Citizenship in Myanmar*, Songkhla: Thaksin University Press, 2016, p. 67.

[87] Brahma Chellaney, "Myanmar's Jihadi Curse", available at https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rohingya-crisis-myanmar-jihadism-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-09?barrier=accesspaylog, accessed on 27 February 2020.

[88] The 'otherisation' process is illustrated in the fact that the official documents refer to them as "Bengalis" or 'Bengali migrants', thus not son of the soil. Such kind of narrative that is rooted in the concept of otherness, makes securitization easy and acceptable to the locals.

[89] It is a coalition of four ethnic insurgent groups: the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).

[90] Thomas M. Sanderson and Maxwell B. Markusen, "Myanmar and Its Rohingya Muslim Insurgency", Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/myanmar-and-its-rohingya-muslim-insurgency, accessed on 10 March 2020.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Shafiur Rahman, "Myanmar's 'Rohingya' vs 'Bengali' Hate Speech Debate", *The Diplomat*, 21 December 2019.

[93] Benedict Rogers, "The Contribution of Christianity to Myanmar's Social and Political Development", *The Review of Faith and International Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2015, pp. 60-70.

[94] Penny Edwards, "Grounds for Protest: Placing Shwedagon Pagoda in Colonial and Post-Colonial History", *Postcolonial Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2006, pp. 197-211.

When the British government withdrawal fund for monasteries, it came as a shock for the Burmese monks.[95] Therefore, in the societal level, there was a sense of an insecurity about the foreigners and other religions in Myanmar. They feared that the expansion of other religion would be a threat to Buddhism. There were religious riots against Muslims in 1938. When General Ne Win was taking draconian actions against Rohingyas, the radical monks and Burmese society remained almost silent on the issue. The Muslims, particularly Rohingyas were the major victim of any kinds of military operations or religious riots in Myanmar. Such operations received one kind of rationale because the securitization narratives established Rohingyas as a threat to the society of Myanmar. The radical monks in Myanmar developed a narrative that the expansion of Muslim population is a threat to the security of Buddhism. Particularly, Ashin Wirathu claims that the countries of Southeast Asia like Indonesia and Malaysia, were Buddhist dominated country, but the expansion of Islam marginalized Buddhism.[96] In this respect, they narrate that Muslims are threat to Buddhism and an unscrupulous expansion of Muslim population will wipe out Buddhism from Myanmar.[97] In Myanmar, a large number of male population go to the monasteries as monks. Therefore, there is a surplus of girls in the society who are not able to manage husbands for them.[98] The Buddhists are claiming that Muslims are using it as an opportunity to convert Buddhist girls to Islam. Monks claim that these trends are threatening the demographic stability in Myanmar and radical monks argue that Muslims have a mission to increase their population in the country. Therefore, new laws are adopted to regulate marriage system in Myanmar.[99] Moreover, the radical monks also view that Muslims are not respecting local culture and are a threat to local values.[100] According to Buddhist radicals' narrative, Rohingya are "Bengalis" which was earlier propagated by the military rulers. Buddhists narrate that "Rohingya" identity is a political construct of various separatist movements led by Muslims.[101] At first, they targeted Indians especially those who entered Myanmar during British rule, later they included all the Rohingyas including those who were living in Myanmar before British rule. Now all Muslims are considered as security threat for Myanmar, including

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[95] Ibid.

[96] Niklas Foxeus, op. cit.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Carlos Sardina Galache, *The Burmese Labyrinth: A History of the Rohingya Tragedy*, London: Verso, 2020.

[99] Melissa Crouch, "Constructing Religion by Law in Myanmar", *The Review of Faith and International Affairs*, Vol. 13, Issue. 4, 2015, p. 1-11 and Melissa Crouch, "Promiscuity, Polygyny, and the Power of Revenge: The Past and Future of Burmese Buddhist Law in Myanmar, *Asian Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 85-104.

[100] Joe Freeman, "Can Anyone Stop Burma's Hard line Buddhist Monks?", *The Atlantic*, 6 September 2017.

[101] A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah, "Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: Seeking Justice for "Stateless"", *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, Vol. 32, Issue 3, 2016, p. 286 and Aye Chan, "The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan (Rakhine) State of Burma (Myanmar)", *SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2005, pp. 396-420.

Kamein.[102] Nowadays, the Burmanization process has become more "Islamphobic" compared to age old "Indophobic" narratives.[103] In the beginning Ne Win targeted all the people who settled in Myanmar from India including Hindus and Muslims, but nowadays the military and monks are targeting mostly Muslim minorities.

The securitization of Muslim minorities in Myanmar is also connected with the economic insecurities of the majority Bamar people. When the British left India, some of the migrants from South Asia were established businessmen in Myanmar.[104] After Ne Win's arrival in power, there were narratives that foreigners are taking control of the economy of Myanmar.[105] Therefore, Ne Win started nationalization process and many Indians whose forefathers migrated to Myanmar were forced to go back to India. Ne Win's securitization process targeting the minorities continued for last six decades. The military rulers used this securitization narrative as an opportunity to establish Bamar supremacy in Myanmar. In Myanmar, there are some Muslim restaurants who use 786 number as signboard to show that they sell "Halal Food".[106] The Buddhists radicals narrate it that the Muslims are developing a separate economic order to control Myanmar.[107] The radical monks vandalised many Muslim restaurants and financial shops identifying them as threat to the security of Myanmar. The radical Buddhists started Movement 969[108] alternative to the Muslim's 786. Radical monks propagated the idea that Muslims are a threat to the economic progress of the Buddhists communities in Myanmar.

On the other hand, due to job scarcity, there is a fear among the Rakhine Buddhist community that Muslims are occupying jobs with less salary which is a cause of unemployment of the Buddhist people in Myanmar. Therefore, they compelled government to adopt new laws to restrict travelling of the Rohingya people in other parts of the country. In addition, it is also argued by some of the scholars that military sponsored draconian operations against Rohingyas in 2017 is connected with the geo-economic interest of the military and multinational companies.[109] Military wants to establish mega industries in Rakhine state, where

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[102] Kamein is a predominantly Muslim ethnic group in Myanmar enlisted among the 135 ethnic groups of the country. Earlier, they were not targeted by the governments or by extremists Buddhists, but nowadays they are also targeted by radicals as like as other Muslims.

[103] Renaud Egreteau, op. cit.

[104] Robert H. Taylor, *The State of Myanmar*, Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2009, p. 275.

[105] Josef Silverstein, "Problems in Burma: Economic, Political and Diplomatic", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1967, p. 118.

[106] International Crisis Group, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, *Asian Report No. 290*, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 05 September 2017.

[107] Jason Szep, "Special Report: Buddhist Monks Incite Muslim Killings in Myanmar", *Reuters*, 08 April 2013.

[108] International Crisis Group, op. cit.

[109] Saskia Sassen, "Is Rohingya Persecution Caused by Business Interests Rather than Religion?", *The Guardian*, 04 January 2017.

foreign multinational companies would invest. Military operations are initiatives to vacant the region for new industrialization. Therefore, the securitization process of Rohingyas is also connected with the military's economic and financial interests.

By securitizing minorities, the government of Myanmar adopted different emergency measures against them. Many of these measures affected all the minorities and some of them are specially developed against the Rohingya community. The spirit of the Panglong agreement of 1947 was that Myanmar would be a multi-racial and multi-religious country. Based on the spirit of the Panglong agreement, the 1948 Citizenship Act defined the principles of citizenship in the country. Though all the inhabitants of Myanmar were not included in the law, the law was more accommodative than the successive laws. However, General Ne Win did not follow the Citizenship Law of 1948 and in 1974 he adopted a new immigration act, where he decided to exclude many people who are not originally from Bamar race. Later, the 1982 Citizenship Law introduced a new nationality system in the country and it categorized citizens of Myanmar in three categories which ultimately restricts the citizenship of Rohingyas.

Before 2015 election, military rulers took initiatives to satisfy radical Buddhists and adopted four major laws to protect Buddhism. These laws imposed restrictions on the people of other religion. The Population Control Law (May 2015) gives the government power to implement population control measures in any areas of the country. However, government applied this law against Rohingyas and ordered Muslim couples that they cannot take more than two kids. The Buddhist Women's Special Marriage Law (August 2015) provides that any marriage of Buddhist woman to a non-Buddhist man requires approval of the authority. The Religious Conversion Law (August 2015) adopted tough provisions for any religious conversion. The Monogamy Law (August 2015) made it a criminal offence to have more than one spouse or to live with an unmarried partner. All such laws mainly targeted Muslim population of the country.

Ne Win's securitization process found a new direction when the military and the radical Buddhists formed an undeclared alliance against Muslims, particularly against the Rohingya community. While Ne Win identified Rohingyas as foreigners, nowadays Rohingyas are considered as a threat to the national, societal and economic security of Myanmar. Earlier security narratives were developed by the military government but nowadays the radical monks also play pivotal role in the process of securitization against the Rohingya community. Moreover, Ne Win's securitization measures were mainly dominated by the military operations and changing citizenship law, but at present, new laws and narratives are developed by the radical monks to target Muslims. The alliance between the military and the radical monks pushed the

NLD and civil society organizations (CSOs) in a silent mode. Therefore, there is no voice within Myanmar who can talk in support of Rohingyas against any kinds of persecution.

5.   The Consequences of Securitization

The securitization of ethnic minorities had remarkable consequences in the socio-political arena of Myanmar. As mentioned earlier, a number of forces dominated political space of Myanmar during the independence movement of the country. The iconic leadership of General Aung San led the country towards a secular state but his assassination changed the trajectory of the country. His successor, U Nu, allowed a special position for Buddhism in Myanmar. At the same time, U Nu's government tried to achieve a peaceful resolution of the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar. U Nu could not succeed because radical Buddhists and ethnic minorities, both were not satisfied with his policies. After U Nu, the military government of Ne Win in 1962 transformed the country from a democratic state to an authoritarian one where Ne Win emerged as the central figure in the political space of Myanmar. At the beginning, the Buddhist nationalists hoped that Ne Win would resurrect pre-British Kingship structure of government and would re-establish the respectable position of monasteries in the society. But his socialist policies distanced him from religious groups. In the last seven decades, the securitization of ethnic minorities, which was started by Ne Win, affected the political, social and economic policies of the country and made significant consequences which have connections with the intensified ethnic violence in Myanmar.

By securitizing ethnic minority issues, military established itself as the sole saviour of the country.[110] Military developed narratives that they are working for the integrity of the country and military actions are unavoidable to secure integrity of Myanmar. Such narratives legitimized military's unscrupulous control in the political space of the country. In the different phases of the political history of Myanmar, military regimes adopted new doctrines to legitimize their position in the political space of the country. The draconian military operations in different parts of the country soured the relations between the military and the ethnic minorities. As a consequence, a number of resurgent and terrorist groups organized in the country and they were threatening the geographical integrity of Myanmar. Military needed to take strong actions against these groups, which ultimately led the country towards violence.

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[110] Mikael Gravers, *Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma: An Essay on the Historical Practice of Power*, Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999, p. 119.

The securitization process diminished multi-cultural fabric of the society. The divide and rule policy of the military government soured the relations between the Bamar people and ethnic minorities. After the fall of Ne Win, the new government started a negotiation process with the ethnic minorities. Later, military took an initiative to enlist ethnic groups and identified 135 ethnic minorities in the country. Though the declared policy of the military was that they would start negotiation with ethnic groups, they have instigated tensions among the ethnic groups for ensuring their stronghold in the political space.[111] Such policies of military helped to develop radical Buddhist groups who spread hate speeches in the society and instigated violence among the ethnic minorities. The dream of a multi-ethnic society has been faded due to divisions among the different ethnic communities. The Rohingya community emerged as the worst victim section of such ethnic violence. The hatred instigated in the society influenced Rakhine Buddhists to enact violence against the Rohingya community in every sphere of life.

The securitization of ethnic minorities by the military and the monks spoiled the political space of the country. Hatred is rooted so deeply in the society of Myanmar that the democratic forces and CSOs become silent against the suppression of Rohingya minorities.[112] The rise of radical Buddhism in Myanmar started a bottom-up securitization process, which helped military to instigate social hatred against Rohingyas. Such factors spoiled the democratic space of the country. In 1990 election, where the NLD received absolute majority, the party nominated Muslim candidates to take part in the election.[113] But, during the 2015 election, the NLD did not allow any Muslim candidate from the party.[114] Moreover, during the 2012 and 2017 violence against Rohingya community, the NLD remained completely silent. When international communities were raising questions about the silence of Aung San Suu Kyi, she continued supporting military's actions fearing that her sympathy for Rohingyas might weaken her relations with the radical Buddhists of Myanmar. Suu Kyi established Annan Commission under the leadership of Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), with the responsibility to find out how the conflicts among the ethnic minorities can be resolved. But when the commission came with recommendations, it seems that Suu Kyi and her government are not interested to implement the recommendations fearing a Buddhist backlash. Moreover, the government suppressed CSOs and human rights bodies and prevented them to talk anything against the military's operation in the Rakhine state.

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[111] David Brenner, "The Tatmadaw's Divide-and Rule Tactics in Myanmar", *The Diplomat*, 17 March 2014.
[112] International Crisis Group, *Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society*, Bangkok/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 6 December 2001.
[113] Azeem Ibrahim, *The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Genocide*, London: Hurst and Company, 2016, p. 41.
[114] Oren Samet, "A Muslim-Free Parliament in Myanmar", *Foreign Policy*, 09 October 2015.

The securitization process affected the human rights standard of Myanmar. In the name of security, military adopted draconian laws in the country. It helped them to avoid the compulsions of maintaining human rights standard. Military's steps against human rights blocked negotiation process with the ethnic minorities and many ethnic groups organized resurgent movements in Myanmar. The political suppression and social oppression diverted many groups to take arms against the state. The government failed to develop any negotiation process to eradicate the tension, rather military adopted strong military measures. Therefore, many resurgent groups are active in different regions of Myanmar. The rule of General Ne Win widened the social division in the country. The successive military regimes continued his legacies and adopted policies which ultimately strengthened military's positions in the power structure of the country.[115]

Though after 1988, military declared for reconciliation, there was no progress in this regard and increased mistrust among the ethnic communities deepened violence in the country.[116] When Aung San Suu Kyi came to power in 2015, she started a negotiation, terming it the 21st Century Panglong process. But the long-standing mistrust between the military and ethnic groups is preventing any progress, rather new alliances of ethnic groups like Northern Alliance are reorganizing. Such developments are threatening the prospects of future reconciliation in the country. In addition to state level, there were subsequent consequences of securitization in the societal level. The long process of securitization by the state helped extremist groups to emerge in the society. Though military regimes were suppressive against Buddhist monks who were raising voice against the military rule in the country, when new radical groups emerged, military developed a nexus with radical groups. On the other hand, the military did not develop any mechanism to make distinction between terrorists and peaceful minorities. Therefore, any military operation goes against all sections of minorities, no matter who is a terrorist and who is not. Such policies are also escalating tension in the society.

Military's polices helped radical Buddhist groups to use violence against Rohingyas in Myanmar. The riot of 2012 was a consequence of the prevailing support of the military towards radical groups. The country entered an era where reconciliation became more difficult. The securitization process increased social hatred in the country. The extremist Buddhists monks considered the Muslims as threat to the society.[117] The "hate speeches" of radical monks weakened Buddhist

[115] Roger Lee Huang, "Re-thinking Myanmar's Political Regime: Military Rule in Myanmar and Implications for Current Reforms", *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 19, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 247-261.

[116] Lee Jones, "Explaining Myanmar's Regime Transition: The Periphery is Central", *Democratization*, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2014, pp. 780-802.

[117] Michael Jerryson and Iselin Frydenlund, "Buddhist, Muslims and the Construction of Difference", in Iselin Frydenlund and Michael Jerryson (eds.), *Buddhist-Muslim Relations in Theravada World*, Singapore: Springer, 2020, p. 275.

values in the society. The society became violent and killing Muslims is sometimes considered as a responsibility for the protection of Bamar race and Buddhist religion.[118] Military tries to earn legitimacy by supporting the radical Buddhist groups. Many traditionalists, who bear Buddhists beliefs that any life should not be killed, are marginalized and suppressed by the military.[119] The military and the radical monks have emerged as a narrator of Buddhism, whose narratives contradict with the traditionalist Buddhist values.

The longstanding military rule and securitization process prevented CSOs to talk in favour of ethnic minorities in Myanmar. During the independent movement of Myanmar, a number of CSOs were very much vocal about the rights of ethnic minorities. In fact, newspapers of that time played influential role in organizing movements against British colonialism. However, things have been changed after the military coup of 1962. The securitization process of ethnic minorities weakened the positions of CSOs and security actors developed a dominant narrative which suppressed democratic and liberal opinions. In recent years, no civil society organization is seen to talk about the rights of Rohingyas. The undemocratic rule for long times weakened the democratic institutions of Myanmar.[120]

The securitization process of minorities is deeply connected with the violence against the Rohingya minorities. The primary securitization narrative by the military was against the immigrants from India, who were influential in the areas of the economy and business of Myanmar. Therefore, Ne Win took measures to nationalize many industries of the country which were owned by migrant people and whose forefathers migrated from India to Myanmar during British rule. Rohingyas were also in this process of marginalization. However, after the emergence of radical Buddhism, they have targeted the Muslim population in Myanmar. Moreover, the restrictions on the movement of the Rohingya people, denial from jobs and isolating them in their localities have marginalized Rohingyas from the mainstream society and they lost their relevance from the social and political life of Myanmar.

The marginalization of Rohingyas trapped them and they fell prey to becoming small arms transporters and drug smugglers. Many Rohingyas were compelled to join illegal business activities for their economic survival.[121] It led them

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[118] Matt Schissler, Matthew J. Walton and Phyu Phyu Thi, "Reconciling Contradictions: Buddhist-Muslim Violence, Narrative Making and Memory in Myanmar", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 47, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 376-395.
[119] Bruce Matthews, op. cit.
[120] Nehginpao Kipgen, "Militarization of Politics in Myanmar and Thailand", *International Studies*, Vol. 53, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 153-172.
[121] International Crisis Group, *A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh*, Asia Report No. 303, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 27 September 2019.

towards financial insecurity. The long securitization process of the ethnic minorities weakened the process of nation building in Myanmar. The securitization narrative developed by the military segregated many ethnic groups from the mainstream politics of the country and they have joined violent and criminal activities, which are threatening the integrity of Myanmar. It helped military to legitimize their stronghold in the power structure of the country but the national integrity of the country has been weakened. The longstanding rivalry between ethnic communities prevented any effective reconciliation process, which ultimately led towards unscrupulous violence. The securitization process weakened multi-cultural structure, marginalized ethnic communities and deepened mistrust. Moreover, the rise of radical Buddhism and their consent to the securitization of ethnic minorities instigated hate speeches and hate crimes in the country. The ongoing ethnic violence in Myanmar is the outcome of the military's longstanding securitization and marginalization process, which is nowadays supported by the radical monks of the country.

6.   Conclusion

In the top-down approach, the political authority's "speech act" needs consent of the audience. As securitization theory suggests that without the consent of the audience, securitization may not be successful. Nevertheless, in horizontal and bottom-up securitization, where some of the audience act as security actor, securitization process becomes comparatively easier and it upholds the legitimacy of the security actors. In case of Myanmar, military's longstanding securitization process found a special legitimacy when radical monks appeared as a security actor. Therefore, it can be argued that horizontal and bottom-up securitization provides special legitimacy for the political authority to adopt emergency measures for securitization. Due to horizontal and bottom-up securitization, societal and political differences become deeper. It escalates social hatred and complicates social relations among the ethnic groups.

In the political history of Myanmar, the religious monks played a role in legitimizing the political authority. A cosmological relation between kings and monks developed social fabric of Myanmar, which was diminished by the colonial rulers. As a result, monks and British rulers had a conflicting relation in the colonial Burma. In fact, the nationalist movements in the country mainly started by the religious monks. General Aung San's emergence as a unanimous leader facilitated the independence movement of the country. But, the relation between monks and the state power in the post-independent Burma was suspicious. The military rule deepened the distance between the military and the monks. The uprising of 1988 and the formation of the NLD forged a strong alliance between traditionalist monks and democratic forces to fight against military rule. On the other hand, the rise of radical monks appeared

as an opportunity for the military. After Saffron revolution, the military suppressed traditional monks and developed an undeclared alliance with radical monks to get legitimacy for their activities. The alliance made notable changes in the political space of Myanmar and strengthened military's position in the society as well as weakened the role of traditionalist monks in the social and political life of Myanmar. Moreover, the democratic forces and CSOs became silent fearing that raising voice against radical monks will weaken their position in the political space.

The securitization narratives developed by the military regimes found a new wave after the alliance between the military and the monks. The ethnic minorities were identified as a threat to the national security and national integrity of the country. In the societal level, the radical monks raised voice that the Muslims, particularly Rohingyas, are threatening the demographic stability of Myanmar and they are not respecting social and cultural values of Myanmar. Such narratives help military government to adopt draconian security measures. The military changed the citizenship law of the country and adopted new laws to marginalize the Rohingya community. Moreover, new restrictions are imposed in the day to day life of Rohingyas. At the same time, before the 2015 election, military approved different laws to fulfil the demands of radical monks. Such laws imposed restrictions on the personal and social lives of minorities. It also legitimized the military to take suppressive actions against the Rohingya community.

The longstanding securitization process and the inclusion of radical narratives against ethnic minorities strengthened the legitimacy of military rulers as champions of Buddhist people. It helped radical monks to entrench their position in the country. The traditionalist monks became irrelevant in the new political set up. The democratic and civil society voices are silenced. The horizontal and bottom-up securitization made any reconciliation more difficult, because the social hatred deepened the divisions, which may not be easy to address through the state policies. The military's alliance with monks facilitated the horizontal and bottom-up securitization process, which helped both to exert more power and to ensure their stronghold in the social and political space of Myanmar.

Finally, it can be argued that the longstanding ethnic conflict in Myanmar is rooted with the supremacy of the Bamar identity and radical Buddhism. The founding fathers of independent Myanmar dreamt a multicultural and multi-ethnic state. However, the failure of secular and liberal forces led the country towards social and political division. The military exploited the scenario and a continuous process of securitization of ethnic identity deepened the division in the society of Myanmar. The rise of radical monks helped military to intensify their securitization process and confirmed their stronghold in the political system of the country. Therefore,

any reconciliation process needs to deal with the deeply rooted social and political divisions of Myanmar. A continuous dialogue and concerted action from all the active forces within and beyond Myanmar can help to re-establish the shattered fabrics of the social and political space of the country.

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BLUE ECONOMY OF BANGLADESH

Abstract

To achieve the vision of being a maritime nation, Bangladesh has to realize its enormous potential in maritime domain since the settlement of maritime boundary delimitation disputes with Myanmar and India. Thus, blue economy is of high priority for Bangladesh. Against this backdrop, the paper aims to identify the priority sectors and major public actors of blue economy of Bangladesh. It also attempts to find out major guidelines for the country's blue economy. With an analytical framework, the paper identifies four priority sectors for Bangladesh's blue economy—exploration and exploitation of resources, advancing/expanding marine activities, protection of resources and technology acquisition. To facilitate the sectors, it analyzes the roles of some specific groups of major public actors for Bangladesh's blue economy. It also provides some possible options for the future of the country's blue economy. These includes making a comprehensive multi-sectoral national blue economy policy, adopting national maritime strategy and legal frameworks, maintaining institutional harmonization, formulating a Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP), survey of sea resources, building marine technological capacity, providing standard maritime education, research and development, allocating adequate public and private funds, attracting foreign investments and maintaining cooperation among littoral states in regional and global platforms through pursuing maritime diplomacy.

Keywords: Blue Economy, Priority Sectors, Public Actors, Blue Resources, Marine Spatial Planning

1.   Introduction

According to Gunter Pauli, the concept of blue economy is evolving yet.[1] In general, blue economy refers to sea, ocean and coastal area based economic activities. It also entails exploitation of marine resources, optimal utilization of

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[1] Gunter A. Pauli, *The Blue Economy 10 Years, 100 Innovations, 100 Million Jobs*, New Mexico: Paradigm Publications, 2010.

oceanic resources and preservation of ocean health.[2] Being a littoral state of the Bay of Bengal (BoB), with a vast coastal area, it is fundamental for Bangladesh to nurture the concept. Realizing the enormous potential of the maritime domain of Bangladesh, the Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman enacted the 'Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974'.[3] It is high time to reexamine the clauses of the act to accomplish the vision of being a maritime nation. Because it will help the country to facilitate one of the targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—"increasing economic benefits…from sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism".[4] The word 'sustainable' has thus entered into the concept of blue economy. There are principles for a blue economy to be sustainable.[5]

Following the settlement of its maritime disputes with India and Myanmar, Bangladesh has stepped up efforts to develop its blue economy to get it transformed from scarcity to abundance through exploitation of its vast oceanic resources.[6] As Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina remarked, "blue economy is a concept which can significantly contribute to the socio-economic development of Bangladesh. The role of marine resources in poverty alleviation, acquiring autarky in food production, protecting environmental balance, facing adverse impacts of climate change and other economic activities is unlimited."[7] Hence, the concept has ushered in a new horizon for the economic development of Bangladesh through utilizing the sea and marine resources.

With expanded maritime zones, for Bangladesh, significance of harnessing oceanic resources under blue economy programme has increased. Thus, efficient exploitation of marine resources and taking optimal benefit from the geographical location are crucial. Consequently, maritime activities, e.g., marine fishing (fisheries and aquaculture), deep-sea mining (sea minerals, oil and natural gas, hydrocarbons, petroleum, rare earth metals, etc.) and surging of sea-borne trade with advanced ports and shipping services need to be broadened. Besides, materializing marine renewable

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[2] Charles S Colgan and Judith Kildow, *Understanding the Ocean Economy within Regional and National Contexts*, California: Centre for the Blue Economy, Monterey Institute of International Studies, March 2013, pp. 11-14; Charles S Colgan, *Measurement of the Ocean and Coastal Economy: Theory and Methods*, California: Centre for the Blue Economy, National Ocean Economics Program, 2004, p. 5.

[3] Abul Kalam, "Maritime Destiny of Bangladesh: Legacies and Prospects", *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2015, p. 293; Mohammad Rubaiyat Rahman, "Blue Economy and Maritime Cooperation in the Bay of Bengal: Role of Bangladesh", *Procedia Engineering*, Vol. 194, 2017, p. 358.

[4] Md. Monjur Hasan, B. M. Sajjad Hossain, Md. Jobaer Alam, K. M. Azam Chowdhury, Ahmad Al Karim and Nuruddin Md. Khaled Chowdhury, "The Prospects of Blue Economy to Promote Bangladesh into a Middle-Income Country", *Open Journal of Marine Science*, Vol. 8, 2018, pp. 357-359.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Md. Khurshed Alam, "Delimitation of Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar by the ITLOS", *The Northern University Journal of Law*, No. 3, 2012, p. 7.

[7] Ibid.

energy, increasing marine biotechnology and promoting coastal urbanization[8] are essential.[9] At the same time, protection of maritime resources (i.e., securing marine organism, evolution of species and interaction between species) from the risk of extinction and secular depletion through formulating national policies and strategies at the national level; arousing debate at the global platform; creating or streamlining legal and regulatory institutions; coastal protection; conservation of marine habitats; regulation of fishing sectors (to protect overfishing, Irregular, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing); regulating adverse effects of expanded tourism activities and regulation of uncontrolled rise of coastal urbanization is crucial. Moreover, governance of resources through surveillance and environmental protection from overexploitation are significant. On the other hand, technology acquisition through regional (engaging with Indian Ocean Rim Association, IORA, etc.) and global cooperation are important. All these substantiate that blue economy is something that is to be monitored by concerned actors.

Against this backdrop, the paper purports to study the following questions: what are the priority sectors of Blue Economy for Bangladesh? Who are the major public actors for nurturing the concept in the country? What are their important roles? What are the major ways that would guide Bangladesh's Blue Economy? The concept of Blue Economy is much wider and inclusive. Thus, the paper limits its scope in addressing the role of the most important public actors of Bangladesh's blue economy.

The research followed a qualitative method. Data has been collected both from primary and secondary sources. This includes literature review for qualitative/textual data, and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with practitioners, academics and analysts. Literature has been collected from a variety of sources, e.g., government and non-government documents, academic journals, books and newspaper articles, clippings and articles sourced from print media. On the other hand, the paper followed semi-structured interview method of KIIs comprised of four phases: constructing topic guide; selecting respondents; arranging interview and setting up of interpretive outlines in realizing relations of actors with predefined theoretical concepts and observations. The paper follows interpretive approach, a method of qualitative data analysis. To analyze the priority sectors and public actors of the blue economy of Bangladesh, thick interpretation approach is adopted.

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[8] Port cum megacities like Chattogram and Khulna as well as 16-20 expanding semi-urban towns are located in the coastal zone. New sites of EPZs and tourism complexes are being planned in the area. Shipbreaking activities in coastal Chattogram are also expanding. Thus, the coastal zone is the preferred site for urbanization and commercialization. See also, Abul Kalam Azad, "Delimitation of Marine Boundaries and Prospect of Blue Economy for Bangladesh: A Critical Overview", *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2014, p. 41.
[9] S.K. Mohanty, Priyadarshi Dash, Aastha Gupta and Pankhuri Gaur, *Prospects of Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean*, New Delhi: Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2015, p. 5.

The paper is divided into six sections, including introduction and conclusion. The second section provides an analytical framework. The third section deals with priority sectors of blue economy of Bangladesh. The fourth section identifies the role of public actors of Bangladesh's blue economy. The fifth section provides some ways to guide the future of the country's blue economy. The sixth section concludes the paper.

2.   Understanding Blue Economy: Priority Sectors and Actors

During the past few years, the term 'Blue Economy' or 'Blue Growth' has surged into common policy discussion all over the world. Despite high-level adoption of the blue economy as a concept and as a goal of policymaking and investment, there is still no widely accepted definition of the term. Blue Economy means the use of the sea and its resources for sustainable economic development. Again, it simply refers to any economic activity in the maritime sector, whether sustainable or not. The concept of blue economy is thus, at an evolving stage and is subject to multiple interpretations owing to the coverage of activities, geographical locations, sectors and actors.

The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) defines blue economy as a marine-based economy which provides social and economic benefits for current and future generations by contributing to food security, poverty eradication, livelihoods, income, employment, health, safety, equity and political stability. Moreover, it restores, protects and maintains the diversity, productivity, resilience, core functions and intrinsic value of marine ecosystems.[10] Similarly, World Bank Group describes the concept as 'comprising the range of economic sectors and related policies that together determine whether the use of oceanic resources is sustainable'. It aims to balance both the economic opportunities and environmental limitations of using the ocean to generate wealth.[11] Similar to the definition of WWF, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) conceptualizes blue economy as balancing economic activity in the ocean in accordance with the long term capacity of ocean ecosystems to support this activity and remaining resilient and healthy.[12]

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[10] World Wide Fund for Nature, *Principles for a Sustainable Blue Economy*, Gland: World Wide Fund for Nature, 2015, p. 4.
[11] Pawan G. Patil, John Virdin, Sylvia Michele Diez, Julian Roberts and Asha Singh, *Toward a Blue Economy: A Promise for Sustainable Growth in the Caribbean*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2016, pp.18-25.
[12] Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *The Blue Economy: Growth, Opportunity, and a Sustainable Ocean Economy*, London: EIU, 2015, p. 7.

A set of literature contextualizes the taxonomy of blue economy sectors[13] and concludes that exploitation of resources and at the same time their protection are the priority sectors of blue economy. Elaborating on the important role of public and private actors, WWF outlines three basic principles for blue economy to be sustainable.[14] Reviewing the existing literature, the paper proceeds with the analytical framework presented in Figure 1 which is comprised of two things: (a) priority sectors of blue economy and (b) its concerned actors.

Figure 1: Analytical Framework

Ocean, conceiving pivotal strategic significance, is of high potential for power politics and geopolitical tension. This is because ocean has the biggest source of offshore hydrocarbon reserves including gas, oil and living resources like fishes, herbs and corals. Hence, exploration and exploitation of resources are

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[13] Gunter A. Pauli, op. cit.; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), op. cit.; Pawan G. Patil et al., op. cit.; Jennifer J. Silver op. cit., "Blue Economy and Competing Discourses in International Oceans Governance", *The Journal of Environment & Development*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, pp. 135-160; Michelle Voyer, Genevieve Quirk, Alistair McIlgorm, Kamal Azmi, Stuart Kaye and Michael McArthur, *The Blue Economy in Australia*, Canberra, Australia: Sea Power Centre, 2017, pp. 37-40.
[14] World Wide Fund for Nature, op. cit.

increasingly being prioritized. As the taxonomy of blue economy sectors is being broadened, maritime activities now range from marine fishing; deep-sea mining; shipping and surging sea-borne trade to mobilizing sustainable coastal urbanization; producing marine renewable energy; flourishing coastal and marine tourism and most importantly, increasing research and innovation. Moreover, increasing marine activity through judicious management helps protect maritime resources from the risk of extinction and secular depletion.

Dispute settlement of maritime area; sovereignty and control over the settled area; problems of IUU fishing; marine pollution; ineffective and lack of marine regulation and non-traditional security menace[15] are some important issues that individual states are rigged with. Therefore, protection of resources through exercising best ocean governance practices is of contemporary demand. It also entails multi-level cooperation on regulation of the coastal marine environment, marine protected areas, maritime safety and security of ports and sea lanes of communication (SLOC).[16] Besides, there is dire need of cooperation in case of technology acquisition, even for the developed nations. For a developing state, enhancing marine biotechnology and producing renewable energy is like a dream in the absence of hi-tech capability. Hence, cooperation at the regional or global (e.g., IORA) level is essential.

A balance is crucial between furthering marine activities and protecting resources. Blue Economy is to respect ecosystem integrity through developing a circular economy. And, sustainable blue economy needs to be governed by public and private processes. These processes need to be inclusive, well-informed, precautionary and adaptive, accountable and transparent, holistic, cross-sectoral and of long-term nature, innovative and proactive.

The actors require to undertake several initiatives. *First,* they must set relevant, measurable and internally consistent goals and targets along with integrated and coherent planning and policies for different socio-economic and ecological areas. *Second,* actors need to monitor and assess performance on the goals and targets. They have to communicate to all concerned in a transparent and accessible way. *Third,* they should establish economic instruments (e.g., taxes, subsidies, fees, etc.) for internalizing benefits, costs and risks as well as frame, implement, enforce and continuously improve international and national laws and agreements. *Fourth,* it requires planning, managing and effectively governing the use of marine space

[15] Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies", *International Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 6, 2017, p. 1293; Sam Bateman, "Maritime Security Governance in the Indian Ocean Region", *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2016, p. 9.

[16] Abul Kalam Azad, "Maritime Security of Bangladesh", in Mufleh R Osmani and Muzaffer Ahmad, *Security in the Twenty First Century: A Bangladesh Perspective*, Dhaka: BIISS, 2003, p. 165.

and resources as well as applying inclusive methods and ecosystem approach. *Fifth,* actors should develop and apply global standards, guidelines and best practices. *Sixth,* they also need to recognize that maritime and land-based economies are interlinked and many of the threats that marine environments face, originate on land. *Seventh,* they must participate during the implementation phase of policies and reach out national, regional, sectoral, organizational and other areas in order to ensure collective stewardship of common marine heritage.

For Bangladesh, blue economy refers to direct and indirect activities in the seas, oceans and coasts which can contribute to sustainable and inclusive economic growth through employment creation, eradication of poverty, ensuring food security and nutrition intake and mitigation and adaptation of climate change. Blue economy conceptualizes oceans and seas as 'Development Spaces' where spatial planning integrates conservation, sustainable use of living resources and mineral wealth extraction, bio-prospecting, sustainable energy production and marine transport.

Blue economy not only requires a balanced approach between conservation and development but also entails fundamental and systemic changes in their policy-regulatory-management-governance frameworks.[17] Based on the analytical framework given in Figure 1, for Bangladesh, blue economy is to be a marine-based economy that includes exploration and exploitation of resources, increasing marine activities as well as acquisition of clean technologies and renewable energy. Stakeholders, particularly public actors are to guide decision-making processes, educational and awareness-raising settings and to mobilize commitments to the vision of a sustainable blue economy and act to turn the vision into reality.

3.   Priority Sectors of Bangladesh's Blue Economy

This section deals with four priority sectors of Bangladesh's blue economy in line with Figure 1: exploration and exploitation of resources, expanding marine activities, protection of resources and technology acquisition.

3.1   *Exploration and Exploitation of Resources*

Marine resources of Bangladesh are blessed with rich coastal and marine resources. It also hosts a wide range of biodiversity, e.g., fishes (about 475 species

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[17] General Economics Division (GED), *Seventh Five Year Plan (FY2016 – 2020): Accelerating Growth, Empowering Citizens*, Dhaka, Bangladesh: Planning Commission, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 2015, pp. 45-46; Lailufar Yasmin and Md. Rezwanul Haque Masud, "Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Bangladesh Cognition", in ASM Ali Ashraf, *Intelligence, National Security and Foreign Policy*, Dhaka: BILIA, 2016, pp. 169-182.

of fish in the coastal areas of Bangladesh); shrimps; molluscs; crabs; mammals; seaweeds; micro or macroalgae; mussel; oyster; other shellfish; sea urchin; sea cucumber; etc.[18] Hilsa accounts for nearly half of total marine catches.[19] Large pelagic fishes, e.g., tuna and other species are yet to be harvested.[20] Marine aquaculture is largely based on tiger shrimp; soft shell crab is also cultured at a limited scale. Untapped microorganisms and other living resources of the BoB are potential sources for marine-based biotechnology. Bangladesh is also blessed with diverse coastal habitats, e.g., mangrove forests, salt marsh and beds. The exact amount of carbon stored by the ecosystems is, however, yet to be traced. Also, no recent information is available on blue carbon sequestration by coastal habitats.

Within the maritime territory of Bangladesh, there might be a number of rich gas reserves which need to be explored in a coordinated manner. The foot of the continental slope in the BoB is at an average distance of 50 nautical miles (nm). It is estimated to be potentially rich in gas.[21] Until now, Bangladesh drilled 26 wells in the offshore locations of the BoB but only two gas reserves were discovered.[22] So far, a total of 26 Trillion Cubic Feet (TCF) gas reserves have been discovered.[23] Among those, Sangu reserves having 0.8 TCF is discovered already depleted. Kutubdia reserves having 0.04 TCF is yet to be developed. Drilling at two other offshore places, viz. Magnama (3.5 TCF) and Hatiya (1.0 TCF) has not yet completed.[24]

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[18] Department of Fisheries, *Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics of Bangladesh 2017-18*, Bangladesh: Ministry of Fisheries, Vol. 35, 2018, p. 129.

[19] Sophie Arnaud-Haond, Jesús M. Arrieta and Carlos M. Duarte, "Marine Biodiversity and Gene Patents", *Science*, Vol. 331, No. 6024, 2011, pp. 1521-1522; and Department of Fisheries, op. cit.

[20] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture*, Rome: FAO, 2014, pp. 34-39.

[21] M. Gulam Hussain, Pierre Failler, A. Al Karim and M. Khurshed Alam Khurshed Alam, "Review on Opportunities, Constraints and Challenges of Blue Economy Development in Bangladesh", *Journal of Fisheries and Life Sciences*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017, pp. 45-57.

[22] Shahiduzzaman Khan, "Intensifying offshore drilling for hydrocarbon", *The Financial Express*, 11 January 2020.

[23] Jack Detsche, "Bangladesh: Asia's New Energy Superpower?", *The Diplomat*, 14 November 2014.

[24] M. Gulam Hussain et al., op. cit.

Map 1: Location of Sangu and Kutubdia in the Bay of Bengal[25]

Bangladesh has the potential to become one of the biggest sources of offshore hydrocarbon reserves. The discovery of the Krishna Godavari and Mahanandi Basins of India with potential reserve of 100 TCF of gas indicates that

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[25] Available at http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=File:GasField.jpg, accessed on 24 April 2020.

the prospect of hydrocarbon reserve in Bangladesh's part is probably high.[26] Besides, potential mineral resources are yet to be explored within the maritime boundaries of the country in the BoB and in the coastal areas. Though no updated survey reports on heavy minerals at the sea bed and beach region in Bangladesh is available, the entire coastal belt has been explored with the discovery of 17 deposits of potentially valuable minerals such as Zircon, Rutile, Ilmenite, Leucoxene, Kyanite, Garnet, Magnetite, Monazite, etc.[27] On the other hand, potential of renewable energy, e.g., wind, wave, solar, tide, hydro etc. in onshore areas and offshore islands of the country is yet to be explored. A wind generator with a capacity of 2 MW is already installed in the coastal area of Kutubdia Island, but it still remains inactive.[28] Besides, salt reserves in the onshore areas and offshore islands are important resources that are yet to be explored at a large scale.

3.2   *Furthering Marine Activities*

Marine activities have two aspects: expanding resources through exploration or exploitation activities and increasing maritime-related services.

Coming out of the traditional fishing practices and exploiting potentials beyond existing fishing grounds, harvesting large pelagic fishes from deeper zones within 200 nm of EEZ and up to the deep seas are the essence of furthering resource exploration and exploitation. Conducting a thorough survey to accomplish stock assessment of marine resources is thus crucial. For marine aquaculture, two broad initiatives at the coastal areas are to be taken: (a) hatchery-based quality seed production and mariculture of important marine species, viz. sea bass, grouper, marine eel, pomfret, mullets, etc.; and (b) intensifying soft shell crab farming by using hatchery produced seeds. Specific initiatives include intensification of tiger shrimp farming, seabass, pomfret and grey mullet breeding and farming of saline tolerant tilapia or genetically improved farm tilapia (GIFT)/molobicus strain farming. For non-traditional marine living species, it is crucial to identify suitable species and develop commercial cultural techniques. Also vital is to develop marine pearl culture at suitable inshore and coastal locations of Bangladesh and use nuclei placement at mental/gonad tissue of pearly mussels. Moreover, development and implementation of open water Integrated Multi Trophic Aquaculture (IMTA) in coastal areas to grow different finfish and shellfish with seaweeds in an integrated farm is important. Enhancing marine biotechnological tools for developing pharmaceutical drugs/

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[26] Jack Detsche, op. cit.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh, "Blue Economy-Development of Sea Resources for Bangladesh", available at https://mofa.gov.bd/site/page/8c5b2a3f-9873-4f27-8761-2737db83c2ec/OCEAN/nolink/Recent-Events, accessed on 13 March 2019.

chemicals and other products are necessary. Conducting a thorough survey for recording the estimates of carbon sequestration in vegetated estuaries and coastal habitat is essential. Also important is sequestering and storing carbon at mangroves, salt marsh and seagrass ecosystems.

To harness and identify more oil and gas reserves, it is essential to establish a logical plan conduct surveys with the present boundary in the BoB; appoint qualified international companies to accelerate offshore exploration and drilling activities to ensure future energy security. Besides, exploiting the potential deposits of marine minerals through deep sea mining is to be done. In case of marine renewable energy, speeding up implementation of already taken initiatives, technology transfer and training on renewable energy sources is important.

As Bangladesh's international trade is mostly handled by coastal ports and seaborne transportations, enhancing port facilities and related transport sectors are to be developed. For enhancing port facilities, the proposal to construct the Matarbari deep sea port on the Maheshkhali Island is a good initiative. It will be 18.7 metre deep and will be able to accommodate container vessels of 8,200 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent unit).[29] Hopefully, by 2023 it will have an annual handling capacity of 0.8 million TEUs of containers and 2.5 million tonnes of bulk cargos and by 2041, special economic zones will be built.[30] The deep seaport will certainly reduce the dependency on and congestion in the prime sea ports at Chattogram and Mongla. It will also help to reduce the lead time. With regard to transportation, buying modern merchant ships and cargo fleets, strengthening local shipping companies for the expansion of fleet in terms of size and capacity and enhancing shipping and transport related activities are important.

As marine tourism is yet to provide adequate earnings for Bangladesh, special attention needs to give on expansion of coastal tourism, tourism in sea beaches and existing and newly developed islands. In addition, encouraging private sector to invest in coastal tourism, making national strategy for tourism, introducing small and medium sized luxury cruise and catamaran ships and construction of modern hotels, cottages and restaurants at the tourist spots along the onshore and offshore coastal locations are important. In this respect, Bangladesh can take lessons from Singapore and Malaysia.

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[29] Shakahwat Hossain, "Bangladesh plans Matarbari sea port with Japanese loan", *The New Age*, 04 August 2019.
[30] Syful Islam, "Matarbari deep-sea port to outshine Asian peers", *The Financial Express*, 29 March 2019.

Shipbreaking, ship recycling and shipbuilding all are significant marine activities.[31] At present, shipbuilding yards are constructing 10,000 Deadweight Tonnage (DWT) seagoing ships for export and are expected to upgrade their capacity to 25,000 DWT.[32] Concentrated in Sitakunda, shipbreaking activities present both challenges and opportunities for coastal zone management. By providing a significant source of steel, saving a substantial amount of foreign exchange and generating employment and large amounts of revenue for various government authorities through the payment of taxes, shipbreaking activities play an important role in the national economy of Bangladesh. However, industrial waste, toxic fumes and other hazardous materials pose serious threat to the environment. Despite introduction of new national policy and legislation in 2011 with a view to improve the environmental and occupational health safety standards in the shipbreaking yards, enforcement of laws is often non-existent and the governance is poor due to lack of adequate monitoring. In contrast, using the Intertidal Ship Recycling method with a natural and concrete slipway, ship recycling facility meets a wide range of stringent environmental and social criteria in Bangladesh. Thus, it should be promoted and nurtured in all possible ways with all eco-friendly infrastructure and compliance of international convention.

3.3   *Protection of Resources*

Protection of resources comprises both protecting resources within a defined geo-graphical maritime boundary of Bangladesh and surveillance to the boundary itself. While discussing protection of resources, Bangladesh needs to take some issues into consideration, e.g., maritime piracy, illegal fishing and poaching, marine pollution, etc.

Marine fish biodiversity is declining day by day due to the use of estuarine set bag net, push net and beach seine fishing in the shallow coastal areas.[33] However, a good number of bottom trawls have already been converted to mid-water trawls to lessen the pressure on the demersal fish stocks to reduce the destruction of sea-bottom habitats and to exploit the mid-water fish stocks.[34] Bangladesh imposes a temporary ban on fishing, particularly of Hilsa, for a certain period. To protect marine biodiversity and to keep fish stocks at sustainable levels, several Marine Protected

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[31] International Maritime Organization, "The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships", IMO, 2009, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---safework/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_154921.pdf, accessed on 06 July 2020.

[32] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit.

[33] Md. Shahidul Islam, "Perspectives of the Coastal and Marine Fisheries of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh", *Ocean & Coastal Management*, Vol. 46, No. 8, 2003, pp. 763-796.

[34] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit.

Areas (MPA) are declared. Bangladesh has taken decision to install Vessel Tracking and Monitoring System (VTMS) with satellite communication links in fishing vessels in phases to monitor and control their maneuver at sea.[35] As a trans-boundary species of the BoB, Hilsa's rehabilitation is needed and it requires a joint effort among Bangladesh, India and Myanmar to prevent the harvest of Hilsa juveniles and protect the mature brood stock during the banning period. Regulation can be adopted on indiscriminate harvesting of gravid mother shrimp, by trawling at the depth of 10-40 meters of inshore marine waters.

Marine pollution, due to shrimp farming, marine waste and litter, poses a serious threat of depletion of marine resources of the country. Coastal shrimp farming has adverse environmental impacts on the level of salinity, mangrove forest, water and soil quality, productivity of estuarine waters, agro-ecosystem, sedimentation and biodiversity.[36] To mitigate the negative impacts crucial is to undertake appropriate regulatory measures; proper management and ecological approach. It is also important to categorize coastal areas based on salinity level, improve traditional and semi-intensive culture systems, apply fertilizer at recommended doses, intensively monitor the environmental impact and establish procedures for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Bangladesh also faces the worst marine pollution because of plastic and marine litter. According to a survey, plastic waste constitutes more than 60 per cent of the litter found on the beaches of Bangladesh. A total of 6,705 pieces of waste products were found on an 18.5 km stretch of the four sea beaches.[37] To manage marine waste, formulation of different strategies and action plans at the regional, national and local levels are vital. Again, to convey the effect of littering to the public for initiating long-term behavioural change, awareness raising through academic activities and information campaigns is essential.

Strengthening maritime surveillance to protect resources from illegal maritime activities, e.g., international piracy and IUU fishing, to maintain maritime safety and security of its maritime boundaries, e.g., ports and SLOC is crucial. For maritime surveillance, Bangladesh Navy (BN) along with Bangladesh Coast Guard and Special Warfare Diving and Salvage (SWADS) play an important role. Bangladesh Navy has hundred and ten surface ships, craft and boats, including six guided missile frigates, two patrol frigates, six guided missile corvettes, thirty-eight

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[35] Ibid.

[36] M. S. Hossain, M. J. Uddin and A. N. M. Fakhruddin, "Impacts of Shrimp Farming on the Coastal Environment of Bangladesh and Approach for Management", *Reviews in Environmental Science and Bio/Technology*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2013, pp. 313-332; M.S. Islam, M. Serajul Islam, M.A. Wahab, A. A. Miah and A.H.M. Mustafa Kamal, "Impacts of Shrimp Farming on the Socioeconomic and Environmental Conditions in the Coastal Regions of Bangladesh", *Pakistan Journal of Biological Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 24, 2003, pp. 2058-2067.

[37] Mehedi Al Amin, "Reckless plastic waste dumping greatly endangering Bay of Bengal", *Dhaka Tribune*, 17 December 2018.

minor surface combatants of various types, thirty auxiliaries and amphibious landing craft and thirty-two small response boats as surface assets.[38] Besides, submarine branch and naval aviation wing are being operated with two diesel-electric attack submarines and fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft.[39] SWADS is trying to conduct special reconnaissance, anti-piracy, counter insurgency, counter narcotics, counter terrorism, covert insertions/extractions, hostage rescue and personnel recovery, hydro-graphic reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, raid and underwater demolition with 150 commandos and 200 divers.[40] In contrast, Bangladesh Coast Guard (BGB) lacks adequate resources particularly high-powered ships and other vehicles. Hence, necessary initiatives to modernize other agencies for strengthening maritime surveillance are highly needed.

Besides, maritime surveillance requires maritime infrastructure building and regional cooperation. For maritime infrastructure building, BN is currently setting up two new bases. One is at Rabanabad in Patuakhali named BNS Sher-e-Bangla and another is at Khilkhet of Dhaka named BNS Sheikh Mujib. In addition, an underwater expressway tunnel namely Karnaphuli tunnel is under construction in Chattogram. Along with these, the upgradation of Chattogram and Mongla ports and construction of deep sea port in Payra and Matarbari will serve as major strategic outpost for protecting Bangladesh's maritime boundaries and its resources.[41] Besides, regional cooperation for surveillance and information sharing is need of the hour. It is high time for South Asian littoral states (Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka) along with Myanmar to outline a coordinated regional approach. Bangladesh needs to be a member state of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC).

3.4   *Technology Acquisition*

For sustainable exploration and exploitation of marine resources, the necessity of utilizing technologies is undeniable and technology acquisition is considered as an important priority sector for Bangladesh's blue economy. For marine fish stock assessment, a survey vessel, 'RV Meen Sandhani' was procured from Malaysia in 2016. It is capable to assess fish stock up to 200 metre depth only.[42] Later a Norwegian vessel named Nansen research vessel arrived in 2018 to carry out an acoustic survey in the maritime boundary of Bangladesh. The vessel can explore the availability

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[38] Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20190225223925/http://www.navy.mil.bd/ships.php, accessed on 20 November 2019.
[39] Moutusi Islam, "Maritime Security Challenges for Bangladesh: Response Options", *BIISS Journal*, Vol, 40, No. 3, 2019, pp. 269-280.
[40] Eric Sof, "Bangladesh SWADS", *Spec Ops Magazine*, 20 October 2012, available at pecial-ops.org/864/bangladesh-swads-special-warfare-diving-salvage/, accessed on 03 March 2020.
[41] Moutusi Islam, op. cit.
[42] Sohel Parvez, "Marine survey in Bay from August 2", *The Daily Star*, 27 July 2018.

of pelagic, mesopelagic and bottom fish up to 1,000 metre depth.[43] Despite these, crucial is to acquire appropriate deep-sea fishing technologies and methods, i.e., long line and hook fishing; improved, faster and eco-friendly fishing trawlers; crafts and vessels for harvesting large pelagic fish. For marine aquaculture, adopting various farming technologies like shrimp brood stocks domestication; Specific Pathogen Free (SPF) seed; brood stock production and semi-intensive farming are also vital. Instead of using manually operated local equipment, the adoption of mechanical equipment (water pump, leveler, etc.) and reliable weather forecasting technology and transfer of advanced production techniques from Europe and North America are significant to enhance salt production. Moreover, shipping industry needs to embrace and adopt clean fuel, clean air and noise reduction technologies, e.g., blue technology and biotechnology.

Besides, comprehensive technological and technical knowhow is required for exploration and exploitation of natural resources specially exploring the petroleum and natural gas in the BoB as well as utilizing renewable energy including wind power, wave energy, tidal energy, Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) and biofuel from marine algae and sea grasses. Thus, Bangladesh needs to acquire sophisticated ocean technology like electronics; miniaturization of equipment; acoustic techniques; earth orbiting satellites; marine propulsion system; imaging and physical sensors; advanced materials (i.e., metallic, ceramic, polymeric and composite materials); information and communication technologies; big data analytics; autonomous systems; biotechnology; nanotechnology; subsea engineering; new technologies for deep seabed mining Vessel Traffic Management Information System (VTMIS) and ocean observing systems.

4.   The Role of Public Actors in Bangladesh

Sustainable development of blue economy requires active participation and decisions by a wide range of public actors with common objectives. For Bangladesh's blue economy major public actors can be categorized into six groups — coordinating bodies, regulatory bodies, academic institutions, research institutions, training institution and security agencies based on their nature and scope of activities. Prime Minister's Office (PMO), Planning Commission (PC) and Blue Economy Cell (BEC) are the most important public coordinating bodies of blue economy. After the settlement of the maritime dispute, PMO started to give the utmost focus for the development of blue economy. With the guidance of PC, PMO established BEC

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[43] "Norwegian research vessel arrives in Ctg for acoustic survey", *banglanews24.com*, 31 July 2018, available at https://www.banglanews24.com/english/business/article/69936/Norwegian-research-vessel-arrives-in-CtgforacousticCtg foracoustic-survey, accessed on 25 March 2019.

in 2017 with the mandate to coordinate blue economy initiatives across sectoral ministries.[44]

Given the breadth of economic activity in Bangladesh's ocean space, the government's objective is to promote a blue economy touches upon the responsibilities of regulatory bodies. Around 29 ministries and divisions are involved with blue economy.[45] The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) focuses on protecting the marine environment and resources. The Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources (MoPEMR) with Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA) and Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) is concerned with the exploration and exploitation of marine mineral and renewable energy. The Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock (MoFL) with the Department of Fisheries (DoF) and Bangladesh Fisheries Development Corporations (BFDC) looks over marine capture of fish and aquaculture. The Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism (MoCAT) with Bangladesh Tourism Board (BTB) and Bangladesh Parjatan Corporation (BPC) is responsible for the expansion of marine tourism. The Ministry of Shipping (MoS) with Bangladesh Shipping Corporation (BSC), Department of Shipping (DoS) and Bangladesh's port authorities like Chittagong Port Authority (CPA), Mongla Port Authority (MPA) and Payra Port Authority (PPA) concentrates on providing maritime services for trade and shipbuilding activities. The Maritime Affairs Unit (MAU) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) is consulting nationally and internationally to promote the concept of blue economy in the context of Bangladesh. Though each ministry focuses on specific priority sectors, sometimes ministries collaborate with each other in formulating, reviewing and consulting laws, policies and action plans. The MoCAT, BPC and MoS are jointly reviewing National Tourism Policy 2009. Again, the MoFL in collaboration with BCG and BN is consulting National Marine Fisheries Policy.[46]

For the enforcement of different policies, regulations and laws, the tasks of security agencies are immense. BN and BCG are not only responsible to maintain the safety and security of seagoing vessels, fishing fleet and all seafarers but also are entrusted with the task of providing surveillance.

Preservation of the marine environment, effective management of coastal zone and formulation of a sound ocean policy as well as the right strategy to address pertinent issues of blue economy require proper maritime research and development. In this regard, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has set up Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute (BFRI), Bangladesh Oceanographic Research Institute (BORI)

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[44] Rezaul Karim, "Ministries dragging their feet over tapping blue economy", *The Financial Express*, 28 July 2018.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Pawan G. Patil et al., op. cit.

and Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD). BORI conducts research on physical, geological, chemical and biological oceanography and climate change. BFRI carries out basic and adaptive research for the optimum utilization of all living aquatic resources and coordinates fisheries research activities.[47]

A thrust in blue economic growth comes from a large number of skilled coastal and offshore engineers, navigators, merchant mariners, fisheries technologists and legal experts, etc. In this respect, the role of public academic institutions like Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology *(*BUET), University of Dhaka (DU) and Military Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) as well as training institutions is essential. In due course of time, several public universities have started to offer programmes, training and courses on marine affairs. But none of them are fully marine based in nature and remain unable to encompass the maritime domain as a whole. To fill this vacuum, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Maritime University (BSMRMU) was set up in 2012 to be a centre of excellence in maritime education. The university has seven faculties and thirty-eight departments.[48] In addition, two training institutes, Bangladesh Maritime Academy (BMA) and Bangladesh Marine Fisheries Academy (BMFA) of BSMRMU as well as Bangladesh Institute of Marine Technology (BIMT) and National Maritime Institute (NMI) also play a vital role to create skilled manpower for judicious exploitation and exploration of marine resources through arranging on-board practical training.

Table 1 shows the role of six groups of public actors in different priority sectors of Bangladesh's blue economy. Although the role should be based on short, medium and long term, this paper divides it into two categories: (a) major activities so far and (b) expecting to do for a visionary future.

Table 1: Roles of Public Actors in Blue Economy of Bangladesh

Public Actors	Major activities so far	Expecting to do
PMO	Forming a high-level committee and BEC and signing a MoU in 2015 with India for blue economy development.	Formulation of Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP) and promoting and facilitating the development of marine industries as a core element of the economy.

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[47] Ibid.

[48] M Ziauddin Alamgir and M Mojahid Hossain Chowdhury, "Maritime Education and National Economic Growth: Bangladesh Perspective", *Bangladesh Maritime Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2019, p. 37.

PC	Incorporating concept of blue economy as a potential driver of growth in Seventh Five Year Plan and identifying 12 actions to undertake for sustainable blue economy	Monitoring implementation status of 12 actions, setting a target to increase share in GDP and guiding relevant ministries, especially BEC to work in accordance with action plans
BEC	Working as a supporting body in organizing seminars and discussion meetings, providing support to state-owned Geological Survey of Bangladesh for purchasing the ship and preparing a road map for five years for the priority ministries and divisions to provide guidelines for blue economy development.	Preparing a comprehensive strategic action plan on blue economy; reviewing work plan and latest reports; drafting national maritime policy and strategy; making integrated coastal management; improving policy and regulatory transparency and creating incentives to encourage transformation of economy from 'brown' to 'green and blue' growth.
MoEFCC	Undertaking National Adaptation Programme of Action, Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, Climate Change Resilience Action Plan to govern and protect marine resources; identifying and declaring ecologically critical coastal and sea area and formulating and implementing marine pollution (control) act, oil pollution (control) act, marine vessel air pollution (control) act and sea dumping (control) act.	Addressing externalities from industrial and agricultural pollution; creating marine dead zones; promoting biomitigation of climate change by blue carbon sequestrations and by restoring coastal ecosystems and habitats; creating green forest belt in coastal areas; conserving marine biological diversity, environment and resources and ensuring sustainable use of ocean.
MoPEMR, SREDA and BPDB	Exploring oil and gas; conducting non-exclusive 2D/3D seismic survey in designated blocks; extracting and commercializing heavy minerals from beach sands of coastal region; undertaking plan for constructing pipeline for LNG to national grid and project for collecting geological and oceanographic data; procuring multirole oceanographic research vessel for geological survey, seismic survey, seabed mapping and database creation and reviewing Renewable Energy Policy 2008 as well as National Energy Policy 2004.	Developing a strong renewable energy sector in coastal areas and offshore islands to generate electricity; encouraging PPP to share data and information; monitoring and best practices; ensuring no offshore drilling near marine protected area; formulating detailed and effective regulation for offshore drilling; having logical plan; multi-client survey and framework for harnessing and identifying potential oil and gas reserves and working with industries to reduce environmental impacts and improve energy efficiencies.

MoFL, DoF and BFDC	Undertaken action plans-Marine Fisheries Management: Plan of Action and Implementation, National Fishery Act 2017; reviewing policies-National Marine Fisheries Policy 2015, National Shrimp Policy, National Aquaculture Development Strategy and Action Plan; implementing projects related to aquaculture and exploration of economically important marine flora; location monitoring and surveillance of commercial fishing vessel by installing VMS and organizing blue economy dialogue on fisheries and mariculture.	Developing mechanisms for effective implementation of Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) for artisanal and industrial fisheries; creating infrastructure and production facilities for coastal belt fisheries; standardizing techniques for maximizing production and better management of living aquatic resources and for aquaculture in case of domestic fish farming in the open sea; initiating seaweed, marine algae, shellfish breeding and culture; developing system to send real-time fishing survey information to the fishing community and developing region-wide standards for processing, certification, labeling and marketing of fish products.
MoCAT, BTB and BPC	Providing basic services, e.g., hotels, resorts and guest houses in coastal areas; promoting sustainable tourism to protect marine resources; formulating Tourism Board Act 2010, Bangladesh Tourism Protected Areas and Special Tourism Zone Act 2010 and reviewing National Tourism Policy 2009.	Formulating plan and vision for marine, eco, lighthouse and cruise tourism; promoting eco-diving, surfing, recreational fishing, boating, tour to Swatch of No Ground, evening live concerts and floating hotels; expanding tourism in 75 outer-islands as well as creating and increasing size of MPAs.
MoFA	Undertaking consultations to elaborate blue economy concept in Bangladesh's context; identifying 26 sectors of blue economy; hosting workshops at national level and third IORA Blue Economy Ministerial Conference in Dhaka to properly manage, exploit and fully utilize maritime resources; formulating policy guidelines on blue economy and going to enact Bangladesh Maritime Zones Act 2019 to establish Bangladesh's right over maritime area in line with UNCLOS 1982.	Pursuing blue diplomacy; using conference and conclave on blue economy to reach out to the international community; engaging with IORA, BIMSTEC and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) to address Bangladesh's blue economy priorities and taking initiatives to engage bilaterally and multilaterally with neighbours for information sharing, joint management, surveillance and disaster management.

MoS, BSC, DoS, CPA, MPA, PPA	Developing shipbuilding industries; expanding domestic fleets, transshipments and transit provisions to increase revenue from shipping and commerce; ensuring licensing, registration and implementation of colour code for fishing trawlers/boats for safety and prevention of illegal fishing and also developing maritime services to support sea trade and transport function.	Following application of global market regulations for environmental standards; linking neighbours to seaports; turning ship recycling into a modern industry with eco-friendly infrastructure and compliance of international convention; increasing shipbuilding capacity of yards and capacity of dry docks and enhancing handling capacities of ports.
BSMRMU, BUET, MIST and DU	Conducting undergraduate and post-graduate programmes on maritime affairs, naval architecture, marine engineering and oceanography; developing competent maritime human resources and bringing all types of marine professionals on a common platform to share knowledge and perform research for the advancement of Bangladesh's maritime sector.	Promoting public awareness to make people ocean-oriented instead of ocean-blind; developing a marine science and technology plan to improve monitoring and understanding of the global ocean process; linking education and training to green and blue growth strategies and collaborating with universities and organizations both at home and abroad to enhance maritime education.
BFRI, BORI and BIM-RAD	Focusing on marine scientific research, physical, chemical and geological attributes, weather and climate services and oceanographic research; providing suggestions to relevant public agencies regarding management of marine resources and collaborating at national and international level in the area of maritime research.	Conducting multilevel research, workshops, seminars and hydrographic and oceanographic survey for sustainable development of maritime sector; enhancing research consciousness in maritime sector to address new dimensions with upcoming challenges and generating scientific understanding of marine ecosystem and resources to underpin their conservation and sustainable uses.
BMA, NMI, BMFA and BIMT	Conducting pre-sea training for ships ratings and seafarer in nautical and engineering discipline, creating skilled manpower for judicious exploitation and harvesting of maritime fisheries resources and conducting courses on marine and shipbuilding technology, marine diesel, fabrication shipbuilding welding and mechanical draftsman.	Training for personnel in coastal security, navigation, engineering, naval warfare, marine law, strategy and logistics management; developing training courses, seminars, symposium on integrated marine management and transferring advanced technologies to relevant users, e.g., fish farmers.

| BN and BCG | Maintaining strategic control, surveillance and safeguard of SLOC for commercial trade; protecting illegal fishery, smuggling, human trafficking; conducting hydrographic and oceanographic survey; developing shipbuilding and repair industry; coordinating with relevant government organs, maritime agencies and organizations; ensuring law and order in EEZ; procuring maritime patrol aircraft and helicopter for maritime surveillance, rescue and salvage ship and conducting courses on basic hydrographic and survey recorder. | Conducting bilateral and multilateral exercise with regional nations to enhance interoperability; developing integrated system to provide continuous, real-time, all-weather detection and identification of intruding ships; establishing effective maritime rescue coordination centre to coordinate with search and rescue activities; arranging compulsory ship reporting system and differential global positioning system along the coasts for enhancing security and safety measures at sea and developing preventive and protective measures against infringement of maritime boundaries, security incidents affecting ships, offshore resources, crews, cargoes and port facilities. |

Public actors are to examine justifiably whether existing rules and regulations meet and facilitate the priority sectors. Despite having several coordinating bodies, maritime interests and resources of Bangladesh are not well managed, neither the maritime activities are well-coordinated. There is a lot of duplication of efforts among the public maritime actors. Besides, till now BEC remains confined to holding occasional meetings due to lack of its adequate administrative setup and permanent manpower. Essentially, the government's move to tap the blue economy has hardly made any progress over the past three years mainly due to the dilly-dallying attitude of the ministries concerned and lack of proper coordination among the implementing ministries, divisions and agencies. A comprehensive plan on blue economy that is to be conducted by 25-member high-powered committee at PMO is yet to be prepared. Of the 60 decisions taken by the committee in different meetings, only some have been implemented by the concerned ministries and divisions.[49] Additionally, concerned 17 ministries and 12 divisions are yet to submit an interim report on development of the blue economy to PMO.[50] Furthermore, research organizations, training institutions and universities are also lacking standards because of the shortage of faculty.

Different public actors have undertaken various initiatives to facilitate the priority sectors of Bangladesh's blue economy to promote sustainable and inclusive growth and employment opportunities in Bangladesh's maritime economic activities in the short, medium and long-term time frames. However, these initiatives are not adequate to harness the full potential of 26 sectors of blue economy as identified by

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[49] Rezaul Karim, op. cit.
[50] Ibid.

MoFA. Hence, for a sustainable blue economy, public actors need to be inclusive, well-informed, precautionary and adaptive, accountable and transparent, holistic, cross-sectoral and long-term, innovative and proactive.

5.   Way Forward

Marine affairs of Bangladesh are characterized by sectoral policies. Recently, public actors of blue economy sectors are reviewing and developing their policies and strategies without taking necessary considerations of inherent interconnections across the sectors that share a common space. It justifies the necessity to come up with a comprehensive multi-sectoral national blue economy policy to guide various sectors through a common policy building on trade-offs and synergies. To formulate such a policy, Bangladesh can follow seven steps, e.g., agenda setting awareness and sensitization; coordination in formulating the blue economy policy; building national ownership of the blue economy policy formulation process; sector identification and prioritization; designing the blue economy policy; policy implementation and monitoring and evaluation .[51] To implement the national blue economy policy, it also requires to formulate and strengthen legal frameworks like enacting 'Bangladesh Maritime Zone Acts' to help protect rights in the maritime resources and to ensure the security of the maritime boundaries.

Formulation and implementation of a multi-sectoral national blue economy policy also require institutional harmonization at each level of governance and consistency in the agreed goals and objectives of blue economy. Setting up a coordinating institution would inevitably be a positive step in the direction. With respect to institution building, the most critical point perhaps is to ensure that all the concerned stakeholders and their interests are represented. In building institution, Bangladesh can consider different options to coordinate different organizations and agencies. *First,* it can build up several institutions to coordinate all the maritime activities. Like Department of Ocean Development for marine research and development agenda; National Ocean Ministerial Board to oversee the implementation, prioritization, budgetary allocation, regional cooperation and the further development of ocean policy; National Ocean Advisory Committee to advise the ministerial board on cross-sectoral ocean issues and National Ocean Office to do the main administrative coordination between government organizations and commercial operator.[52] *Second,* Bangladesh can follow the examples of Mauritius

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[51] United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Africa's Blue Economy: A Policy Handbook*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, pp. 67-84.
[52] M Khaled Iqbal, "Ocean Policy for Bangladesh—A Comprehensive Roadmap", *Bangladesh Maritime Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2019, p. 10.

and Seychelles by establishing a designated Ministry of Blue Economy.[53] **Third,** it can also establish a separate department for blue economy through comprising representatives from all other ministries relevant to ocean management.[54] **Fourth,** it can also think of building a National Maritime Commission/Council (NMC) as a unifying interagency/ministerial body with monitoring cells to bring together policy and operational agencies with a view to ensure the proper outcome from the overall activities.[55] Whatever options Bangladesh chooses, it needs to ensure that the institution must be endowed with legal powers to reap the benefits of the blue economy.

At the operational level, a multi-sectoral national blue economy policy needs to be pursued through a nationally integrated maritime strategy. Adoption of an integrated strategy will complement the existing sectoral strategies of blue economy. It should be achieved through step by step process. Recently, MSP is gaining attention as a new integrated strategic approach to sustainably manage marine resources by integrating socio-economic and environmental concerns at the same policy.[56] With a growing interest in marine affairs, MSP can provide a strategic framework for achieving blue economy policy goals for Bangladesh. In the planning and development of MSP, it can learn lessons from countries like Australia, Germany, Belgium and Japan which have successfully implemented MSP to boost economic activities in the ocean. For the proper management of marine resources, MSP also needs to develop alternative thinking regarding marine living and non-living resources. For example, it must look for other important uses of fish parts, e.g., fish oil, fish liver residue and fish ensilage, fish maws, fish hydrolysates and peptone. In addition, with the momentum of the fast-increasing aquaculture and huge success in inland aquaculture, MSP should replicate such expertise in sea aquaculture for seaweed, pearl and oyster. Besides, strengthening regional fisheries bodies, national fisheries management agencies, fishing community and fish workers organizations, regulating and controlling harvesting as well as diversifying fishing areas to avert risks associated with overfishing of certain fish stocks are critical for sustainable and equitable use and management of marine resources through MSP.

The development of MSP and multi-sectoral ocean policy also require surveying marine resources. Indeed, Bangladesh still does not know how many

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[53] Moutusi Islam and Lam-ya Mostaque, "Blue Economy and Bangladesh: Lessons and Policy Implications", *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2018, p. 136; Md Shahidul Hasan, "Maritime Verdicts and Resource Exploration for Bangladesh", *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 3, July 2014, p. 227.
[54] Abul Kalam Azad, op. cit.
[55] Moutusi Islam and Lam-ya Mostaque, op. cit.
[56] Kawshik Saha and Afsana Alam, "Planning for Blue Economy: Prospects of Maritime Spatial Planning in Bangladesh", *AIUB Journal of Science and Engineering*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2018, pp. 59-66; Vijay Sakhuja and Kapil Narula, *Perspective on Blue Economy*, New Delhi, India: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2017, pp. 11-14.

varieties of fish and the exact amount of marine resources exist beneath the BoB as no surveys have been conducted during the last three decades. Before anything, a comprehensive, multi-client, consolidated and pragmatic survey of marine resources is needed which can well unveil the vastness of marine resources, quantity of the exploitable resources, their different industrial benefits and potentiality of exports. In this respect, Energy and Mineral Resources Division's moves towards conducting a multi-client survey, Petro Bangla and the United States Geological Survey (USGS)'s joint survey to identify potentials of oil and gas exploration in the offshore areas[57], the arrival of Norwegian vessel and procurement of RV Meen Sandhani from Malaysia to assess fish stock have been a good start.[58]

For blue economy to be sustainable, the significance of efficient maritime professionals, e.g., legal practitioners, environmentalists, mariners, engineers, oceanographers, hydrographers, researchers and academicians are crucial. Numbers of institutions have offered graduates, postgraduate degrees and training courses related to maritime affairs but these institutions often lack standard education. Consequently, Bangladesh is yet to project itself as a prospective maritime country with vast potentialities. In this regard, the country needs either to establish a central single controlling body like the Indian Institute of Maritime Studies or declare BSMRMU as a central body to maintain maritime education standard. Such a central body needs to foster maritime studies, develop new interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary educational approaches towards the oceans, initiate extensive new training about applicable international law and legislation as well as regional and sub-regional instruments and policies for officials involved in relevant blue economy sectors and ensuring equitable and beneficial collaboration between Bangladesh's newly established institutions and other universities of China, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Australia and the USA to develop high-tech multi-disciplinary education system.

Marine professionalism and development of the blue economy need to be firmly embedded in marine research and development. Thus, Bangladesh should conduct medium and long-term research on preservation, processing and quality control of marine products, fisheries, aquaculture as well as discovery and utilization of off-shore and deep-sea minerals, physical oceanography, ocean currents, waves and interaction between water and atmosphere, offshore wind and tidal industry and prospect of different marine industries like macroalgae, mussels clams oysters, pearly oysters, sea cucumber and sea urchin. In this respect, establishment of a research laboratory solely dedicated to marine research and exploration of ocean

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[57] Shaikh Rezanul Haque Manik, "Blue Economy: A New Prospect for Bangladesh", *The Daily Sun*, 20 February 2018.
[58] "Norwegian research vessel arrives in Ctg for acoustic survey", op. cit.

resources in BUET is a welcoming step. Despite this, Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD) should focus more on research projects solely dedicated to the blue economy. Sound research in these sectors also requires sufficient funds. With this respect, it needs to undertake two steps. **Firstly**, in national budget, ensuring enough budgets for maritime research. The government's initiative to fund 1,400 crore projects for strengthening marine research efforts to explore untapped resources from the Bay is a welcoming step.[59] In allocating fund, government can follow Systematic Investment Plan (SIP) where a small amount of funding (e.g., BDT 0.2 million) could be provided to researchers for a year and based on the progress, further funding can be extended. **Second** is harnessing the financial support from the international agency. For example, Bangladesh can take the opportunities from the flagship Horizon 2020 programme of the EU which funds blue economy related research and innovation in EU and beyond. Also, Bangladeshis can look for individual research grants and research jobs in Europe using 'Euraxess' portal.[60]

Essentially, exploration and exploitation of marine resources depend on marine technological capacity building.[61] However, it is an expensive affair. Bangladesh can explore two possible options. **First** is asking for public finance to enhance the status of Bangladesh in marine technology. **Second** is seeking foreign direct investment and going for foreign assistance in the form of loans and grants. But experts opine that efforts should be rendered for creating maximum funds and revenues from public sources.

The development of blue economy also depends on building of marine and coastal construction in seas and coasts. However, such kind of marine affairs become too expensive for a developing country like Bangladesh. Therefore, Bangladesh should make an all-out effort to attract foreign investors in the sectors like port, offshore LNG platforms, coastal energy hubs and special economic zones, climate adaptation and resilient new industrial complexes, infrastructures, buildings and networks of services mushrooming in Cox's Bazar, Kutubdia, Maheshkhali, Patuakhali, Khulna and Mongla areas.

Scholars note that aspects of marine pollution, fisheries management, protection and preservation of marine environment, marine scientific research, marine safety, enforcement responsibilities and disaster management can be

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[59] Ahmed Noor Hossain, "How we can manage our marine resources better", *The Daily Star*, 26 February 2017.
[60] "Blue economy: EU invites Bangladesh to take benefit from 'Horizon 2020'", *bdnews24.com*, 25 November 2018, available at https://bdnews24.com/economy/2018/11/25/blue-economy-eu-invites-bangladesh-to-take-benefit-from-horizon-2020, accessed on 25 April 2019.
[61] Md. Jahan Shoieb and Md. Muhibbur Rahman, "Emerging Strategic Landscape in the Bay of Bengal and Maritime Capability Building of Bangladesh", *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2014, p. 31.

addressed through maritime cooperation between and among the littoral states.[62] Considering these issues, through pursuing maritime diplomacy, Bangladesh needs to build partnerships among and between stakeholders across countries, oceans and international systems on blue economy. It should be based on mutual trust and respect, common area of interest, equitable sharing of benefits to secure sustained and beneficial outcomes for all blue economy-centric enterprise. In this respect, Bangladesh must value maritime diplomacy to develop a regional cooperative management regime for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, quick regional response for jointly protecting regional MPA, joint patrolling for surveillance and exchange of intelligence and joint hydrography and seismic survey for regional maritime scientific research programme. Besides, it needs to arrange dialogues at regional and international levels not only for exchanging information and knowledge but also for sharing legal, policy and institutional expertise among states to achieve objectives of blue economy. In building partnerships, Bangladesh needs to engage actively with institutions like IORA, BIMSTEC, IONS, etc. at regional level and with World Bank, European Development Bank, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Environment Programme and the EU at the international level.

6.   Conclusion

After the settlement of maritime delimitation dispute with the neighbouring countries, adoption and implementation of the blue economy concept, methods and plans for sustainable use of its coastal and ocean spaces have increased in Bangladesh. Hence, this paper aimed at identifying the priority sectors and major public actors for nurturing the concept of blue economy in Bangladesh. Besides, it also suggests major ways to guide Bangladesh's blue economy.

Blue economy concept has ushered in a new horizon for the economic development of coastal countries like Bangladesh. Different scholars have tried to define the concept of blue economy differently because of their different approaches. Similarly, the concept has also sparked interest in Bangladesh. A number of consultations at the national and international levels have been initiated by the government to elaborate on the concept of the blue economy in the context of Bangladesh since 2015. By synthesizing different scholars understanding, the paper proceeds with an analytical framework comprised of two things (a) priority sectors of blue economy and (b) its concerned actors.

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[62] Christian Le Miere, *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges*, London and New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 6; Md. Khairul Islam, Mahbubur Rahaman and Zobayer Ahmed, "Blue Economy of Bangladesh: Opportunities and Challenges for Sustainable Development", *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 8, 2018, p. 169.

Based on the nature of activities, the paper identifies four groups of priority sectors of Bangladesh's blue economy, e.g., exploration and exploitation of resources, expanding marine activities, protection of resources and technology acquisition. Exploration and exploitation of resources include harnessing the potential of large pelagic fishes, marine aquaculture and other non-living resources like mangrove forests, salt marsh and seagrass beds, oil, gas, polymetallic sulphides, ferromanganese crusts and ferromanganese nodules of the BoB. Marine activities can be structured into two aspects: advancing resources exploration or exploitation activities and increasing maritime-related services like trade through establishing deep sea port, tourism, shipbuilding, shipbreaking and ship recycling. Moreover, due to wide range of marine activities, the country is rigged with the secular depletion of ocean resources. As a result, protection of resources has been the third priority sector. Moreover, regulation of coastal marine environment, MPAs, maritime survey and surveillance also entail multiple-level cooperation, especially for technology acquisition. Thus, technology acquisition is the last priority sector.

Effective operation of the priority sectors depends on the involvement of several concerned actors. However, the paper limits its scope to trace the role of the most important public actors of blue economy as they remain at the forefront of policymaking and implementation. It is found that some 29 ministries and divisions concerned are involved with the blue economy. In this connection, it categorizes the actors into six groups, e.g., Coordinating Bodies, Regulatory Bodies, Academic Institutions, Research Institutions, Training Institutions and Security Agencies. Under the visionary leadership of the current government, these public actors have undertaken a number of initiatives like formulating, reviewing and developing sectoral policies and plans, commissioning research vessels, conducting various programmes, training and courses on maritime affairs and maintaining safety and security at the sea, etc.

Despite these initiatives, Bangladesh is yet to harness the full potential of its marine based economic activities and resources due to the lack of proper coordination, national blue economy policy and management approach, MSP, human capital, institutional arrangement, research, technology, proper monitoring and evaluation frameworks. With this respect, formulating a national blue economy policy along with the development of nationally integrated maritime strategy and legal frameworks like, 'Bangladesh Maritime Zone Act' is need of the hours. Besides, maintaining institutional harmonization at each level of governance and consistency in the agreed goals and objectives of blue economy through proper institution building, like National Maritime Commission/Council (NMC) or Ministry of Blue Economy or Department of Blue Economy or a set of institutions to bring together policy and operational agencies is crucial. Furthermore, making a comprehensive MSP;

surveying of sea resources; marine technological capacity building; maintaining standard maritime education; research and development with marine professionals; allocating adequate public and local funds and attracting foreign investments in blue economy sectors; e.g. in building marine and coastal constructions is also crucial. Besides, for full-fledged development of blue economy also require is to maintain cooperation between and among littoral states and engaging with regional and global platforms through pursuing maritime diplomacy.

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Nahian Reza Sabriet

TERRORIST FINANCING IN BANGLADESH IN THE POST-9/11 ERA: METHODS AND RESPONSES

Abstract

This article investigates the major sources of terrorist financing in Bangladesh and measures that have been taken by the Government of Bangladesh to counter those sources of terrorist financing. In doing so, a modified theory has been developed upon Michael Freeman's theoretical framework of the methods of terrorist financing. The modified theory refines the concept of state sponsorship by adding regime support as a variable. It has been argued in the article that the domestic political regime may provide direct or indirect support to terrorist groups targeting political opposition. Relevant empirical evidence is also manifested to prove the utility of the modified framework. In conclusion, the paper stresses the need for bolstering national efforts to combat terrorist financing.

Keywords: Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, Legal Sources of Terrorist Financing, Illegal Sources of Terrorist Financing, State Responses to Terrorist Financing

1.   Introduction

Terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh have shown remarkable skills in raising and moving funds. A close look at the post-9/11 terrorist incidents in Bangladesh would clarify this. On average, most of the terrorist attacks required an amount ranging from BDT200,000-1,000,000 (US$2,400 to 12,000).[1] The highest amount was spent for the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in 2016 which required an estimated amount of BDT800,000-1,000,000 (US$10,000 to 12,000).[2] The gravity of the threat is often referred to as 'an economy within an economy'.[3] According to

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[1] Information collected from the Bangladesh Police (BP) Headquarters and content-analysis of the *Daily Prothom Alo* (2005-19). However, the amounts may vary considering whether the cost of only a terrorist attack is considered or whether the subsidiary costs are included as well. In this case, the subsidiary costs are also included.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Paul Cochrane, "The Funding Methods of Bangladeshi Terrorist Groups", *Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel,* Vol. 2, No. 5, 2009, available at https://ctc.usma.edu/the-funding-methods-of-bangladeshi-terrorist-groups/, accessed on 3 June 2019.

one analyst, 33-35 terrorist groups in Bangladesh have created a network within the country for systematic funding of terrorism and these groups have generated about US $300 million every year.[4]

This study focuses on the trends in terrorist financing in Bangladesh in the post-9/11 era. According to the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) officials, the grenade attacks on the Awami League (AL) convention in 2004 and the Jama'at-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh's (JMB) countrywide terrorist attacks in 2005 had each cost around BDT200,000-300,000.[5] After those two major events, most of the incidents were executed by individual militants[6] rather than organized terrorist groups targeting secular bloggers, Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transgender (LGBT) activists and some foreigners around the country. However, none of these attacks cost more than BDT 10,000 except for two incidents: the Holey Artisan attack in 2016 and a robbery at the prison van in Trishal, Mymensingh, in 2014.[7] The proper value of the cost required for these events vary depending on how the concept of 'financing' is depicted; however, it has been estimated by both the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), DMP officials and the journalists from a leading national newspaper that in these two cases, the amount crossed the boundary of thousand (in BDT). It has also been reported that different groups like the neo-JMB[8] and Ansar Al Islam (AAI) are now planning to build up inter-group nexus for fundraising and other operational issues.[9]

This paper makes a contribution to the terrorism studies literature by revisiting Michael Freeman's theory on the sources of terrorist financing. A thorough study of 150 journal articles published between 2001 and 2018 suggested that Freeman's typology is the most widely cited literature on the sources of terrorist financing. Specifically, it is indeed the only concrete theoretical material which has been referred to by the Western academia. However, there has been no previous research focusing on the evaluation of Freeman's theory in the Bangladeshi or any South Asian context and this research looks forward to contributing in this regard.

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[4] Ibid.

[5] From personal interviews taken in between June 2018 to December 2019.

[6] This does not refer to lone-wolf terror attacks (LWTAs), per se. They might be part of different groups, but the financing of the events did not require organized financial capacity. The attacks on the bloggers were carried out by the Al-Qaeda inspired terrorist outfit, viz. Ansar al-Islam (AAI).

[7] See more in Iftekharul Bashar, "Bangladesh", *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,* Vol. 9, No. 1, 2017, pp. 43-46; and, Madiha Khan, Md. Shahidul Islam and Shejuti Haque, "Impact of Holey Artisan Restaurant Attack on Restaurant Business in Dhaka City", *Southeast University Journal of Arts and Social Sciences,* Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017, pp. 67-81.

[8] The reemergent variant of the previously banned (old)-JMB outfit which came to the scene after 2015.

[9] "JMB planned to merge with Ansarullah Bangla Team, Neo-JMB: Police", *The Business Standard,* 25 November 2019, available at https://tbsnews.net/bangladesh/crime/jmb-planned-merge-ansarullah-bangla-team-neo-jmb-police, accessed on 10 May 2020.

Nevertheless, in this research, Freeman's framework has been modified in light of other academic works.

The paper addresses a central research question: what are the major sources of and responses to terrorist financing in Bangladesh? The research is a qualitative study. Both primary and secondary data were used for this study. The primary data includes in-depth interviews and document analysis. 17 interviews with senior officials and experts were conducted in order to get substantial amount of perspectives, varied opinions and diverse experiences.[10] Official reports published by Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU)[11] were studied thoroughly to understand the initiatives taken at the national level to counter the sources of terrorism. Other primary sources include United States (US) Country Report on Terrorism from the US Department of State[12], the Mutual Evaluation Reports published by the Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering[13], annual reports from notable think tanks such as the Global Financial Integrity and reports from various national and international newspapers.

Secondary data were collected from various books, journals and newspaper articles. The conceptual and theoretical part of this paper has benefited from several writings. These include, among others: Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas's edited volume Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective[14], Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert's edited book Countering the Financing of Terrorism, and Paul Cochrane's article "The Funding Method of Bangladeshi Terrorist Groups"[15] published in Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel.

Thus, the paper examines the sources of and responses to terrorist financing in Bangladesh. It has been organized as follows. After the introduction, the second section reviews existing literature and touches on the conceptual debates on terrorist financing. Three distinct issues emerge in the existing literature: the connection

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[10] For detailed information about the interviewees, see Appendix 1.

[11] An extensive document analysis has been performed by studying the Annual Reports published by the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU), Bangladesh Bank, including BFIU Annual Report 2011-12, BFIU Annual Report 2012-13, BFIU Annual Report 2014, BFIU Annual Report 2014-15, BFIU Annual Report 2015-16, BFIU Annual Report 2016-17. See more on BFIU's official site https://www.bb.org.bd/bfiu/bfiu_publictn.php

[12] US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, *Country Report on Terrorism: Bangladesh*, Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, 2005-16.

[13] Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, *Mutual Evaluation Reports*, Sydney South: APG, 2013-17, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-bangladesh.html

[14] Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, California: Stanford University Press, 2007.

[15] Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert (eds.), *Countering the Financing of Terrorism*, New York: Routledge, 2008.

between terrorist financing and international political economy; the lack of a concrete theoretical basis for the study of terrorism as well as terrorist financing; and, finally, the changing patterns in the sources of terrorist financing following the newer waves of terrorism. The third section modifies a dominant theory of terrorist financing, given by Michael Freeman. The fourth section presents the central research findings. The fifth section evaluates the existing national, regional and international measures for combating terrorist financing. The sixth section concludes the paper.

2.   A Review of Literature

A review of the existing literature on terrorist financing reveals three major themes. The first deals with relations between terrorist financing and the international political economy; the second shows how the lack of a strong theoretical conceptualization has created ambiguity in the study of terrorist financing; and the third narrates how the study of terrorist financing has changed in recent years embracing the newer sources.

2.1   Terrorist Financing and the International Political Economy

Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas note that adopting a political economy perspective to the financing of terrorism implies "how the potentially divergent interests of the key actors engaged in the raising, distribution, and spending of funds—and the institutional settings in which decisions about financing have made, might have outcomes".[16] However, the approach looks heavily driven by the issues of 'interests' and 'policies' which ignores other variables. Giraldo and Trinkunas's analysis refers to state sponsorship and popular support as the sources to be dealt with greater emphasis. Thus, states are being taken into account as the sponsors of terrorism when it is important to infiltrate or taper off the strength of any rival power. On the other hand, popular support has two different magnitudes—working as a means of voluntary contribution or through the process of extortion. Their arguments capture the process of extortion in cases when there is scarce convergence among the interests of the terrorist group vis-à-vis the targeted population.

Giraldo and Trinkunas rightly claim that most writings on terrorism focuses on the political and societal dimensions of security.[17] Thus, terrorist financing, which represents an economic dimension of the problem, is often seen as a subsidiary part to the political motives of a terrorist actor or group.[18] They suggest a 'political economy'

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[16] Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
[17] Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, op. cit.
[18] Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

approach for a better understanding of terrorist financing. On the other hand, a group of scholars who lean towards the alternative or Marxists theories, address the issue of globalization and the development of a capitalist-consumerist economy that enabled the terrorist groups to gather a generous and continuous network of alliances. These alliances are spread all over the world defying the conventional sources of terrorist financing attaching a multifaceted apparel to the analysis.[19]

2.2   Lack of Well-Grounded Theory

Detecting the sources of terrorist financing hugely depends on how terrorism or terrorist activities are defined. Hence, Hamed Tofangsaz's argument on the conceptual peculiarities deserves a special attention. 'How objectively terrorism should be defined' catches a major debate given that there are numerous dialects used to refer to terrorism, be it as a 'repressive act' or 'terrorist offence' or just 'terrorism'.[20] The constituting elements of terrorism are often represented as 'underlying acts', 'repressive acts' or 'acts of violence' which contain different types of crimes respectively ranging from murder to hijacking.[21] This indeed led to the sustaining complexity in adopting a universal convention or all-encompassing regulation on terrorist financing in the first hand.

From a generic lens, terrorism is defined as an activity that is performed by a group or a 'structured' or 'organized' group. Which, on the other hand, implicitly shifts the debate towards organized crimes and individually motivated terrorist activities. Hence, it is worth looking at the definition of a terrorist act provided by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an initiative of G-7 countries to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. According to the FATF:

> [A]ny group of terrorists that: (i) commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully (ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts; (iii) organi[z]es or directs others to commit terrorist acts; or (iv) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with a common purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering the terrorist act or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act.[22]

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[19] Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Mogens K. Justesen and Robert Klemmensen, "The Political Economy of Freedom, Democracy and Transnational Terrorism", *Public Choice,* Vol. 128, No. 1-2, 2006, pp. 289-315.
[20] Hamed Tofangsaz, "Criminalization of Terrorist Financing: From Theory to Practice", *New Criminal Law Review: International and Interdisciplinary Journal,* Vol. 21, No. 1, 2018, pp. 57-140.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), "Guidance on Criminalising Terrorist Financing", available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjmt8vO_6npAhVC73MBHWKSCcIQFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.fatf-gafi.org%2Fmedia%2Ff atf%2Fdocuments%2Freports%2FGuidance-Criminalising-Terrorist-Financing.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1bOZHur

The FATF's reference to the phrase 'group of terrorist' is not to be ignored since it offers a narrow perspective on the organizer and user of terrorist financing. Anne L. Clunan has rightly pointed out how conceptual loopholes have been creating practical 'jailbreaks' against combating the sources of terrorist financing at the international level. As the argument continues, she has addressed the conceptual ambiguity on the definition of 'collective interest' which lets the countries lean on free-riding tendencies and eventually creating the ultimate beneficiary payoff for the terrorist regimes.[23] Thus, countering the sources of terrorist financing that depends upon the multiple rubrics of collective actions (i.e., institutional capacity, punctuated learning) is also hampered due to the enigma and a sheer lack of conclusiveness.

2.3   New Terrorism, Newer Sources

It is undoubted that following the global systemic change, the world has never seen diversity as much as it has experienced in the late 20th and the early 21st century. Hence, the phenomenon named as 'new terrorism' arrives at the doorsteps, which is defined by its monstrous degree of casualties and lack of definite politically motivated demands.[24] However, an interesting issue can be addressed while discussing this new form or structure of terrorist activities regarding how the non-state actors have taken over the lion's share of the terror acts all over the world. On the other hand, a number of scholars have directly addressed the growth of Islamist terrorism as one of the 'major distinguishing' features of new terrorism. The forms of terrorist financing have also earned major shifts. Noticeably, during the period of 'old terrorism', state sponsored terrorism would be considered as one of the defining characteristics and, as a result, state sponsorship would be the most frequent source of terrorist financing.

The sources, nowadays, have become manifold and multifarious. John T. Picarelli, Louise I. Shelly and Chris Corpora have focused on different 'enterprises' as sources of modern-day terrorist financing. In their analysis, crimes being used as the sources of the funding of the terror acts include—narcotics smuggling, commodity smuggling, goods smuggling, migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons, extortion, intellectual property theft, counterfeiting, fraud, credit card theft and armed robbery.[25] On the other hand, there have been significant changes in the types of actors involved.

HNm88X8wG0grkos, accessed on 11 May 2020.

[23] Anne L. Clunan, "The Fight against Terrorist Financing", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 121, No. 4, 2006, pp. 569-596.

[24] Antony Field, "The 'New Terrorism': Revolution or Evolution?", *Political Studies Review,* Vol. 7, No. 2, 2009, pp. 195-207.

[25] Louise Shelley, John Picarelli and Chris Corpora, *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda,* Ohio: Wadsworth, 2003, pp. 143-166.

Phil Williams notes the emergence of 'hybrid forms of organizations' that adopt an 'explicit political agenda' followed by 'a quest for power'. [26] These organizations inhibit a desire to make profit through illegal activities and use of a tremendous level of violence.[27]

Michael Freeman has added six criteria upon which terrorists determine their sources of funding—quantity, legitimacy, security, reliability, control and simplicity.[28] Thus, it clearly says that a terrorist group would look for the highest amount of money from a secure and consistent/predictable source that would let them attain ideological superiority and control over the targeted group. As diverse the categories are, the sources have also become dispersed. One example can be given with reference to Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun's narratives on the gemstone trade by Al-Qaeda.[29] Farah and Braun have addressed how the organization adopted a tricky manoeuvre for terrorist financing through the international trade of diamonds and tanzanite as their value is sustainable than any other capital, their easy transportability and, more precisely, they cannot be spotted by any metal detector.[30] Therefore, following the alteration of the methods of terrorism and the means of terrorist financing, counter terrorism activities have to follow suit. However, this is where the issue gets complicated considering the contradictory expedients and controversial outcomes. One factor is undoubtedly recognizable that even in the 21st century, states are the primary units on the global stage and inefficient measures by such countries lead to the scar of poor governance and terrorist outbreaks. Following this cynical chain of terrorist network created by the gemstone trade, Ola Olsson sarcastically refers to diamonds as 'rebel's best friends.[31]

In summary, the existing literature on terrorist financing incorporates diverse issues. In one hand, terrorist financing is seen from a politico-economic perspective going beyond its traditional strategic dimensions; on the other hand, a number of newer sources are being taken into account in order to adopt more comprehensive narratives. However, the absence of an all-encompassing theoretical grounds is still creating ambiguity for both the theorists and the practitioners.

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[26] Phil Williams, "Warning Indicators and Terrorist Finances", in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, (eds.), *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective,* California: Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 32.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Michael Freeman, op. cit.
[29] Douglas Farah, and Stephen Braun, *Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man who Makes War Possible*, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2007.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ola Olsson, "Diamonds Are a Rebel's Best Friend", *World Economy,* Vol. 29, No. 8, 2006, pp. 1133-1150.

3.   Theoretical Framework

This section presents the theoretical framework of Michael Freeman on terrorist financing. It also modifies Freeman's framework by adding new variables. Finally, this section addresses three approaches dedicated to countering terrorist financing: international approach, regional approach and national approach.

3.1   Michael Freeman's Theory and the Sources of Terrorist Financing

Freeman identifies four sources of terrorist financing—State Sponsorship, Illegal Activities, Legal Activities and Popular Support.[32] State sponsorship refers to external support provided to a terrorist group by a foreign state. Freeman refers to state sponsorship as a common phenomenon during the Cold War years adopted by both United States (US) and the Soviet Union.[33] Other examples of state sponsorship can be found in the cases of Libya supporting Abu Nidal, the Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, Iran-supported Hezbollah and Syria-supported Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[34] Second, Freeman considers illegal means as an alternative for the terrorist groups given state sponsors can be unreliable and may constrain their activities. From money laundering to kidnapping, every illegal activity can be a source of terrorist financing. The examples include Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) imposing forceful taxation upon the population and kidnappings by the Talibans in Pakistan or by the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines.[35] Third, legal activities include legitimate sources of funding like the Japanese organization Aum Shinrikyo's operations through the earnings from a computer software company, a real estate business and a noodle shop.[36] Fourth, public support incorporates the donation by a sympathetic or a motivated population. Hence, Freeman refers to groups like Al–Qaeda and Palestinian Islami Jihad who receive donations from charitable sources and diaspora communities.[37]

In the existing literature, a hierarchy among the sources is found. Freeman himself has addressed state sponsorship to be more or less obsolete in the post-Cold War era. On the other hand, scholars like Ali Hamza, C. Christine Fair and Rebecca

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[32] Michael Freeman, op. cit., p. 464.
[33] Ibid, p. 465.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid, p. 466.
[36] Ibid, p. 469.
[37] Ibid, p. 470.

Heller,[38] Mark Basile,[39] Steven Simon and Jeff Martini[40] have predominately focused on popular support, particularly, in the case of weak or less developed countries. In Figure 1, Freeman's model is explained through three layers where each of the tier shows different level of importance captures by the theorists who worked on the sources of terrorist financing in developing or third world countries.

Figure 1: Freeman's Framework for Understanding Terrorist Financing[41]

Public Support

Legal/Illegal Activities

State Sponsorship

In this figure, state sponsorship becomes the least important source whereas legal/illegal activities become more significant and public support is considered as the most significant source of terrorist financing. However, this hierarchy is majorly based on the stereotyped idea of the North/South divide where the Southern countries' population is being taken as less educated and prone to cooption, external motivation and assimilatory means.

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[38] C. Christine Fair, Ali Hamza, and Rebecca Heller, "Who Supports Suicide Terrorism in Bangladesh? What the Data Say", *Politics and Religion*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2017, pp. 622-661.
[39] Mark Basile, "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's financial network is likely to withstand the current war on terrorist financing", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2004, pp. 169-185.
[40] Steven Simon and Jeff Martini, "Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda Its Popular Support", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2004, pp. 129-145.
[41] Michael Freeman, op. cit.

3.2   A Modified Theory of Terrorist Financing

This article contributes to the existing literature by presenting a modified theoretical framework. It argues that political regimes in some countries, rather than an external state, may patronize terrorist groups against political opposition. This patronization may come in various forms: direct support for extremist groups at best, toleration of their presence or tacit support at least. In a nutshell, the domestic state regime, rather than a foreign state sponsor, may also act as a source of terrorist financing for non-state groups. Figure 2 presents a modified theoretical framework for understanding the sources of terrorist financing.

Figure 2: Modified Framework of Terrorist Financing

Here, public support, legal/illegal means and state sponsorship all are given equal importance considering the sources of terrorist financing in Bangladesh. However, the idea of 'state sponsorship' is modified with an additional conceptualization of 'regime sponsorship' where the terrorist groups can also be funded by internal regimes or political parties, not just by external states. Thus, coupled with regime sponsorship, state sponsorship earns an equal status in the framework with public support and legal/illegal means. There is also an interplay between the sources where the variables may have significant connection with one another's domain of operation.

This modified framework challenges the dominant idea found in the literature that public support is the most significant source of terrorist financing in developing or underdeveloped countries. It contends that each source can be equally important given the changing nature of terrorism landscape in the post-9/11 era.

3.3   Approaches to Countering Terrorist Financing

Efforts to countering terrorist financing can be taken at three levels: international, regional and national (Figure 3). At the international level, the most significant actor is the United Nations, more precisely, the United Nations Security Council Counterterrorism Committee. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) itself declares the regional/multilateral approach as a part of the Violent Extremism Action Plan. Another international actor is the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF is an initiative of the G-7 industrialized countries aimed at combating both money laundering and terrorist financing. At the regional level, Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering plays an important role. Although economic cooperation-focused regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have adopted several legal instruments in the fight against terrorism, they are yet to formulate any mechanism for countering terrorist financing.

Figure 3: Organizational Hierarchy in Countering Terrorist Financing

For the purpose of this article, the BFIU is the lead national agency in Bangladesh responsible for detecting and countering terrorist financing. The BFIU works closely with various other national agencies such as the Criminal Investigation

Department (CID) of Bangladesh Police, for investigating terrorist financing related offences.

In summary, although Freeman's framework is a prominent one reflecting upon the sources of terrorist financing, it still requires modification in order to be applied in the context of Bangladesh. The present paper argues that this modification will give a clear understanding of the sources of terrorist financing in Bangladesh which may help counter terrorist financing at national, regional and international levels.

4.   Terrorist Financing: A Bangladesh Perspective

This section presents the central research findings on the sources of terrorist financing in Bangladesh.

4.1   Illegal Activities

Freeman defines illegal activities as extortion of money through 'revolutionary taxes.'[42] This section explores how money laundering, robbery, underground leftist activities and illegal arms sales constitute four major illegal activities and their possible use for terrorist financing.

4.1.1   *Money Laundering and Cryptocurrency Business*

Money laundering involves a process where 'unclean' capitals are being refined. This 'dirty money' is usually obtained by activities which are considerably connected with 'the avoidance of particular economic regulations'.[43] In modern days, money laundering itself is being seen as a crime which incorporate smuggling, trafficking or illegitimate arms/drugs sales.

The worldwide plight attached to the distortion of illegal capitals or money launder has been noticeably increasing throughout the recent years. The illegitimate capital flow that is contributing to the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is worth US$800 billion – US$2 trillion which is estimated to be the 2-5 per cent of the global GDP.[44] The 'dollarization' trend has significantly helped the money launderers get a free pass with the money following a global financial network and monetary system.

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[42] See Michael Freeman and Moyara Ruehsen, "Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2013, pp. 5-26, and, Michael Freeman, "Typology", op. cit.

[43] Vito Tanzi, "The Underground Economy", *Finance and Development* Vol. 20, No. 4, 1983, pp. 10-13.

[44] The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC), *Transnational Organized Crime and The Impact on The Private Sector: The Hidden Battalions*, Geneva: GITOC, 2017.

In the case of Bangladesh, this flow has its effects. Since 2004, the level of capital flow has been increasing (Figure 4). The average yearly flow started rising from US$3.35 billion and had a significant increase in 2008 peaking US$6.44 billion. In 2013, the amount reached its highest remarking US$9.66 billion as the estimated yearly capital flight.

It is difficult to identify a symmetric connection among capital flows, money laundering and terrorism due to lack of empirical evidence in the context of Bangladesh; neither there has been a generous amount of research on this issue, particularly in the case of Bangladesh. Domestically, the issue is also region-specific.

Figure 4: Capital Flight from Bangladesh (2004-2013)[45]

On the other hand, a brief focus on Table 1 provides with an understanding how different areas of the country contribute differently to the issue of money laundering and terrorist financing. The table contains the proportion of the Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) based on different areas provided by the BFIU.

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[45] Reports collected from Global Financial Integrity, "Average Annual Illicit Financial Outflows", available at https://www.gfintegrity.org/issues/data-by-country/, accessed on 13 August 2018.

Table 1: STRs in Bangladesh[46]

Sl.	Division	Per Cent
1.	Dhaka	55
2.	Chattogram	19
3.	Rajshahi	7
4.	Khulna	7
5.	Barishal	1
6.	Sylhet	4
7.	Rangpur	5
8.	Mymensingh	2

As Table 1 shows, Dhaka and Chattogram regions are more vulnerable to suspicious transactions. Even though Sylhet and Rajshahi regions do not show a larger proportion, according to the DMP officials, both of the regions have a growing number of illegal cash transactions through both formal and informal means.[47] On the other hand, BFIU notes that in the FY 2015-16, the number of STRs found to be involved in terrorist financing was 3, which increased to 10 in the 2016-17 and to 21 in FY 2017-18.[48] Similarly, cryptocurrency and credit card forgery have become a popular source of terrorist financing among different groups, particularly, among the AAI members. In between mid-2019 and mid-2020, at least three major incidents can be traced, i.e., on 27 September 2019; 10 February 2020 and 24 March 2020 where the police arrested numerous AAI wolfpack members for their engagement in cryptocurrency business.[49]

Friedrich Schneider and Ursula Windischbauer had explained that organized crimes overall had a value of US$800 billion all over the world in 2001 which increased to US$1700 billion in 2008 following the rapid growth of capital flow.[50] In this study, six amongst the sixteen interviewees, including two from the BFIU, do also think money laundering should be considered as one of the major sources contributing to the terrorist financing in Bangladesh. The main reason money laundering is not reported as significant as it is because in most of the cases the

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[46] See More on the BFIU's official website: Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU), *Annual Report 2011-18,* Dhaka: Bangladesh Bank. Available at https://www.bb.org.bd/bfiu/bfiu_acts.php

[47] From personal Interviews taken between August 2018 and November 2018.

[48] From a personal interview with the Deputy Directors, BFIU, 12 September 2019. See more in Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, *Annual Report 2017-18,* Dhaka: Bangladesh Bank, 2019.

[49] For more, see Mohammad Jamil Khan, "ABT converting cash to Bitcoin to buy arms", *The Daily Star,* 27 September 2019. And, "'Wolfpack leader' of Ansar Al Islam arrested by CTTC", *The Daily Star,* 25 March 2020.

[50] Friedrich Schneider and Ursula Windischbauer, "Money Laundering: Some facts", *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2008, pp. 387-404.

transaction is so fast that the counterterrorism units cannot trace it or find out its sources or its connection with a terrorist group. On the other hand, the interviewees have also opined that some of these people who are engaged in terrorist financing through money laundering are backed by powerful politicians or business executives. Thus, they can easily slip through the loopholes of law and order and this issue hardly becomes a mainstream concern.

4.1.2 *Robbery*

Robbery is comparatively a new method regarding the sources of terrorist financing. Although its propensity is limited within a specific region like Chattogram and Rajshahi, it should still be counted as a source considering the recent upheaval. A high official from the Intelligence and Special Affairs division of the CID, BP has specifically mentioned the robberies aimed at shops and other places owned by Hindu families which have been appropriated by the concept of '*gonimot er shompod*' [goods which are captured through jihad] by the Islamist militants.[51]

In the last week of September 2018, an organized robbery took place in a Hindu jewellery store in Chattogram from which ornaments worth BDT 12,00,000 had been robbed off.[52] The 2016 Ashulia bank robbery is one of the sensational cases in the domestic crime-terror continuum. However, from the arrested criminals with terrorist group affiliations, the division of the looted resources have been learned. The collected resources, once being transformed into cash or other monetary value are assembled into the collective funding. Such groups' accumulated funds are then generally divided into three factions: i) organizational expenditure; ii) salary of the members; and iii) terrorist activities.

Terrorist groups' appropriation of funds through robbery clearly illustrates why terrorism is often defined as a form of organized crime. The groups who are even operating at local levels have infrastructures of their own which include joined or combined networks and they are regularly officiated. An estimated amount of BDT4,000,000-6,000,000 is collected through robbery in a year and about 40-50 per cent of the collected money is being used for organizational expenditure, 25-30 per cent for the salaries and only 10-20 per cent are only for prompted terrorist activities (Figure 5).[53]

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[51] From a personal interview with the Deputy Inspector General (DIG), CID, BP, 25 November 2018.
[52] From a personal Interview with Superintendent of Police (SP), Lawful Interception Cell (LIC), BP, 9 July 2019.
[53] Ibid.

Figure 5: Estimated Proportion of Looted Money Being Used by a Terrorist Group[54]

Division of the Collected Money (per cent)

Hence, a very little amount is required for a terrorist incident to happen and the leftovers are preserved to bolster the groups politico-infrastructural status. It is, however, not quite surprising considering how Damian Bugg, Australian Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions has estimated Al-Qaeda would use only 10 per cent of its income on terrorist operations while the remaining 90 per cent would have been used for training of the troops and maintaining the network cells.[55]

4.1.3   *Underground Leftist Activities*

Although considered as a very unconventional source of terrorist financing, leftist groups operating at the underground levels should be identified as well. The BP officials have predicted a very low amount (almost about BDT 500,000-1,000,000 per year) being obtained from these movements. However, interestingly, these groups do not identify themselves as 'terrorists' or 'criminals', rather 'radical armed groups' or 'Robinhoods of the community' who would long for overthrowing the asymmetrical relation between the rich and poor population within the country and extract money from the former to banish the social inequality. On the other hand, these groups often have connection with other organized groups who are motivated by radical religious ideas but converge at any point of interest to organize some activities together.

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[54] Based on personal interviews and documents from the CID, 19 September 2018- 23 December 2019.
[55] Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, op. cit.

Armed leftist movements, however, is not a very recent phenomenon in the global context. Rather, in the mid-20th century, there had been significant rise in the number of leftist terrorist attacks in the countries exposed to the capitalist economy. The trend is rather different considering how these groups have affiliated themselves with conflicting and similar ideologies at the same time.

4.1.4   *Illicit Arms Sales and Drug Trafficking*

Both regionally and internationally selling arms have been a long running business all over the world. In the case of arms business, the network can operate in two distinct formats — either arms are directly sold to the buyers or the technology which can be used for further production of arms in a distant place.[56] Both of the forms have been used in terrorist networks where the earnings from the business are also being invested in further kind of terrorist activities. As per the opinion of a senior reporter from *Prothom Alo*, direct arms sales are more prominent among the Bangladeshi terrorist groups than transfer of technologies.[57] Moreover, in most of the cases, technological lessons are provided as complimentary handouts given the senior members of an organized group will help the newbies learn the procedure of making small arms.

In most of the individually motivated terrorist acts in Bangladesh, neither expensive nor heavy arms have been used. Looking at the terrorist events from 2014-2019, it is quite visible that most of the activities have been carried out by using explosive belts, machetes or light arms. Selling old arms being used in criminal activities is convenient for two reasons — since most of them are risky to use once they have been under the lens of the police force and, on the other hand, sold out arms can be reused in other activities by professionals who can dismember the machineries and recycle them without leaving any trace of their previous activities. According to some professionals from the CID, about 20-30 per cent of the arms sales are being used for terrorist activities or operations largely of illicit kinds.[58] Hence, the amount of money is not more than BDT800,000-1,000,000 but this is not again something to be ignored or subsided. In summary, money laundering, robbery, underground leftist activities and illegal arms sales constitute a major section of the illegal activities that contribute to the financing of terrorism in Bangladesh. However, it is really a hard task to differentiate a crime in general and an illegal action which may lead to terrorist financing. Hence, these sources are often unnoticed and ignored.

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[56] Andrew J Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales,* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014.
[57] From a personal Interview with a Senior Reporter, *The Daily Prothom Alo* , 15 September, 2018.
[58] From Personal interviews with DIG and Additional DIG, CID, 25-28 November 2018.

The transnational crime-terror nexus and the geopolitical dimension also become relevant as Bangladesh is located in the middle of three drug trafficking channels—the Golden Triangle in the east, the Golden Wedge in the north, and the Golden Crescent in the west.[59] In 2005, the National Board of Revenue (NBR) found out five Bangladeshi companies to be involved in terrorist financing by investing their profit from illicit heroin trafficking in the UK.[60] Although the major groups like the AAI or JMB have not developed any consolidated form of drug smuggling business, they often link up with criminal groups and create temporary networks around these vulnerable regions to complement the financing of terrorism.[61]

4.2   Legal Activities

In Michael Freeman's theoretical framework, the use of legal means for the collection of funds for terrorist activities, depends on a state's jurisdiction and regulatory means whether certain activities are considered legal. Freeman refers to mostly national and international business operations from which the collected profits are later being used for terrorist activities.[62] This section discusses how Hawala/Hundi and Money Collected from Cow Sellers and Fish Markets take part in the financing of terrorism in Bangladesh.

4.2.1   *Hawala/Hundi and Foreign Remittances*

Hawala can be defined as an alternative to remittance which is extensively informal in means and depends on trust between the broker and the owner. It is often used as a medium of easy means of transaction and also for preserving time. According to the 9-11 Commission,

> The *hawala* system, long dominated by South Asians and serving customers throughout the Middle East, … operates out of nondescript storefronts and countless bazaars and souks. It reaches both small villages throughout the region and large cities around the world. It is quick, efficient, reliable, and inexpensive. It draws from a long tradition of providing anonymous services.[63]

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[59] Md Razidur Rahaman, "Drug Trafficking in South Asia: A Case Study on Bangladesh", *Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 9, 2014, pp. 178-184.
[60] Anand Kumar, "Terror Financing in Bangladesh", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 2009, pp. 903-917.
[61] From a personal interview over the phone with Deputy Commissioner (DC), Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP), 23 April 2020.
[62] Michael Freeman, op. cit., 469.
[63] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, "Al Qaeda's Means and Methods to Raise, Move, and Use Money", in *Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph*, 2003, available at http://govinfo. library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch2, accessed on 23 February 2019.

The operational characteristics of *hawala* transaction evolves around the *hawaladars* who 'hold accounts with the banking sector or use its channels for settlement operations'.[64] Hence, *hawala* system is not always a means of corruption but in some countries, it has been ordained as 'illegal' (for example, India). In the case of Bangladesh, most of the informal transactions are happening from the channel though Middle East consider the huge number of migrants working there. A CID investigator notes, since this transaction method hardly leaves a formal specimen to trace the whole system, it is very hard to detect which money is transacted for which purpose.[65] Specially, in a country like Bangladesh where there have been numerous informal transactions happening, surveillance is a troublesome issue.

The system is defined by five major characteristics: i) speedy transaction; ii) less operational cost; iii) versatility; iv) cultural convenience; and v) anonymity.[66] Some DMP officials claim that in September 2018, there had been significant information about a considerable illegal transaction of about BDT1,800,000 through informal channel which supposedly had a link with terrorist groups could not be captured because of the rapid and anonymous network of *hawala* system.[67]

Sometimes, both over invoice and under invoice methods are followed to get away with the criminalization of the *hawala* system. Most often, false invoices are related to imports and exports aligned to the people working in the Middle Eastern countries. But they somehow manage to present a medical emergency or some purpose of higher necessity. At times, there is no benefit in capturing the receiving point because the family members who live in remote villages often are not even aware of the system. They would just receive the money while the broker might invest the additional money for additional/illicit purposes.

However, the BFIU estimates about 15-20 per cent of the yearly *hawala* transaction being used for the purpose of terrorist activities or intra-regional crimes.[68] A reporter from the Daily *Prothom Alo* has provided with the statement that almost about BDT1,800,000-2,000,000 for the purpose of the organizational fund for the neo-JMB organizations have been collected through *hawala* channels solely from India.[69]

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[64] Mohammed El Qorchi, Samuel Munzele Maimbo and John F. Wilson, "Informal Funds Transfer Systems; An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System", *IMF Occasional Papers 222*, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003.
[65] From a personal interview with the DIG, CID, 25 November 2018.
[66] El Qorchi et al., op. cit.
[67] From a personal interview with the DIG, CID, 25 November 2018.
[68] From a personal interview with Deputy Director (Policy Wing), BFIU, 13 September 2019.
[69] From a personal interview with Senior Reporter, *Prothom Alo*, 16 August 2019.

Informal transactions are very common among the people who visit Saudi Arabia for a yearly pilgrimage. Thus, it is difficult to trace whether the money is going to be used for just religious purpose or terrorist activities. On the other hand, almost every interviewee from the DMP has pointed out to one important issue that terrorism nowadays does not require a significant amount of money for the task itself, thus, surveillance on irregular financing mechanism becomes hard and uncertain.

Besides these direct linkages, foreign remittances have also been used for the purpose of terrorist financing. Although there is no evident data on what percentage of these remittances might be involved in the financing of terrorism, Bangladesh Bank empowered by the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) has published specific guidelines for postal remittance business for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. It has been reported that the intelligence agencies are focusing on the British diaspora comprising some 600,000 members which alone send around half a million remittances to Bangladesh every year.[70] A similar situation is speculated to happen so far as the Bangladeshi diaspora in the Middle Eastern countries are concerned. Given how these contributions are interlinked with crowd funding and willful contribution, it is very hard to separate them from each other due to the lack of theoretical and empirical clarification.[71]

4.2.2   *Money Collected from Cow Sellers and Fish Markets*

The contribution of money collected from cow business and fish markets to terrorist financing is very unique in the context of Bangladesh. Around the border areas with India, cow business is a very common profession. However, the connection of these business groups is quite extraordinary considering their affiliation with religious purposes. According to a senior official of Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), most of these people who are in this business are either former felons or people with significantly dark past who used to have this job as a subsidiary form of earning.[72] Thus, terrorist organizations with religious motif influence these people to invest their income into something 'not sinful', rather may become a means of decontaminate their sins and live a pious life.

Although no distinct amount is known, the police estimates a sum of BDT10,000-25,000 being organized from the cow selling market and the fishing

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[70] "Radicalisation in Reverse: How Britain Exports Islamist Extremism to Bangladesh", *The Economist,* 19 September 2019, available at https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/09/19/how-britain-exports-islamist-extremism-to-bangladesh, accessed on 23 April 2020.

[71] From a personal interview over the phone with Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka and Deputy Director, BFIU on 23 April 2020.

[72] From a personal interview with DC, CTTC over the phone, 19 August 2019.

population in a year.[73] It is also easier to manipulate this section of targeted population since the literacy rate tends to fluctuate within these working groups. There is hardly any formal or institutional way to make them aware of the consequences and the broader cycle initiated by the terrorist groups making the whole situation evasive and complex.

To summarize the section, it can be said that the contribution of legal activities to terrorist financing in Bangladesh is quite alarming because these activities are quite difficult to put under surveillance. The underlying networks under informal transactions and simple cattle business help the terrorist form a different kind of channel where it is easier to hide in front of the naked eye.

4.3   Public Support

This section analyzes two sources of public support for terrorist financing in Bangladesh: individual or public donations and women's contributions. Popular support is a very convenient source for terrorist financing as it can easily collect a huge amount of money without risking an easy exposure.

4.3.1   *Individual/Public Donations and NGO Funding*

In the case of Bangladesh, donations for terrorism are mostly based on individual enthusiasm rather than organized public donations. Even in the terrorist incidents which occurred from 2001 to 2018, most of the terrorists were motivated by a relative or a friend. In the case of Holey Artisan Attack, as collected from the information provided by one of the leading newspapers of the country, Tanvir Qaderi who was a prime donor of the attack, sold his private car (Dhaka Metro GA37-5961) to Md Motiur Rahman at Uttara and in exchange received BDT1,250,000 and used the entire payment for the purpose of the attack.[74] In addition, a daughter of the owner of a very famous business organization was radicalized and left home with BDT800,000 which she supposedly donated for financing terrorist activities.[75]

Public donations are significantly low in the case of Bangladesh. In most of the cases, the number of collective public donations arrive from the Madrasa funds and from the weekly collection of Mosques where the organizations themselves may not be directly involved in terrorist operations, but the broad network of alliances filter out the money and invest it for the purpose of terrorism. A less prominent

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[73] Ibid.

[74] Information collected from the documents provided by a national newspaper [to remain anonymous], collected from the CTTC, DMP.

[75] From a personal interview with a Senior Reporter, *Prothom Alo,* 18 September 2018.

yet alarming source of public support in terrorist financing is freelancing. Hence, Bangladesh is entering the realm of Terrorism 2.0 which represents a new era of terrorism where the terrorist groups are utilizing the social networks and online means to achieve their own goals and spread out their political manifesto.[76] A high-ranked official from the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), BP has pointed out that internet providing with an enormous opportunity of anonymity, Bangladeshi terrorist groups are also using it to motivate people, gather money through online transaction and through mobile financial services like bKash while using fake virtual phone number and Internet Protocol (IP) address.[77]

Non-Governmental Organizations have also been found to be responsible for a significant source of terrorist financing. In 2009, a Madrasa funded by Green Crescent, a British charity organization was found to extremist linkages.[78] In 2019, four local NGOs: Small Kindness Bangladesh (SKB), Bangladesh Chashi Kalyan Samity, Nobo Krishi Private Ltd, and Nobodhara Kalyan Foundation were caught for channeling around BDT730 million for the purpose of terrorism.[79] These organizations not only funded terror groups operating in Bangladesh like JMB or AAI but also transferred funding through banking channels to sponsor foreign militants in India.[80]

The extent of voluntary public support may not be as severe as it seems to be as in a society, it is not an easy task to get radicalized while being unnoticed. A police official working on the issue of terrorist financing has given an insight into this:

> Most of the people of Bangladesh are self-educated. Even people in the remote areas who don't know how to read or write, are conscious about their surroundings and whereabouts; they regularly read out the political events and thus develop a critical knowledge, which is more practical than theoretical basis. On the other hand, Bangladesh is not an individualistic society. It is really hard to be radicalized and keep it as a secret from the family, extended family or even from the neighbors who have a good communication with the family.[81]

Thus, the role of the community becomes crucial in the question of surveillance as it is fruitful to engage the local community in the information

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[76] Arie Perliger and Ami Pedahzur. "Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence", *Political Science & Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2011, pp. 45-50. And, Steve Ressler, "Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, present, and future research", *Homeland Security Affairs,* Vol. 2, No. 2, 2006.

[77] From a personal interview with the Additional Director General (ADG) (ret.), Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), 7 January 2019.

[78] "Radicalisation in Reverse", op. cit.

[79] Mohammad Jamil Khan, "4 local NGOs funded terror organisations", *The Daily Star*, 01 January 2019.

[80] Ibid.

[81] From a personal interview over the phone with SP, LIC, BP, 28 September 2018.

collection mechanism rather than a rigid formal procedure to gather substantial information.

4.3.2 *Gendering Terrorist Financing: The Role of Religious Women Groups (Talims)*

The role of women in terrorist financing is quite noticeable vis-á-vis Bangladesh and other South Asian Muslim majority states. Women groups named as *Talims* are often seen roaming around households providing women with religious and motivational lessons. According to the DMP, these groups gain a certain advantage in the case of terrorist financing as they can go beyond the traditional public vs private spatial distinctions of the society. Once being familiar with a certain household, they can learn about the monthly income of the family, the name of the earners and also other socio-economic conditions. Thus, these groups often work as a manipulative network for the women, particularly the housewives who can further collect funds from the family earnings and donate them to the religious groups.

These groups, on an average, mostly are found in the semi urban or rural areas where they build up a strong network of communication. As opined by an official from the DMP who had been engaged in the counterterrorism activities against female radicalization, women can easily melt within the local households as women are mostly welcomed in the *andarmahals* (in-house) than the males considering the societal formulations.[82] According to CTTC, recently, these groups have shifted their focus on the elite women living in the high-class urban area, specifically around the capital's Gulshan, Banani, Uttara and Mohammadpur area from which a significant amount of funding is expected.[83]

Individual/public donations and the role of women groups are unavoidable since they hold the potential to radicalize a large number of people while gather funds for terrorist operations. The blessings of anonymity lying with these charitable donations make it easier for the groups to collect funding and harder for the counterterrorism units to catch them.

4.4 State and Regime-Sponsorship

The concept of state sponsorship was relevant in the context of ethnic insurgency in the southeastern Chattogram Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh. In the CHT region, the Shanti Bahini, an armed wing of the Parbatya Chattogram

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[82] From a personal Interview with Additional Deputy Commissioner (ADC), CTTC, 16 September 2018.
[83] From a personal interview with DC, CTTC, 28 November 2019.

Janasamhati Samity (PCJSS), was engaged in a protracted rebellion against the state security forces for two decades, which ended in 1997 following the signing of the CHT Peace Accord.

Although Freeman has posited the notion of state-sponsored terrorism as an external threat, most of the interviewees for this study suggest that internal regimes or political parties have to be considered as important actors when the sources of terrorist financing is considered. Hence, question arises whether we need a regime-centric approach or a state centric approach to study terrorist financing. A high ranked official from the Intelligence and Special Affairs division of the CID, BP has referred to the verdict on the 2004 grenade attack, which was delivered on 10 October 2018. In the verdict, the court sentenced 38 individuals including senior officials of the then BNP-led four party alliance government for their direct involvement in the grenade attack on Bangladesh Awami League rally that killed 24 people and seriously injured another 400.[84] Terrorism analysts in Bangladesh contend that the political regime in 2004 developed an unholy alliance with the militant group Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) to eliminate Bangladesh Awami League, the then major opposition party.

Therefore, the idea of state sponsorship cannot be referred to as a dominant source of terrorist financing in Bangladesh unless the concept is modified with the idea of internal supports from different political regimes. The direct and indirect alliances between the political parties and militant organizations are important variables given their roles in terrorist operations.

In summary, both state and non-state actors can be engaged in direct or indirect funding of terrorist financing. The means or instruments can be different and the funds can be collected through legal or illegal activities and public donations. In the case of Bangladesh, all of the sources added by Freeman was found in the empirical evidences. The description suggests that each of the sources must be treated with equal emphasis as well.

5.   Countering the Financing of Terrorism in Bangladesh

This section discusses the relevance of three levels of analysis for understanding responses to terrorist financing in Bangladesh.

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[84] From a personal Interview with the Deputy Inspector General (DIG), Intelligence and Special Affairs Division, CID, 27 November 2018 and 21 January 2019. For more, see, "August 21 grenade attack: What happened on that day", *The Daily Star,* 10 May 2020.

5.1   International Approach

Internationally, the foundation of the FATF by the G-7 community in 1989, initiated a breakthrough in countering the financing of terrorism. The United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy also refers to the forty points and nine recommendations provided by the intergovernmental organization. As referred to the Section II, Paragraph 10 of the strategy,

> To encourage States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Forty Recommendations on Money-Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force, recognizing that States may require assistance in implementing them.[85]

The creation of Egmont Group of Financial Units in 1995 expanded the scope of surveillance upon the factor to a greater extent. However, these financial units do not have any enforcement ability or any juridical power over the sovereign state authorities; they are merely taken as instruments to create certain legislative measures, operative suggestions and analytical reports for assessment.

The BFIU became a part of the Egmont group in July 2013. It expanded the global partnership for the organization as well as its responsibility to advocate the bridge between national and international concerning bodies. However, although there is no definite way to measure how much impact the global authorities are having upon countering the sources of terrorist financing in Bangladesh, it is undoubted that an international coordinating means is a very significant necessity if not an obvious one, considering how terrorism and terrorist financing are transcending the conventional borders every day.

There are a number of issues why this global management system is not sufficient to combat terrorist financing. A retired RAB official has claimed this is happening because the exchange of information is mostly happening in a linear order where the international bodies are less concerned about listening to the necessary appeals by the domestic bodies and more interested in pushing their own agendas.[86] On the other hand, another CTTC official has argued, the policies adopted by the global authorities are based on some stereotypical ideas on the financing of terrorism presenting mostly the demands of the western world.[87] He has also mentioned that often these governing bodies have their links with the World Bank, International

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[85] United Nations, "UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force", available at https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy, accessed on 5 December 2018.
[86] From a personal interview with the Additional Director General (ADG) (ret'd), RAB, 7 January 2019.
[87] From a personal Interview with DC, CTTC, 21 November 2018.

Monetary Fund (IMF) and other global bodies which consider terrorist funding or illicit transaction as just natural 'transaction activities' and not of viable security concerns.[88] Moreover, the responsiveness of the international authorities also depends on the global stature of a country where countries like Bangladesh fails to get a considerable attention. Thus, the available international mechanism does not turn out to be fruitful enough to ensure necessary proliferation of regulations to national and local divisions.

5.2   Regional Approach

Regionally, the most significant supervisory body in the question of terrorist financing is the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering. The group was established in 1997 currently holding a number of 41 active member states. As a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on money laundering, the compliance report vis-à-vis the regulatory means of Bangladesh is not satisfactory. Following the Second Follow-up Report of APG in 2018, Bangladesh has been found to be low compliant to 27 of the 40 regulations; partially compliant to 12 and compliant to only one.[89] The APG suggests not only supervisory and regulative amendments but also judiciary actions to be developed concerning the global context of terrorist financing. In the 2016 Mutual Evaluation Report of the APG, the Judicial Administrative Training Institute (JATI) had been praised as a positive development to combat 'financial crime matters.'[90]

A reason behind the dissatisfactory situation regarding the countering terrorist financing has been pointed out to be the lack of coordination between the cross-border counterterrorism units themselves and the financial organizations by both a Senior Reporter from the *Prothom Alo* and another high official from CID.[91] On the other hand, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has failed to prove itself fruitful in the regional context. In one hand, the organization tends to avoid the debates on cross border terrorism within the region considering the cut-throat relation between India and Pakistan over the issue. Even though coming with a promise to help the member states take collective and individual attempts to combat terrorism, the association fails to organize practical manifestation. Hence, it is not only misusing the opportunity it could utilize as a regional organization but also

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[88] Ibid.

[89] Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, "Second Follow-up Report: Mutual Evaluation of Bangladesh", *Mutual Evaluation Report,* Sydney: APG, 2018.

[90] Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, "Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Bangladesh," *Mutual Evaluation Report,* Sydney: APG, 2016.

[91] From a series of personal Interviews with Senior Reporters, *Prothom Alo* and Additional DIG (Ret.), CID taken in between 19 September 2018 and 23 September 2018.

restricting the counterterrorism efforts of the concerning states as well. However, the Additional Protocol to the 1987 SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism in 2004 has contributed to an important issue which is providing with a wider dimension to the definition of the 'funds' of terrorism. As elucidated in the Article 3(1),

> 'Funds' mean assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travelers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts and letters of credit.[92]

Among other regional arrangements, Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)'s Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime as well as the sub group on combating the financing of terrorism are to be noted. The 2015-16 meetings of the members have focus on various important issues of terrorism bringing in the requirement of broader regional cooperation, development of institutional framework and so on. The delegation from Bangladesh, hence, played a major role bringing in the issue of human trafficking and national & regional responses to terrorist financing including those of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and the FATF.[93]

5.3   National Approach

BFIU is responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on terrorist financing from the Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR), Suspicious Activity Report (SAR), Cash Transaction Report (CTR) and other information related to money laundering as the central organization at the national level. BFIU works as a bridge between the banks, other monetary organizations and the law enforcement agencies where the cluster of information is collected, filtered and disseminated. The reporting organizations of BFIU includes insurers, money chargers, stock dealers and stock brokers, securities custodians, asset managers, non-profit organizations, cooperative societies, real estate developers, lawyers, notaries and other legal professionals.[94] BFIU works through different wings including the Policy Wing, Monitoring and Supervision Wing, Complaints Handling

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[92] "SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism", available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv18-english, accessed on 8 October 2018.
[93] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, "BIMSTEC Summit Delivers on Terror Where SAARC Failed". *The Economic Times*, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/bimstec-summit-delivers-on-terror-where-saarc-failed/articleshow/65623374.cms.
[94] For more, see the official website of Bangladesh Bank, available at https://www.bb.org.bd/bfiu/. For associated laws and acts, see https://www.bb.org.bd/bfiu/bfiu_acts.php

& Information Exchange Wing, Analysis Wing, Monitoring & Supervision Wing and Administration Wing. The BFIU also has the responsibility to supervise the implementation of the Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) in 2002 and the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2009 as well as their amendments within the national border.

angladesh started with a terrific beginning as the first South Asian country to adopt the MLPA followed by its subsequent application since April 30, 2002.[95] The Anti Money Laundering Department (AMLD) of the Bangladesh took follow-up steps to strengthen the strategies including the Know Your Customers (KYC) policies, established a Central Compliance Unit (CCU) and made obligations regarding the submission of STRs and the CTRs. A focus on the STR/SAR report of BFIU from the FY 2012-13 to the FY 2016-17 can give a view that the number of STRs has increased from 416 to 2357 (Figure 6). The numbers have also constantly had an increase over the years as in 2013-14, it went up to 621; 1094 in FY 2014-15 and 2357 in FY 2016-17.[96] According to one of the deputy directors from the policy wing, this indicates twofold implications—in one hand, the number of reports increasing means there can be a wider network of alliances between the illicit operatives; on the other hand, it does refer to the fact that more precise reports are also being available day by day.[97]

Figure 6: Number of STRs from 2012-2017 Reported to the BFIU[98]

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
[95] The repercussion of the forceful implementation of Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) compelled Bangladesh to waste a significant amount of foreign money to gain the 'frozen' money back. Which, eventually, led to the creation of its own central task force and seven regional ones to combat money laundering and terrorist financing to combat future calamities. The subsequent result of these procedures helped the country formulate a significant any money laundering regime in 2002. For more, see Kamal Hossain, "Fighting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: The Role of Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit", in *Intelligence, National Security and Foreign Policy: A South Asian Narrative,* edited by ASM Ali Ashraf (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs (BILIA), 2016), pp. 95-110.
[96] See Muhammad Mijanur Rahman Joddar (eds.), Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, *Annual Report 2016-18,* Dhaka: Bangladesh Bank.
[97] From a personal interview with Deputy Director (Policy Wing), BFIU, 25 September 2018.
[98] Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, *Annual Report 2011-18,* Dhaka: Bangladesh Bank. Available at https://www.bb.org.bd/bfiu/bfiu_publictn.php.

However, having a wider variety of reports does not necessarily mean that significant actions are taken to combat the sources. According to another Deputy Director from the Monitoring Wing, BFIU struggles to conjoin the enforcement and policy frameworks, since it works merely as a platform and does not have any jurisdiction over the implementation of the laws and the violations.[99] Following the 2016-17 BFIU annual report, BFIU's engagement with its various sources can be elucidated through Figure 7.

Figure 7: BFIU's Engagement in Terms of Compliant Sources[100]

According to both of the interviewees, BFIU does also have to rely on the information provided by various banks and organizations whose degree of providing valid information can differ. Sometimes, banks may have some known or familiar client whose suspicious or irregular transactions are not often reported. Table 2 provides with the data containing the estimated amount of transaction and the actual transaction reported by the banks concerned. Hence, it can be seen how a considerable amount of transaction often remain ignored or unreported.

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[99] From a personal Interview with Deputy Director, Monitoring Wing, BFIU, 1 October 2018.
[100] Based on BFIU's Official Publications, 2017-18.

Table 2: Estimated STRs and Reported STRs Presented by Different Types of Banks in 2016-17[101]

Sl.	Category	Estimated STR (million BDT)	Reported STR (million BDT)	Reported STRs as Percentage of Estimated STRs (per cent)
1.	Islamic Bank	4.97-5.96	2.98	50-60 per cent
2.	Foreign Bank	0.66	0.46	70 per cent
3.	Private Commercial Bank (PCB)	12.28-13.09	9.82	75-80 per cent
4.	State Owned Bank (SOB)	0.85	0.72	85 per cent

An interviewee from the Intelligence and Special Affairs Unit of BP has mentioned,

> There is a growing reluctance among the police members. There is also no significant regulation for the police to combat terrorist financing. We just have to take 'terrorism' as a whole and dissect the incident into several categories. Sometimes, the focus on security makes the issue of financing subsided. And, again, there are newer sources which don't even fit into the category of the general ideas of terrorist financing.[102]

However, the gaps in the countering terrorist financing also stem from the lack of awareness among the members in the counterterrorism units and also among the organizations directly or indirectly related to the surveillance of terrorist financing. The gravity which is more loosely fitted to the label of 'financing' has to be cut off and free from the stereotyped distinctions as well. On the other hand, Bangladesh Bank had limited the number of daily mobile cash-in transactions from BDT25,000 (US$312) to BDT15,000 (US$187) and restricted the discharge limit from BDT25,000 (US$312) to BDT10,000 (US$125)[103] but it has to be taken into consideration that most of the terrorist incidents did not require even an amount of BDT10,000 and in most of the cases the rules are not properly followed by the store managers/ bKash agents (specially, when the withdrawers are women/children).[104]

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[101] Based on BFIU Annual Report 2016-17 and Personal Interviews with the Deputy Directors of the BFIU.

[102] From a personal interview, DIG, Intelligence and Special Affairs Unit, CID, BP 25 November 2018.

[103] Mehedi Hasan, "Mobile Banking Transactions Fell by 12.3% in September," *Dhaka Tribune*, November 5, 2018, https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/banks/2018/11/05/mobile-banking-transactions-fell-by-12-3-in-september

[104] From a personal interview with DC, CTTC, 15 July 2019.

In summary, although a number of measures have been taken in order to counter the sources of terrorist financing in Bangladesh, they lack fruitful implementation. This creates a complexity and even prolongs the threat of terrorist financing at national, regional and international levels.

6. Concluding Remarks

The sources of terrorist financing are diverse and multi-dimensional. As terrorist incidents do not require a lot of money to take place, every source can bring about severe impact. Thus, the sources have to be dealt with cautious approaches. Following the course of time, newer and newer sources are contributing to the financing of terrorism in Bangladesh. The sources discussed in different sections have shown how the sources can be politically motivated, socially motivated or completely based on an economic transaction system. Measures available for countering terrorist financing at three different levels have also shown interesting findings regarding how the efforts fail to meet expected outcomes due to the lack of implementation.

This paper has examined the relevance of a modified theory of terrorist financing. The modified theory builds upon the works of Michael Freeman. Three sources of terrorist financing, as hypothesized by Freeman, are found relevant in the context of Bangladesh. These include illegal activities, legal activities and public support. This article shows that Freeman's idea of state sponsorship can only be feasible if it is modified with the concept of regime sponsorship. Although Freeman's theory provides a broader framework for understanding the methods of terrorist financing, this paper provides a richer analysis of how the broader methods of terrorist financing, such as illegal activities, legal activities, and public support can be further disaggregated. Among the illegal activities, robberies and underground leftist activities are very unique in the case of Bangladesh. Similarly, money collected from the cow business and fish market as well as the role of women groups which have been respectively discussed under legal activities and public support are also very exclusive considering the conventional understanding on the sources of terrorist financing.

The findings in this article indicate the needs for strengthening existing efforts to combat terrorist financing. Given the fact that terrorist groups operating in the country have shown remarkable success in raising and moving funds through informal and cash-based transaction systems, traditional banking system can barely do anything to deal with such financing methods. More creative measures are needed to detect and counter terrorist financing that should emphasize robust intelligence, proactive law enforcement, and effective community-based intervention.

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GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH: IMPLICATIONS OF POLICIES, CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS

Abstract

Bangladesh is moving ahead with aspirations to realize the dream of *Sonar Bangla* (Golden Bengal). It scrapped the label of 'bottomless basket' and became a success story. It has an average growth rate of 8 per cent and is expecting to officially terminate its Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2024. Bangladesh is celebrating its graduation. In this backdrop, governing the transition period and further sustainability is crucial. Proper measures to keep socio-economic development wheels in the right track are inevitable. The issue of good governance comes in whenever the smooth transition is in concern. Policies and actions are the crucial part of governance while proper implementation of the policies and ultimate result from those largely depends on good governance. Policies specifically focusing on securing sustained economic growth, a healthy environment or an inclusive social development are important in their own right for sustainable development. This paper argues that integrative sustainability governance, promoting evidence-based policy, facilitates coherent policies which steer strategic implications for further economic growth to reach the development ambition. This paper also discusses different policies and actions taken by the government, challenges of sustainable development and possible way forward.

Keywords: Governance, Sustainable Development, Poverty, Debt Management, Mega Projects

1.   Introduction

Since independence in 1971, Bangladesh has been struggling to realize the dream of *Sonar Bangla* (Golden Bengal). It has experienced a lot of hurdles in the state-building process just after independence. Natural calamities, assassination of Father of the Nation along with most of the family members, military intervention in the later political landscape and political turmoil have largely affected the

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development aspiration of the country. The leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has given a fresh blow in the sail and determined a vision to be a developed country by 2041. A vision which has action can bring constructive change in the society. The government has strong political commitment and goodwill to this vision and obviously has undertaken some policy actions and strategies. Bangladesh has been doing excellent in growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and per capita income in the last few years. It has celebrated its graduation from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in 2018. Current trajectory of development indicates that a way toward a middle-income country is not very far. Now, it is crucial to put things in the right track for the smooth transition, to focus on ensuring sustainability to escape from the middle-income trap. Besides the hardcore economic factors such as indices, perimeters and benchmarks, performance of the government is equally significant. To achieve sustainability, good governance stands in as a prerequisite. Arguably, graduation is not the end rather, a medium, a beginning of ceaseless work inevitable for strengthening the trend of achievement.

Governance and sustainable development are closely connected. Governance for sustainability is a holistic idea which emphasizes a common responsibility of values, visions and actions. The issue of good governance comes in whenever the smooth transition is in concern. The transitional approach towards governance for sustainability can be an effective beginning. This approach focuses on transition management through 'learning by doing'. Governing the transition period is crucial and proper measures to keep socio-economic and political advancement in the right track is inevitable for escaping from the threat of the middle-income trap. It is a general understanding that policy making is a part of governance while proper implementation of the policies and ultimate result from the actions largely depends on good governance. Governance for sustainable development necessarily incorporates climate governance, financial and investment governance, organizational development and human development as well. Now, it is necessary to understand: what are the different areas of policy instruments and actions undertaken by the government of Bangladesh to ensure sustainable development? What are the implications of those policies and actions? What are the governing challenges and how those can be addressed? Is there any way to explore a new framework of governance? This paper argues that the strategy of integrative sustainability governance assists in integrating long-term envisioning, multi-actor interactions and short-term actions and coherent policies which creates the strategic implications for sustainable development.

The paper is based on secondary sources of information, i.e., academic journals, books, newspaper articles and reports. It is divided into six sections. Following the introduction, the second section discusses good governance; the

third section deals with the relationship between good governance and sustainable development; the fourth section discusses different areas of policies and actions taken by the government; the fifth section discusses multiple challenges towards governance and development, and; the final section sheds light on way forward and concludes the paper.

2.   Good Governance

Governance is at the key center of development discourse and a crucial element of modern development approach. This concept of 'governance' is as old as human civilization. It is related to the process of making decisions and implementing those decisions. The concept of "Good Governance" is widely used in development literature but still it is debated in the academic arena and scholars hardly reached any consensus regarding its definition.[2] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its 1997 policy paper, defined governance as "the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels".[3] Governance has three broad areas: economic, political and administrative. Economic governance prioritizes on decision-making processes that affect country's economic activities and its relationships with other economies where political governance emphasizes on the decision making to formulate policies and administrative governance on policy implementation.[4]

The paradigm shift of governance to good governance basically portrays a normative dimension addressing the quality of governance.[5] In another sense, for the purpose of this paper, good governance can be defined as "the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for equitable and sustainable development".[6] The United Nations (UN) has defined eight features of good governance, i.e., consensus-oriented, participatory, transparent, accountable, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and rule of law. Here, accountability and transparency mean both political and financial accountability and transparency. Access to information and people's participation is crucial to ensure good governance. Moreover, equitable and efficient distribution is critical for good governance and development. Good governance also focuses on combatting corruption, securing basic human rights and the rule of law.

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[2] Carlos Santiso, "Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality", *The Georgetown Public Policy Review*, Vol. 7, No.1, 2001, pp. 1-22.

[3] Khandakar Qudrat-I Elahi, "UNDP on Good Governance", *International Journal of Social Economics*, Vol. 36, No. 12, 2009, p. 1169.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Santios, op. cit., p. 5.

[6] Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman (ed.), *Governance and Development: Bangladesh and Regional Experiences*, Dhaka: Shrabon Prokashani, 2006, p. 15.

3.   Linking Governance and Sustainable Development

Good governance is more than a legal idea and development strategy, rather it is a set of social norms comprising the rule of law, honesty and accountability.[7] On the other hand, sustainability is 'a higher order social goal or fundamental property of human or natural systems'.[8] Governance for sustainability is a holistic idea which emphasizes a common responsibility of values, visions and actions. Though this concept is not defined properly yet, it is followed by some features and components (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Governance for Sustainable Development[9]

- Integrating decision making centres
- Coordinated elaboration and selection of policy options
- Reasonable Consistency
- Cooperative Implementation

- Shared sustainability goals
- Specified rules and regulations

Policy Integration

Common Objectives, Trade off rules and indicators

Programmes for System Innovation

Information and Incentrives for Practical Implementation

- Policy frameworks for technological advancements and innovations

- Proper actions guided by different policy instruments - i.e., tax reforms, procurement laws, tennure agreements, etc.

Good governance becomes a crucial part of smooth transition. The transitional approach towards governance for sustainability can be an effective

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[7] N. Licht, C. Goldschmidt and Shalom H. Schwartz, "Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance," *Working Papers Series 2003-605*, Michigan: William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, 2003, p. 146.

[8] B. J. Richardson and S. Wood, *Environmental Law for Sustainability*, Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2006, p. 13.

[9] Md. Mostafizur Rahman, *Good Governance: Theory and Practice,* Dhaka: Srabon Prokashani, 2014, pp. 133-134.

beginning. This approach focuses on transition management through 'learning by doing' and gradual advancement.[10] Transition management is a governance strategy which tries to integrate long-term envisioning, multi-actor interaction and short-term actions based on innovations.[11] It is a process-oriented model which aims at achieving particular outcomes. The key focuses of transition management are-vision of sustainable development and setting of transition goals, establishment, organizing and development of a transition arena beside the normal policy arenas, using transition experiments and programmes for system innovation, monitoring and evaluating the transition process, creating and maintaining public support, portfolio management, and the use of learning goals for policy and reliance on circles of learning and adaptation.[12] Now, governing the transition period is crucial and proper measures to keep socio-economic and political advancement in the right track is critical. Figure 2 shows sector-wise different measures for the transition period.

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[10] Ibid., p. 135.

[11] D. Loorbach, "Transition Management: Governance for Sustainability", Conference paper titled *Governance and Sustainability: New challenges for the state, business and civil society*, Berlin, 30 September-01 October 2002, cited in Md. Mostafizur Rahman, op. cit., p. 134.

[12] R. Sanders, *A Systems Approach to Governance for Sustainability,* Brisbane: Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines, 2003, p.14.

Figure 2: Governing the Transition Period

Economic

- Debt management startegy
- Monitoring finance in mega projects
- Policy arrangements to face withdrawal of trade support
- Mobilization of domestic resource
- Global Partnership
- Preparing national taskforce

Political

- Political will and vision
- Political stabiltiy
- Strengthenig democratic institutions and practices
- Strong commitment

Social and Environmental

- Quality education and developemnt of human capital
- Women empowerment
- Ant-Corruption initiative
- Health sector development
- Strengtheing the social safety net
- Environmental sustainability
- Climate change mitigation and adaptation

Media and Technology

- Access to information
- Media communication and monitoring
- Development of ICT sector

Governance and sustainable development are closely interlinked. Governance is vital for moving towards sustainability as well as crucial for remaining sustainable.[13] Sustainable development highly dependents on effective and equitable governance. Effective governance includes problem-solving capacity of the governments or states to pursue sustainable development. It is highly connected to institutional capacity, technology, expertise and financial resources and the ability to engage in long-term planning to deal with interconnected problems.[14] On the other hand, equitable governance emphasizes on distributional outcomes and equitable treatment for the marginal groups. It seeks greater equity in global decision-making, especially in economic governance, but also to the distribution of wealth, resources,

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[13] Joachim Monkelbaan, *Governance for the Sustainable Development Goals: Exploring an Integrative Framework of Theories, Tools, and Competencies*, Singapore: Springer Nature, 2019, p. 16.
[14] Ibid., p. 1.

and opportunities within societies.[15] Governance, policy and sustainability are parallel linkages as sustainability, being more than a vision, can be a fundamental principle for more efficient and effective policies and governance.[16] Linkage among the three suggests that proactive policies, network governance structures, and appropriate scaling of governance favour sustainability.[17]

Figure 3: Relations Among Governance, Policy and Sustainability[18]

As the governance and sustainable development are interlinked, a comprehensive framework can be followed. Integrative Sustainability Governance largely promotes evidence-based policy making and policy coherence which leaves some long-term implications for the future development and international cooperation. It is a specific form of sustainability governance and can be defined as 'a collective enterprise which aims to address sustainability problems adequately through fostering fundamental change.'[19] Actually, it is a combination of transition management, metagovernance, experimentalist and network governance mainly focusing on changes in understandings, networks, structures, technologies, policies,

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[15] Ibid.

[16] National Research Council, *Sustainability for the Nation: Resource Connections and Governance Linkages*, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2013, p. 142.

[17] Stephen Jordan and William H. Benson, "Governance and the Gulf of Mexico Coast: How Are Current Policies Contributing to Sustainability?", *Sustainability*, Vol. 5, 2013, p. 4702.

[18] National Research Council, op. cit., p. 142.

[19] Joachim Monkelbaan, op. cit., p. 193.

problem domains or entire societal domains.[20] This framework contains elements from the action research, transition management, experimentalist governance, integrated risk management and systems thinking cycles besides the special focus on politics, polity and policy dimension.[21] It works as a hub of network and policy outlet for SDGs. It promotes effective and equitable governance.

Policy coherence is the pre-requisite of development and effective governance. Policy coherence means integrating the economic, social, environmental governance dimensions of sustainable development at all stages of domestic and international policy making. It removes inconsistencies between the policies. For example, giving subsidies to a specific industry, such as farming or fishing, may help create jobs, but it may also negatively affect environmental conservation. Equally, a government may decide to invest in renewable energy to increase climate action, but in doing so could negatively affect employment without proper consideration of how and when it invests.[22] Key mechanisms of enhancing policy coherence are political commitment and leadership, policy integration, intergenerational timeframe, analyzes and assessments of potential policy effects, policy and institutional coordination, local and regional involvement, stakeholder engagement, and monitoring and reporting.[23] Firstly, political and policy statements can help translate commitment into action; secondly, policy co-ordination can resolve conflicts or inconsistencies between policies, i.e., policies regarding bio-fuels energy and climate and renewable energy policies may have conflict of interest which needs careful coherence and coordination; and thirdly, systems for monitoring, analysis and reporting on the impacts of policies to provide evidence to inform decision-making.[24] Ultimately, integrative sustainability governance as well as coherent policies under this framework creates a strategic horizon towards development. Here, strategic implication means augmenting the performance which provides long-term positive effect or outcome towards achieving the vision and desired goals. On the other hand, public policies decided in advance bear strategic importance in a position that generates most effects. For example, Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100 seeks more comprehensive development policies and planning which would generate greater benefits for the next hundred years if properly implemented.

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[20] Ibid., p. 43.
[21] Ibid, p. 203.
[22] Scotland's International Development Alliance, "Improving Policy Coherence in Scotland: Delivering a safer, fairer and more sustainable world for all", Report published in May 2020, available at https://www.intdevalliance.s cot/how-we-help/policy-and-advocacy/policy-coherence-sustainable-development, accessed on 06 May 2020.
[23] See Ernesto Soria Morales, "Why is policy coherence essential for achieving the 2030 Agenda?", UN System Staff College, 10 September 2018, available at https://www.unssc.org/news-and-insights/blog/why-policy-coherence-essential-achieving-2030-agenda/, accessed on 25 April 2020.
[24] OECD, *Better Policies for Sustainable Development 2016: A New Framework for Policy Coherence*, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016, p. 15

Graduation is a process through which a country ends its LDC status and shifts towards a middle-income country. Latest indicators show that graduation for Bangladesh from the LDCs to the developing nation is not very far as it has fulfilled the UN's current criteria (see Table 1). It will undergo a few years of observation and can officially graduate to a developing country by 2024 at the earliest after the next review in 2021.

Table 1: Projected Progress towards LDC Graduation[25]

Indicators	Gross National Income Per Capita (US$)			Human Assets Index			Economic Vulnerability Index		
	2018	2021	2024	2018	2021	2024	2018	2021	2024
Graduation threshold	1,230	1,245-1,270	1,345-1,375	66 or above			32 or above		
Bangla-desh's score	1,274	1,730-1,780	2,260-2,500	73.2	79.2	86.3	25.2	24.8	24.7

Bangladesh's graduation from LDCs is indeed a milestone in its long-term economic and social development commitment. However, this graduation brings some challenges and opportunities which need careful attention from the government and policy makers.[26] Bangladesh is in a crucial juncture and the key concern is to avoid the 'middle-income trap' as a number of countries are stuck in that status and are unable to come out. Now, it is time to be prepared for the probable impacts of graduation. It is a dire need to take timely action, to promote good governance for the transition and formulate effective strategies to combat the challenges coming ahead. To keep the development wheels in the motion, Bangladesh government has undertaken a number of sector-wise policies and actions through which a number of targets have been set to keep the development trajectory in motion. The following section discusses those policies and actions in detail.

4.   Policies and Actions for Sustainable Development

Bangladesh became an independent nation through a struggle for national emancipation in 1971. Just after the independence, a war-torn country had gone

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[25] Mustafizur Rahman and Estiaque Bari, "Strategy towards Bangladesh's Sustainable LDC Graduation", *CPD, Policy Brief*, No. 4, 2018, p. 1.

[26] Bangladesh can continue to access global climate finance even though losing access to Official Development Assistance (ODA). Besides, being a middle-income country, it can uphold the spirit of South-South collaboration to help other countries in graduation. But graduation will take away some opportunities like losing duty-free access to the markets of developed countries, competing with other developing countries in the market without subsidies for indefinite periods of time, no longer being eligible for grants and low interest loans under ODA from the developed countries.

through huge challenges in both state-building and nation-building processes. Poor GDP growth, political instability and devastating calamities like floods and famine had obstructed its development aspiration, the dream of 'Golden Bengal'. Now, it has torched the so-called label of 'bottomless basket' and became a success story. It has an average growth rate of 8 per cent and is expecting to shed its LDC status by 2024.[27]

Current government under the Awami League (AL) has got a long tenure and has taken some visionary measures for the growth and development. According to the 'Vision 2041', Bangladesh aspires to be a developed country by 2041. It has already done a tremendous improvement. Decline in population growth and rising per capita income, reduction of poverty and unemployment show the competitiveness of the country. Bangladesh ranked 105th among the 140 countries in the Global Competitiveness Index (see the Table 2). Garment trade exports and emerging service sectors including microfinance and computing, and digital transformation, etc. have added new dimensions to the ongoing economic growth of Bangladesh.[28] Current trajectory indicates a way toward a middle-income country is not very far but it is crucial to put things in the right track for the smooth transition. Smooth transition needs good governance and proper strategy to manage and proper policy actions to pull the wagon towards the goals and vision. This section discusses different areas of policy decisions and actions for governing various sectors and their implication for the sustainable move of the country.

Table 2: Bangladesh in Index at a Glance[29]

Index	Rank in 2019	Rank in 2018
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)	105th out of 141 countries	103th
Human Development Index (HDI)	135thout of 189 countries	136th
Global Hunger Index (GHI)	88thout of 117 countries	86th
Global Ease of Doing Business Index	168th out of 190 countries	176th
Global Connectivity Index	73th out of 79 countries	76th
Global Innovation Index	116th out of 129 countries	126th
Corruption Perception Index	146th out of 180 countries	149th
SDG Index	116th out of 162 countries	111th
Climate Risk Index	9th out of 10 countries	
Global e-Commerce Index	103thout of 152 countries	88th
Global Food Security Index	83th out of 113 countries	83th

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[27] Katharine Rooney, "Here's what you need to know about Bangladesh's rocketing economy", *World Economic Forum*, 19 November 2019, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/11/bangladesh-gdp-economy-asia/, accessed on 20 March 2020.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Compiled by the authors from Word Development Indicators, Washington, DC: World Bank.

4.1   Economic Governance

Bangladesh has been able to continue the trend of development and growth. In the last 5 years, its GDP remains more than 7 per cent. In FY2018-19, the GDP growth rate was 8.13 per cent.[30] Its total export was US$30,903 million during July-March of FY2018-19 and import was US$40,895 million in FY2018-19 (July-February).[31] Export earnings from ready-made garments and knitwear, agricultural products, handicraft products, leather and jute products, etc. are increasing. Foreign reserve reached US$32.12 billion at the end of 30 April 2019.[32] FDI inflow in the country in 2018-19 fiscal year stood at US$2,540 million.[33]

The key focus of monetary policy of the government is to promote economic growth in line with the SDG agenda. Agriculture has been given the top most priority to become self-sufficient in food. The government is working relentlessly for this sector considering the 7th five-year plan, National Agriculture Policy and SDG.[34] To increase domestic and foreign investments, the government is focusing on the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model. It also formulated investment friendly policies, acts and laws. For example, Bangladesh Economic Zone Authority (BEZA) has taken an initiative to create employment of around 10 million people by establishing 100 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) throughout the country by 2030.[35] There are 88 SEZs in Bangladesh among which 59 are government-owned and 29 are privately owned.[36] To simplify the business and provide fast and hassle free services to the investors, the government passed 'One Stop Act, 2018' in the Parliament, which would open a new horizon in the investment environment. This act would help investors to have necessary services from the same office. The full international standard online One Stop Service was launched in January 2019.[37] Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) is working to facilitate the investment and establish industries and provide administrative coordination service. It is expected that those policies and actions would help a congenial environment and improve the ranking in the 'Ease of Doing Business' index.

Industrialization is an important factor for sustainable economic development. The government introduced 'National Industrial Policy 2016' to

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[30] Finance Division, *Bangladesh Economic Review 2019*, Dhaka: Ministry of Finance, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, June 2019, p. 13.
[31] Ibid, p. 7.
[32] Finance Division, op. cit., p. 8.
[33] "Bangladesh's FDI rises over 5pc from July to October", *The Financial Express*, 25 December 2019.
[34] Finance Division, op. cit., p. 7.
[35] Ibid, p. 21.
[36] BEZA, available at https://www.beza.gov.bd/economic-zones-site/, accessed on 12 May 2020.
[37] Finance Division, op. cit., p.21.

accelerate industrialization. One of the key focuses of this policy is to promote cottage industries, small and medium industries, and to encourage women entrepreneurs. Moreover, continuous endeavor of the government for the last decade in poverty reduction has been rewarded. The 7th Five Year Plan (FYP) targeted to reduce poverty rate at 18.6 per cent by 2020.[38] To attain the target of poverty alleviation, the key focus of the government is on the social safety net and introduced National Social Security Strategy (NSSS). Moreover, the government is emphasizing on attaining poverty and hunger related targets to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is projected to reduce poverty rate at 9.7 per cent and malnutrition rate less than 10 per cent by 2030.[39] Now, the concern is that in comparison to the pace of economic growth, the rate of poverty reduction declined.[40] Income inequality and urban poverty have added a new dimension to the concern.

Tourism is another potential area of fostering economic advancement. Tourism sector contributed 4.4 per cent in the GDP in 2018 and it is projected that it would reach 4.6 per cent in 2028.[41] So, this sector has a significant role in economic growth. Government has undertaken a number of policies and actions for the further development of this sector, i.e., National Tourism Policy-2010, Bangladesh Tourist Reservation Area and Special Tourism Zone Act-2010, formation of tourist police for the safety of tourists and establishment of tourism board to harvest the untapped potential of this sector. Connectivity is the precondition to foster regional trade and investment. Bangladesh has already joined the Belt and Road Initiative sponsored by China, BBIN and BIMSTEC initiative for establishing regional cooperation and people to people connectivity.

4.2   Human Resource Development

Human resource development is one of the core agenda of sustainable development. The first priority of human resource development is education. In the era of globalization, technical education is the top most priority. Technical education offers great opportunities for employment at both domestic and overseas markets. The importance of technical education in Bangladesh can hardly be overemphasized where only 14 per cent of students receive technical or vocational education.[42] This is very marginal compared to many developed and even some developing nations.

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[38] Ibid, p. 219.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Bangladesh Needs Traditional and New Solutions to End Poverty: World Bank", Press Release, World Bank, 07 October 2019, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/10/07/bangladesh-needs-traditional-and-new-solutions-to-end-poverty-world-bank, accessed on 22 May 2020.
[41] Basharat Hossain and Syed Naimul Wadood, "Potential Unexplored? Tourism and Economic Growth of Bangladesh", *Journal of Tourismology*, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2020, p. 9.
[42] Kamal Uddin Ahmed, "Why technical education is imperative", *The Financial Express*, 31 January 2020.

The government adopted 'National Education Policy-2010' to create skilled and competent human resources by enhancing the quality of education and increasing accessibility to education in all tiers.

Bangladesh is enjoying a demographic dividend now. At present, more than 65 per cent of our population is of working age, between 15 and 64 years[43] and this percentage will reach 70 in 2030.[44] Demographic dividend is not guaranteed or automatic: rather, it requires huge investment in governance, education, infrastructure, health; and nutrition focusing, the youth development. Demographic dividend can be a momentum for Bangladesh as it is going to be a middle-income country by 2024 and a developed country by 2041. So, youths can be a crucial agent for smooth graduation and sustainable economic growth. The major challenge of reaping the dividend is creating jobs for the unemployed youths and equipping them with education. The government is implementing different types of development programmes to accumulate demographic dividend. National Education Policy has given special focus on technical and vocational education as well as ICT education. Within 2020, the government targeted to increase the enrolment rate of technical education up to 20 per cent.[45] Again, necessary steps have been taken to implement National Technical and Vocational Qualifications Framework (NTVQF) at all levels. An 'Integrated Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Development Action Plan' has been developed aligning it with SDGs and the 7th Five Year Plan. Currently, in total 8,852 TVET institutions are in operational mode. Out of these, 119 institutions are operating through the government. The rest of 8,733 institutions are running privately.[46] Education Master Plan has been prepared involving all strata of education for building a skilled and modern education system by including ICT in the education sector. The government also endorsed National Youth Policy 2017. The objective of this policy is to increase the engagement of the youths in good governance, ICT development, environmental education and protection, green technology and volunteerism, etc. Moreover, to utilize the youth's potentials, the government also initiated National Skill Development Policy 2011 to improve the quality and relevance of skills development for various groups including women and physically challenged.[47]

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[43] Abu Afsarul Haider, "'Demographic dividend' could turn into a 'demographic disaster'", *The Daily Star*, 02 March 2019.

[44] Md. Atikur Rahman, "Skillful and efficient human resources needed for development", *The Independent*, 06 October 2018.

[45] Finance Division, op. cit., p. 203.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Centre for Research and Information (CRI), *Bangladesh: Youth Development,* October 2017, p. 5.

The fertility rate as well as death rate has decreased, average life expectancy has increased and neonatal and maternal death rate has decreased notably.[48] The Community Clinic and Expanded Program of Immunization have opened a new horizon in the health sector. But recent COVID-19 pandemic has shown the gaps in the health sector which needs special attention from the policy makers to achieve the health-related goals of the SDGs.

Women empowerment is another crucial indicator of sustainable development. To empower women, it is necessary to encourage self-employment of women and entrepreneurship, stop violence against women and trafficking, facilitate safety of women in the workplace and ensure women's participation in mainstream economic activities. Government introduced different policies and acts to ensure women's rights for example, 'National Women Development Policy 2011', 'National Child Policy-2011', 'Domestic Violence (prevention and security) Act 2010', 'Comprehensive policy on Initial Care and Development of Child 2013', 'Dowry Prevention Act 2018', 'Child Marriage Prevention Rules 2018', 'Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Act 2014' and Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Rules 2018', etc.

4.3   Environmental Governance and Climate Change

Environmental governance is the key concern in maintaining a balanced relationship between economic growth and sustainable development. It is a concept in political ecology or environmental policy related to defining the elements needed to achieve sustainability and resilience.[49] Besides, ecological objectives of development must take a central position in building a socially inclusive, environmentally sustainable and democratically vibrant society.[50] Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries induced by climate change. It is projected that, because of climate change, annual rainfall will increase about 4 per cent in 2030, 2.3 per cent in 2050 and 6.7 per cent in 2070, annual average temperature will increase by 2.4 degree Celsius and annual average rainfall will be changed by 9.7 per cent within 2100.[51] Moreover, 'The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)' predicts that by 2050, Bangladesh will lose 17 per cent of its land and 30 per cent of its food production because of the negative impact of climate change.[52]

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[48] Finance Division, op. cit., p. 205.
[49] Mohammad Tarikul Islam, "Ensuring enforcement of environmental governance", *The Financial Express*, 29 April 2018.
[50] Atiq Rahman, "Environmental governance and growth", *The Daily Star*, 12 March 2015.
[51] Finance Division, op. cit., p. 262.
[52] Ibid.

The prime directives of environmental governance issued from the article 18(a) of the constitution of Bangladesh is that protection and improvement of the environment and preservation of the natural resources, biodiversity, wetlands, forests and wildlife for the present and future citizens shall remain the State's obligation in all circumstances. Government has undertaken multiple policies and action plans under this directive. The 7th Five-Year Plan (2015–2020) emphasizes promotion of green growth and sustainable development. The Perspective Plan of Bangladesh (2010-2021), seeks to promote environment protection, climate change preparedness across government policies to benefit the poor.[53] Besides, the government has formed Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP), 2009 to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) through enhanced efficiency in the usage of natural resources and conventional energy, low carbon energy dimensions of development intervention design.[54] This plan covers 44 activities within 6 thematic areas. To implement these activities Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) has been formed and the government has promulgated 'Climate Change Trust Fund Act, 2010' to run this fund.

Bangladesh is going to develop 'National Adaptation Plan (NAP)' under UNFCC in order to fix integrated adaptation strategies and activities to meet long-term impact on climate change. Bangladesh has prepared 'Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)' plan which aims to reduce 10 per cent carbon emission with international cooperation and decline 5 per cent carbon release with own ability by 2030.[55] Moreover, the government introduced 'Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA)' and 'Climate Change Unit' to adapt climate change impact. Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100 is the most significant step towards fighting climate change. It has 6 specific goals[56] and to attain these goals BDP 2100 has initiated 'Flood Risk Management Strategies' and 'Freshwater Strategies' at national level. Again, Industrial Policy (2016) highly emphasizes on environment friendly industrialization and less pressure on natural resources. This policy made Effluent Treatment Plants (ETPs) mandatory for industries that produce toxic wastewater

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[53] Bushra Ferdous Khan, *Governance for Green Growth in Bangladesh: Policies, Institutions, and Political Economy*, report prepared by Adam Smith International, October 2017, p. 14, available at https://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/sites/default/files/downloads/resource/Governance%20for%20Green%20Growth%20in%20Bangladesh_Policies%2C%20Institutions%2C%20and%20Political%20Economy_0.pdf, accessed on 12 February 2020.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Finance Division, op. cit., p. 263.

[56] The six goals are: 1. Ensure safety from floods and climate change related disasters; 2. Enhance water security and efficiency of water usages; 3. Ensure sustainable and integrated river systems and estuaries management; 4. Conserve and preserve wetlands and ecosystems and promote their appropriate use; 5. Develop effective institutions and equitable governance for in-country and trans-boundary water resources management and 6. Achieve optimal and integrated use of land and water resources.

and kept provisions of punitive measures against the offenders.[57] This policy also promotes the *3R* principle (Reduce-Reuse-Recycle) for all industries and discourages establishment of industries in agricultural land.

To conserve biodiversity, Bangladesh has already prepared 'National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) 2016-2020' based on 'UN Biodiversity Strategic Plan 2016-2020'. Moreover, 'Bangladesh Biodiversity Act, 2017' has been enacted and 'Ecologically Critical Management Rules, 2016' has been prepared. The key focuses NBSAP are: conservation of Ecologically Critical Areas (ECA): 13 areas including Saint Martin Island and Halda River; 'Blue Economy Action Plan' to preserve and manage marine and coastal biodiversity; monitoring marine pollution by measuring Dissolved Oxygen and solid in water.

Bangladesh is a signatory country of Montreal Protocol (signed in 1990) and formed 'National Technical Committee on Ozone Depleting Substances (NTCODS)' in 1995. Later, to implement this protocol, Ozone Cell was formed in 1996. Beside those policies and actions, Bangladesh is currently working to attain SDG Goal 13 and Goal 14. For this purpose, it has formulated 'Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies of Bangladesh (2016-2020)'. Moreover, green banking, forest conservation and social forestry are the remarkable initiatives to environmental sustainability.

Most importantly, disaster management is at the heart of environmental governance in Bangladesh as it is a disaster-prone country and experiences natural disasters time and again, for example, devastating cyclones in 1970 and 1991, SIDR in 2007, AILA in 2009 and fatal floods in 1988, 1998, 2004 and 2007. Now, increasing the capacity of disaster response and disaster management is the main concern of the government. The National Plan for Disaster Management (NPDM 2016–2020) has been formulated to address the disaster risks. Bangladesh is the member of 'Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC)', 'Regional Integrated Multi Hazard Early Warning System (RIMES)' and 'International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)'. The government also prepared the Contingency Plan for the early recovery and developed the inundation map for flood and the risk map for storm surge to facilitate the construction of infrastructures in the disaster-prone areas. Community based warning programmes also gained much effectiveness. The government also introduced two cells: Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA) and Multi-Hazard Risk and Vulnerable Assessment Cell under the awareness building programmes to measure the impacts of climate change and disasters on the lives and livelihoods.

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[57] Bushra Ferdous Khan, op. cit., p.14.

4.4   Technological Advancement and Digital Governance

The development of science and technology in the last century brought a revolutionary change in every aspect of human activities. The digital age has opened a new window of opportunities for developing economies. Bangladesh is focusing on strategic innovation to attain its vision and SDG targets. Investment in the ICT sector not only develops human capital but also creates its own innovation system in the global competitive environment. Now, Bangladesh is branding the dream of 'Digital Bangladesh' and showed a praiseworthy performance in ICT development. Government has established Digital Centres to provide services to the rural people, e-Learning, and providing easy and cheaper access to internet services. In January 2020, there were 66.44 per cent internet users which increased 9.5 per cent than the previous year.[58] Moreover, there were 163.0 million mobile connections in Bangladesh in January 2020 (4.5 per cent increased than in 2019). In February 2018, the government launched 4G mobile technology and Bangabandhu Satellite-1, the first transport and communication satellite, was launched in May 2018. The development of IT industry largely helped in digital transformation and growth. It is estimated that Bangladesh exports US$1 billion of technology products every year and it is expected to increase to US$5 billion by 2021.[59] There are 0.6 million IT freelancers working in the country.

Now, what are the policies and actions to govern these huge potential sectors? The ICT division of the government has undertaken multiple policies and initiatives. Bangladesh Hi-tech Park Authority was established under 'Bangladesh Hi-tech Park Authority Law-2010'. It aims to promote IT/ITES based hi-tech industry, creation of tech-based employment for youths, and building a conducive environment for investment. Now, 28 hi-tech park/software technology parks throughout the country have been established.[60] Construction of 'Bangabandhu Hi-tech City' at Kaliakoir, Gazipur is ongoing. Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA) has been established to introduce digital signature of e-commerce, e-transaction and e-governance.

The government introduced National Science & Technology Policy-2011 to ensure application(s) of science, technology and innovation (ST&I) for achieving sustainable development by poverty alleviation, employment generation, and environmental sustainability.[61] A draft on 'The National ICT Policy 2018' has been proposed which is the amended version of the National ICT Policy 2015. This policy

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[58] Digital 2020: Bangladesh, 17 February 2020, available at https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-bangaldesh, accessed on 20 April 2020.
[59] Katharine Rooney, op. cit.
[60] Finance Division, op. cit., p. 192.
[61] National Science & Technology Policy-2011, Ministry of Science and Technology, p. 6.

covers 48 action plans and eight strategic issues.[62] Introduction of 5G is the key focus of the proposed policy. One of the major policy interventions in ICT governance is Digital Security Act 2018, though it has been criticized from different sections of the society. The act was passed on 01 October 2018 in the parliament. The main objective of the act is to combat digital crimes and ensure security of lives and assets.

4.5   Energy Security and Governance

The power sector of Bangladesh is one of the fastest growing sectors in South Asia. Both production and consumption capacity has been increasing for the last five years. To secure the energy supply and meet increasing demand, the government has given much focus on diversification of energy sources, more specifically on the efficient and best use of energy. Government has taken several policies and initiatives to meet increasing demand for power and energy. National Energy Policy (NEP) was formulated in 1996 and updated in 2005. The key focus of this policy is to promote environment friendly energy development programmes, encourage public-private partnership in energy sector development and bring the whole country under electricity facility by 2020.[63]

According to Power System Master Plan (PSMP) 2016, the government projected to increase electricity generation capacity to 24,000 MW by 2021; 40,000 MW by 2030; and 60,000 MW by 2041. According to the Power Division, in 2019, total generation capacity was 22,787MW (including captive and renewable).[64] This policy aimed at providing electricity for all by 2021. Currently, 93 per cent of people in the country are enjoying electricity facilities. Besides the traditional sources of electricity production, the government is focusing on renewable energy. Renewable Energy Policy of Bangladesh 2009 first expressed the vision of having 10 per cent (at least 2000MW) of total power generation from renewable sources by 2020.[65]

For effective utilization and conservation of renewable energy both in public and private sector, Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA)' was established under Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority Act, 2012. PSMP 2016 declared the target of increasing renewable power

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[62] These are: a) digital government, b) digital security, c) social equity, d) universal access to education, e) research and innovation, f) skill development, g) employment generation and h) strengthening of domestic capacity to cope with the changes of emerging technologies.

[63] Charles K. Ebinger, *Energy and Security in South Asia: Cooperation or Conflict?*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011, p. 96.

[64] Power   Division,   available   at   https://powerdivision.gov.bd/site/page/6cd25d49-3150-482a-8bd0-701d18136af7/At-A-Glance, accessed on 21 April 2020.

[65] Benuka Ferdousi and Rubel Molla, "Renewable Energy in Bangladesh: Achievements, Potentials and Challenges", *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2018, p. 36.

generation to 2,470MW by 2021 and 3,864MW by 2041.[66] Currently, Renewable Energy Installed Capacity is 626.69 MW.[67] To reduce carbon emission, the 7th Five Year Plan and 'Energy Efficiency and Conservation Master Plan up to 2030' targeted to save 15 per cent primary energy per GDP by 2021 and 20 per cent by 2030.[68] Moreover, 'Energy Efficiency and Conservation Rules 2016' has been formulated as well as the government initiated multiple programmes like promoting energy efficiency in industries and residential sector, inserting energy efficiency and conservation provisions into the Bangladesh National Building Code, in the textbooks of the schools and madrasas as well as Energy Saving School Awareness Program has been introduced.

Bangladesh is also constructing Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP) with a capacity of 24,000MW which is expected to be operational in 2021. Government has taken initiative in cross border trade of electricity through bilateral cooperation with Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. It is closely working with neighbouring countries as well as UNESCAP, SAARC, BIMSTEC, SASEC and D-8 for enhancing the power sector. However, the power sector is facing multiple challenges like shortages of natural gas, inefficiency of power plants, limited potential of renewable energy, poor financial health of power generating companies, and lack of technology and expertise, etc.

4.6   Political and Institutional Development

Political commitment and leadership are the prime mover of continuity of development and governance mechanism. Bangladesh has been experiencing a stable leadership and political regime for the last decade. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the government is heading towards its political commitment—mission of being a middle-income country by 2024 and a prosperous country by 2041. The basic principles of the state policy ushered in the constitution of Bangladesh are the key aspiration for a prosperous future and directives for a progressive and inclusive development agenda.

Bangladesh has been experiencing less political turmoil since the last few years. Parliament is functional with a majority of members from AL, the party in power. So, parliament is enjoying a congenial environment to raise any legislation, move and get them passed, though there remains debate whether the members actually articulate people's concerns properly or not. Parliament plays a significant role for the implementation of Agenda 2030. It facilitates good governance and can ensure inclusiveness and make the government accountable for its policies through

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[66] Ibid, p. 37.
[67] SREDA, available at http://www.renewableenergy.gov.bd/, accessed on 20 April 2020.
[68] Finance Division, op. cit., p. 157.

law-making and budgetary exercise. SDG 16 incorporates the spirit to strengthen democratic institutions, public administration reform and good governance, with particular emphasis on enhancing citizens' participation and promoting public ethics.

Strong and decentralized local government is another prerequisite for sustainable development. It offers an opportunity for genuine popular participation in public governance. The 7th FYP has set an objective to capacitate city corporations and municipalities both institutionally and financially. To enable more effective functioning of the local government, the Paurasabha Bill 2009 and City Corporations Bill 2009 have shown clear political commitment to assist in terms of policy support, legislative and executive actions.[69] Local governments have been well-equipped with the establishment of Union Information Service Centres.

Bureaucracy is a crucial element of governance and an agent of development. It is an institutionalized and disciplined way of policy determination, policy framing and implementation. In countries like Bangladesh, having a colonial past, bureaucrats hold more power over the decisions of the government. Political instability and military rule in the past have strengthened the position of the bureaucracy in the context of Bangladesh. The question of public accountability of bureaucracy is still debated. Neo-patrimonial culture and patron-client practices, red-tapism, corrupt practices debar the development aspirations and create a backlog. But in recent times, it is trying to come out from those irregularities and practicing meritocracy.

The judiciary is a significant organ of the democratic political system. It establishes the basis of social justice and equality to ensure good governance by using its laws and institutions.[70] On 02 November 2007, Judiciary was separated from the executive department. Still there remains debate whether the judiciary is separated in real sense or not. This debate became acute when the government turned back to the spirit of 1972 constitution and passed 16th amendment bill on 17 September 2014 to empower parliament to remove judges of the Supreme Court for their incompetence or misconduct based on a two-thirds majority.

Corruption is at the total reverse point of the idea of sustainable development. It debilitates the key institutions of the national integrity system (NIS) and hinders rule of law. It promotes injustice and creates mistrust on government largely affecting its legitimacy. To fight corruption, Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was formed under Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004 which was passed on 23 February

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[69] General Economic Division, *The 7th Five Year Plan (FY2016-FY2020): Accelerating Growth and Empowering Citizens*, December 2015, pp. 382-383.
[70] Md Anwar Hossain Molla, "Judiciary and Good Governance in Bangladesh", *South Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2008, p. 246.

2004 and came into force on 09 May 2004. The key mission of the commission is to fight, control and prevent corruption and promote good practices. The role of the ACC became more crucial when the government declared zero tolerance principle against corruption. But it is often criticized for failing to demonstrate its purpose and became a 'toothless tiger'. The commission itself is accused of corruption sometimes.[71] Anti-Corruption Commission (Amendment) Bill, 2016 was passed in the parliament on 08 June 2016 to allow the police to investigate graft charges and judicial magistrates to hold trials. However, 'The Sarkari Chakori Ain Bill 2018' passed in October 2018 raised huge debate because under this act ACC must seek the permission of the authorities concerned before arresting any public servant prior to a court framing charges.

5. Challenges Towards Governing the Development Vision

Discussions in section four reveal that there is an abundance of policies regarding every sector to keep the wheel of development in motion. But it is important to understand how effective those policies could be, what are the limitations in the path of their implementation and what are the challenges towards sustainable development.

Firstly, the COVID-19 pandemic will obviously have a bitter impact on the global economy. South Asia will face a stormy experience due to adverse impacts of this pandemic. The World Bank forecast that the growth will fall to a range between 1.8 and 2.8 per cent in 2020, down from 6.3 per cent projected six months ago.[72] According to the Asian Development Outlook (ADO) 2020, Bangladesh will lose 0.2-0.4 per cent GDP growth rate due to the corona virus outbreak[73] and is expected to grow by 7.8 per cent in Fiscal Year 2020 and 8.0 per cent in 2021.[74] Though ADB is expecting a strong economy of Bangladesh, the World Bank has forecast GDP to be between 2 and 3 per cent .[75] Bangladesh will struggle due to decline in remittance inflow, halt in export-import, decline in RMG industry, and unemployment. Already RMG sector has received work order cancellations of nearly US$3 billion and about 2 million workers in the industries will be affected by this.[76] Though Bangladesh showed tremendous resilience in previous crises i.e. 1997 Asian financial crisis and

[71] "ACC director suspended for leaking info", *The Daily Star*, 11 June 2019.
[72] World Bank, *World Bank. 2020. South Asia Economic Focus, Spring 2020: The Cursed Blessing of Public Banks*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 12 April 2020.
[73] "Bangladesh to lose 0.2-0.4 per cent GDP growth rate due to virus outbreak: ADB", *The Daily Star*, 03 April 2020.
[74] Asian Development Bank (ADB), *Asian Development Outlook 2020: What Drives Innovation in Asia?*, April 2020, p. xxi.
[75] Rejaul Karim Byron and Wasim Bin Habib, "Outlook is grim for Bangladesh", *The Daily Star*, 13 April 2020.
[76] M Shahriar Azad Bhuiyan, "Covid-19 and its impact on Bangladesh economy, *The Business Standard*, 15 April 2020.

2008 global financial crisis, COVID-19 pandemic is totally different in magnitude as it requires extraordinary responses. Government has announced a total financial package of BDT727.5 billion to face the possible impact of the coronavirus on the economy.[77] Besides, experts are suggesting to raise revenue through comprehensive tax reforms to manage more resources for expenditure on infrastructure, health and social development. However, Bangladesh is aspiring to be a middle-income country, it should be more careful about its donor-fed economy because in the post-coronavirus period, foreign aid may not be forthcoming like it did before.[78]

Secondly, endemic corruption is another challenge towards achieving development goals. Bangladesh became 146th among the least corrupt countries out of 180 countries according to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2019. Rent seeking through discretionary access to public bank loans, non-payment of those loans, insider trading and other manipulations of the stock market, corruption in public procurement and spending, evasion of taxes and illegal land grabbing including public land, etc. have become a major barrier to good governance and development aspiration.[79] Sometimes reports of political patronage to these corrupt practices come out. Default loans became a cancer in the banking system. According to the Global Economic Prospects report, Bangladesh's default loan ratio was estimated at 11.4 per cent for 2019 and it topped the list of loan default index in South Asia.[80] According to Bangladesh Bank, as of December 2019, the total amount of outstanding loans was BDT10.18 trillion out of which an amount of BDT 943.31 billion was classified (nonperforming) loans.[81] Irregularities in purchasing for housing projects for the RNPP (Pillow scandals)[82] shows the trend of severe corruption in public purchase.

Thirdly, income inequality is another challenge. High inequality leads to social tensions and tends to contribute to social and political instability.[83] One of the reasons behind the creation of Bangladesh was income inequality, it remained manifested after the 49 years of independence. As per the latest Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Gini coefficient, which is the economic measure of equality[84], stood at 0.482 in 2016, up from 0.458 in 2010.[85]

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[77] "PM announces Tk 727.5 billion package to fight coronavirus impact", *The Financial Express*, 05 April 2020.
[78] Shihab Sarkar, "Economic fallouts from Covid-19", *The Financial Express*, 30 March 2020.
[79] Sadiq Ahmed, *Evidence Based Policy Making in Bangladesh: Selected Case Studies*, Dhaka: Policy Research Institute of Bangladesh, 2017, p. 137.
[80] Mosharaf Hossain, "Default loans: Cancer of the banking system ", *The Financial Express*, 16 March 2020.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Mizanur Rahman, "Report: Tk36 crore embezzled in Rooppur housing project scam", *Dhaka Tribune*, 15 July 2019.
[83] Sadiq Ahmed, op. cit., p. 115.
[84] The Gini coefficient is measured on a scale of 0 to 1; the closer it is to 1 the higher the inequality is in the society.
[85] Muhammad Abdul Mazid, "Bangladesh: The state of income inequality", *The Financial express*, 26 October 2019.

Fourthly, poor infrastructure is another challenge. Quality infrastructure is a sine qua non for economic development. It accelerates growth through supporting trade links, reducing production and transaction costs, expanding agricultural and industrial productivity and advancing private investment etc. But in terms of quality infrastructure development, Bangladesh is far behind, in South Asia. In the Infrastructure pillar of Global Competitiveness Index, it ranked 114th in 2019 while Sri Lanka ranked 61st, India 70th, Pakistan 105th and Nepal 112th.[86] Limited resources for building new infrastructures and lack of decentralization of infrastructure development projects are barring the quality infrastructure in Bangladesh.

Fifthly, proper policy implementation, assessment and coordination is one of the key issues of governance and sustainable development. Success of policy lies on how the policy is evaluated and what level it is implemented. Policy making process is highly top-down in nature in Bangladesh. Bureaucrats play the major role in decision making and policy formulation rather than experts and researchers. Often draft policies are finalized without proper debate in the parliament or without feedback from the mass people or stakeholders. In case of implementation of the policy, bureaucratic tradition is also maintained and lacks appropriate coordination and accountability. Lack of inter-organizational communication, i.e., different ministries and NGOs, conflict of interest and internal complexity hinders proper implementation. As multiple actors like government ministries, NGOs, individuals are involved in the implementation process, they have differences in outlook and sense of urgency, different opinions on leadership and organizational roles[87] become a challenge for the proper implementation of policies. Moreover, 'learning by doing' is less emphasized. Lack of adequate resources, designated evaluation authority and measuring instrument, is a barrier in evaluation when there exist institutional biases and less specified instruments. Coordinated evaluation is also less emphasized. For example, when environmental policy, agricultural policy and industrial policy are discussed, it needs to be evaluated simultaneously in a single evaluation paper that can assist in comparing the achievement and impacts of one policy to another. Most importantly, policy coherence is less visible in midst of policy abundance. Policy coherence in economic, environmental and social governance is crucial for domestic and global consistency especially in the area of migration, food security, regional trade, illicit money flow and ecological sustainability. The 'top-down' nature of policy making and implementation is a major concern while inter-policy inconsistency undermines the potentiality of policy outcome. For example, many aspects of National Environment Policy, Agricultural Policy, Water Policy, Industrial Policy

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[86] Md. Tuhin Ahmed, "Challenges of boosting private investment in Bangladesh", *The Financial Express*, 29 December 2019.
[87] Anisur Rahman Khan, "Policy Implementation: Some Aspects and Issues", *Journal of Community Positive Practices*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2016, p. 7.

and Land Use Policy overlap with each other and with forest policies, resulting in conflicts and inconsistencies that frequently hinder forest program implementation.[88]

## 6.	Conclusion

Bangladesh has come to a long way despite experiencing military crackdown, political ups and downs since its independence. Current political leadership, to make the dream of 'Sonar Bangla' a reality, has undertaken a valiant mission for development and set a vision to be a developed country by 2041. Bangladesh has already achieved the criteria to be a middle-income country and it will officially graduate from the LDCs in 2024. Now, it is crucial to ensure sustainability of the development for the smooth performance towards the Vision-2041. Actually, graduation does not necessarily lead to continuous development progress, rather graduating countries require to facilitate smooth transition through bypassing reversal of development progress. Governance for sustainability is a holistic idea which emphasizes a common responsibility of values, visions and actions. It necessarily incorporates climate governance, financial and investment governance, organizational development and human development as well. Proper strategy and policy actions can ensure the smooth transition and post-graduation development progress. Bangladesh government has formulated policies, undertaken various decisions and actions for the sustainable development move of the country. But there are a number of governing challenges in the pathway. Recent outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic would be a major threat to the economy. Moreover, endemic corruption, growing inequality, poor infrastructure, lack of proper policy implementation and evaluation and ultimately poor performance by democratic institutions become a headache for the governance and aspiration for development. As there is strong political will and commitment for development from the political leadership, to make those strategies and policies a success the government can focus on following issues. Firstly, the government should give more focus on the agricultural sector to overcome the economic shake created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Besides, it should focus on proper transition management, i.e., preparing a debt management strategy, financial arrangement on mega projects, mobilizing the domestic resources, and enhancing global partnership to support development initiatives and strategic partnership between public and private to implement domestic policy. Besides, building and maintaining quality infrastructure and reducing bottlenecks for doing business need to be focused. Growing income inequality should be taken carefully through creating more jobs and reducing poverty. Secondly, ACC should be more

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[88] Nur Muhammed, Masao Koike and Farhana Haque, "Forest Policy and Sustainable Forest Management in Bangladesh: An Analysis from National and International Perspectives", New Forests, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2008, pp. 9-10.

proactive in checking the corruption. Political will and public awareness are needed to realize the 'zero-tolerance policy' against the corrupt practices and irregularities. Thirdly, the government needs to focus on quality education, especially the technical and vocational education for skill development and quality human capital. Research should be encouraged more for critical and innovative thinking. Fourthly, the government should focus more on the health sector as coronavirus has opened different irregularities, poor performance and gaps of this sector. Budget needs to be increased in this sector. In the fiscal year of 2019-20, this sector had 4.9 per cent of total allocation. Finally, the most important thing is that the government should focus more on policy implementation and evaluation. Implementation process should be more inclusive through involvement of grassroots people. Decision making processes should be accelerated and come out from the colonial bureaucratic tradition. Moreover, policy options based on overall development perspective should be prioritized for implementation. Coordination among public and private organizations is necessary for effective implementation. The outcome of the policy implementation can be measured through proper evaluation. There should be no institutional and ideological biases in the evaluation process and the government should form a national committee on policy evaluation comprising researchers, practitioners, civil society and different stakeholders. Most importantly, to ensure sustainable development, policy coherence in some sectors especially food security, green growth and tackling Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) needs to be addressed through applying Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) framework proposed by OECD. Besides, sustainability problems need to be addressed adequately through collective enterprise by applying the lens of Integrative Sustainability Governance (ISG) which largely promotes evidence-based policy-making and network governance.

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BOOK REVIEW

The Belt Road and Beyond—State-Mobilized Globalization in China: 1998–2018 by Min Ye, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, USA, March, 2020, xvi + 252 Pages.

With the aim of developing new trade routes, stimulating infrastructural developments and promoting economic integration by instigating new trading patterns across the world, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is by far the most ambitious foreign policy initiative by China. While BRI is a global vision promoting global development through infrastructure and investment, it is also thought to be the potential driver of energizing the new wave of globalization.[1] Amid the growth of nationalism and protectionist policies, USA and Europe tend to be withdrawing from the well-established understanding of globalization. USA cuts its funding in World Health Organization (WHO) after the emergence of COVID-19.[2] It has also stepped back from climate change negotiation during COP-25. All these facts reveal that USA, once a promoter of globalization, is retreating from the idea of globalization and multilateralism. On the contrary, China is emerging as strongest supporter of globalization by initiating global connectivity, investment and infrastructure through its mega plan BRI. In this regard, in *The Belt Road and Beyond—State-Mobilized Globalization in China: 1998–2018*, Min Ye attempts to analyze how China is making its policies to expedite globalization through promoting state-mobilized implementation of globalization.

This book explains how China is implementing initiatives to mobilize state and market, what are the principles behind these initiatives, and how China is making its Chinese capitalism more explicable through its state-mobilized globalization. This book runs well over 252 pages with a beautiful prologue in the beginning. The prologue tells the story of how a city named Urumqi, the capital of Xinxiang province, prepares itself to implement the ambitious plan of BRI. With the story of Urumqi, the author attempts to showcase how China launched a nationalist strategy of embracing globalization to cope with economic challenges. Urumqi's story also shows how China is implementing its nationalist strategy through mobilizing sub-national governments into growth generating programmes. Apart from the prologue, the book has three major parts namely *The Theory, The Strategies* and *The Subnational Actors*. Each part consists of a number of chapters. A total of eight chapters located under these three major parts.

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[1] Anastas Vangeli, "Is China the potential driver of a new wave of globalization?", *The Conversation*, available at https://theconversation.com/is-china-the-potential-driver-of-a-new-wave-of-globalisation-71575, accessed on 26 May 2020.

[2] Christine Wang, "Trump threatens to permanently cut off WHO funding, withdraw U.S. membership", *CNBC*, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/19/trump-threatens-topermanently-cut-off-who-funding-withdraw-us-membership.html, accessed on 20 May 2020.

In the *Theory* part of the book, Min Ye introduces the State-Mobilized Globalization Framework (SMGF) as an investigative tool to unpack the origins and characteristics of all these nationalist strategies that were taken since 1990's to promote sub-national provinces and markets for embracing globalization. This part comprises of two chapters that explains why China's 'autocratic' leaders started to promote nationalist strategies and how China's sub-national and commercial actors are involving actively to implement these strategies. Min Ye demonstrates that China's BRI is not just a 'strike of pen'. Rather, it is an outcome of a continuous process of previous nationalist strategies towards globalization. And the reason behind these strategies is the high economic growth. Because of China's rapid economic growth for the past two decades[3], an ideology or a general consensus develops in the Chinese state system. This general consensus is that the high growth needs market expansion and globalization. In support of this consensus, the idea of modernization in Chinese state system takes its shape.[4] Through SMGF, Min Ye enlightens her readers about the drivers and outcomes of the strategies under this and explains major development initiatives such as BRI and other previous initiatives.

Min Ye illustrates the confluence of different interests and drivers in formulating and implementing various strategies under the SMGF. Behind the formulation of each of these strategies, she explains a critical stage that was built up by economic emergencies, pressing domestic imperative and nationalist external ambition. With this framework, the author aptly introduces the 'coordinated-capitalist' nature in the Chinese State based on the long-term study of globalization from 1998 to 2018. Economic growth and development worked as dominant drivers among all other competing issues and priorities in this nature of 'coordinated capitalist' state. The communist organization built a 'coordinated' voice that helped to mobilize fragmented state groups with the support of this idea of 'coordinated capital'. This coordination helped China's provincial leaders and commercial actors embrace nationalist strategies under this Framework and implement these strategies in a cohesive manner. The notion of Chinese capitalism started to revive and spread across China and the world through this 'coordinated-capitalist' idea under the state-mobilized framework.

The second part of the book is *"The Strategies"*. It is dedicated to analyze the nationalist strategies taken under the SMGF. Min Ye discussed the strategies in three separate chapters under this part. These are devoted to evaluate three national strategies—the Western Development Programme (WDP), the China Goes Global (CGG) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) under the SMGF. Before BRI, the

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[3] Richard Herd and Sean Dougherty, "China's economy: A remarkable transformation", *OECD Observer*, available at https://oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/1685/China_92s_economy:_A_remarkable_transformation.html, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[4] Joan van Heijster, "Imagining Modernization: The Symbolic Embrace of GDP in China", *Chinese Political Science Review*, Issue 5, 2020, pp. 50-73.

WDP and the CGG were two important nationalist strategies that took place under this Framework. Min Ye demonstrates these two previous nationalist strategies as empirical validation of China's State-mobilized globalization. According to Min Ye, BRI is the continuation of these two strategies under China's SMGF in the part titled *The Theory*. Under *The Strategies* part, the author relates the Framework in dissecting drivers and implementing process of the WDP that launched in 1999 and executed till 2012. How WDP transforms the economy of Western China[5] and the role of state-market forces are well explained in this part. The analysis of the WDP uncovers the background of announcing this nationalist strategy in the time of economic crises and how this strategy changed the pattern of regional development planning in China. Although this strategy was focused on the development of Western China, Min Ye showed how this strategy helped spread the high economic growth and industrialization across China. This progression of industrialization and globalization in Western China has been done through mutual enhancement of both state and market.

The political economy of China's outbound investment[6] has been analyzed in Chapter Four under the second part of this book. It analyzes formulations and implementation process of China's outbound investment policy of the second most important nationalist strategy—the CGG. This nationalist strategy under the SMGF propelled after the WDP and implemented till 2015. This chapter examines the CGG's origin, pattern, fragmented implementation and how it contributes in enhancing globalization process across China. Min Ye compiled important official documents throughout her research on the SMG in China. In this chapter, she scrutinizes China's outbound investment and analyzes the patterns of change in the regulatory framework based on the official documents. Author dissects various trends, distributions, problems of outward investment from China, comprehensive statistics and comparative cases in regards to the discussion on China's outbound investment. The last chapter under the *'Strategies'* part discusses the latest national strategy under SMG that is BRI. Based on three specific analyses, Min Ye discusses the formulation and the execution process of BRI. First she analyses preexisting state fragmentation and prior policies and demonstrates strong evidence in instigating contexts of national strategies. Second, she examines the characteristics and nature of political mobilization in China behind all the national strategies in support of globalization. And her third analysis demonstrates the complex interaction and fragmentation among an 'autocrat' leader, national agencies, and sub-national actors in shaping the national strategy in China and abroad.

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[5] Hongyi Harry Lai, "China's Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and Prospects", *Modern China*, Vol. 28, Issue 4, 2002, pp. 432-466.
[6] Benesch Friedlander Coplan and Aronoff LLP, "China Goes Global: Examining China's Outbound Investment", *China Insights*, January 2010, available at https://www.beneschlaw.com/images/content/1/1/v1/112/January_2010.pdf, accessed on 27 May 2020.

Min Ye demonstrates the justification behind the birth of BRI by analyzing strategies in the second part of the book. Her analyses validate state fragmentation and economic crises as determining factors that propelled China's leaders to go for nationalist strategies like WDP, CGG and the latest BRI.[7] In this part, Min Ye also does comparative analyses of these three nationalist strategies. In the systematic comparison of these three strategies, she signifies some specific differences. In the WDP that is the first nationalist strategy, top-down mobilization is found as the major change. In the top-down mobilization, political leadership and the heads of national agencies converged noticeably on internal economic development priorities. This change promotes high cohesion at the top layer in the China's state system. Later, it is seen that political leadership is promulgating outbound globalization as a national priority in the CGG.[8] But at the same time, economic bureaucracies start to be disintegrated into different preferences. For that reason, sub-national actors reinterpret this strategy and use CGG to nourish their own needs. Therefore, sub-national actors stay away from the original intent of the CGG. This divergence between political leaders and sub-national actors promote internal investment than outbound globalization. In the latest and ongoing strategy of BRI, it is seen that a broad consensus forms in support of integrating foreign policy and domestic development. Although this convergence in China promotes Chinese implementers' interest outside China, the recipient governments sometimes view this strategy as diplomatic moves by Beijing.

A comprehensive discussion on how sub-national actors are playing their role in China's SMG is made in the final part of the book named *"Subnational Actors"*. This part is comprised of three separate chapters. The first chapter of this part is Chapter Six which discusses the implementation patterns of subnational actors in the nationalist strategies by assessing the involvement of three selected cities of China—Chongqing, Ningbo and Wenzhou. The discussion reveals the contribution of these three cities on local development. Although being one of the important actors in the Chinese state system, local/provincial governments are not active in international negotiations. But they are the key drivers of making successful economic growth and globalization. The market-implementation of globalized strategies of these three selected cities have been intricately discussed in this chapter. The author has chosen these cities based on different economic and local power structures. All these three cities have distinct levels of economic power authorized by national government, diverse local technocracy, varied economic structures and different corporate interests. The first city—Chongqing follows the state capitalism. Since it has state-owned enterprise (SOE); state banks and highly politicized local government; it represents the state-capitalism. Ningbo is the second city that has diverse economic structure and highly competent local

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[7] Min Ye, "Fragmentation and Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 28, Issue 119, 2019, pp. 696-711.
[8] Benesch Friedlander Coplan and Aronoff LLP, op. cit.

bureaucracies. Therefore, this city is close to the developmental state. Wenzhou with its dominant private capital and weak local state is the third city, i.e., closer to the liberal market economy. By analyzing the different patterns of their involvement in market-based economic growth for globalization demonstrates how different political-economic systems make valuable contribution in diverse programmes and mechanisms in implementation even under the same political dynamics from the top.

The growth and globalization of Chinese companies has been discussed in the following chapter. Since different companies have different policy priorities and different political choice, they develop different types of relations with global market and home government. Therefore, Chinese companies habitually improvise the nationalist strategies in their own ways. They contribute in suggesting latest knowledge on the ideas and experiences of corporate elites in China.[9] In this chapter, Min Ye aptly confers how these Chinese companies challenge domestic politics in the corporate circles of China. The discussion in the chapter reveals that by adopting nationalist strategies, state and market reinforce each other in the economic realm. It largely helped in maintaining high growth in China throughout the past decades. It also tells the gradual strengthening of corporate nationalism in China that makes symbiotic relations between authoritarian state and companies. The concluding Chapter blends the theoretical and empirical analyses of the earlier discussions and argues findings on economic debates related to China; state-market roles and rising China's impact on global development. The political future related to communism and the rise of Xi Jinping in the Chinese state system is also discussed in this chapter. Min Ye discusses the importance of state and market for other countries to achieve success in the globalized world, apart from China's involvement in globalization. The chapter also covers the impact on world economic development. The changing of power and its possible consequences due to China's involvement in globalization is also aptly discussed in this chapter.

Being a practitioner of authoritarian-political system, China has build a strong political order in the regime and this authoritarian-political system has been personified by the inclination of the President Xi Jinping.[10] The country follows a state-controlled capitalist system in which the state controls financial sector, major infrastructure companies and local governments. Therefore, when China launched a mega global plan like BRI which is already a continuation of previous nationalist strategy under the state-mobilized globalization framework, this initiative will have a huge impact on global economic connectivity and infrastructure. It is natural that foreign policy analysts will critique this ambitious plan and express concern about Beijing's diplomatic move when

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[9] Nana de Graaff, "China Inc. goes global. Transnational and national networks of China's Globalizing business elite", *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2020, pp. 208-233.
[10] "China's authoritarian turn is a challenge for the world", *Financial Times*, available at https://www.ft.com/content/a8366500-2271-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b, accessed on 25 May 2020.

Chinese political autocrats launched this type of mega plan for global development. In this regard, Min Ye comments that foreign observers should not miss important domestic drivers, economic causes and the important contribution of internal institutions that shaped the ground for launching BRI and will continue to support its implementation process. Therefore, Min Ye clarifies that the launching of BRI is not just a 'vision' of a leader rather it is a combination of economic crisis and priorities.

Under SMGF, the BRI is thought to be an impressive strategy for promoting globalization in and outside China where China is playing the proactive role. The author shows that Chinese political leaders accept this strategy as their grand foreign policy initiative and will be facilitating this initiative to secure a central role in international economic governance and globalization process. Since its inception, this initiative is gaining attention and assumption that this initiative will rebalance globalization.[11] At the same time, critics of neoliberalism-centered globalization alert that overdoing economic rationality as a mere cost-benefit calculation for profit maximization can make marginalization and lead to enormous benefits for a small group of people.[12] Therefore, it is still a long way to go for assessing this initiative that whether this will bring common prosperity for all or not. Regarding this, Min Ye, rightly remarks on the anticipation on BRI that it will take a long time to finally understand whether this plan will make China successful in achieving win-win globalization across the world. Although this initiative managed to make a cohesive platform for Chinese capital to expand globally and gained worldwide attention toward globalized China, it needs to go a long way to assess whether China's industrial overcapacity can lead the world's latest industrialization.

The findings of this book is a result of well-conducted research. Running an in-depth research on China's policy making is a difficult task since the country, in some cases, is not much willing to share information. Min Ye excels in this area and she successfully arranged notable numbers of interviews that mostly consists of retired government officials with almost 20 years of experience. She did a commendable task since conducting field research in Chinese localities is extremely complicated. Her field research covered Chongqing, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Shanghai and Urumqi where she outshined in collecting important information in adaptive and versatile manner. She predominantly focused on interviews to draw interactive roadmaps for analyzing archival collection and statistics. The author successfully developed this book, which is thematically sound and rich in empirical evidence through conducting this research for four long years from 2014 to 2018. With a reader-friendly approach, this book will undoubtedly make substantial contribution to the existing literature on China's policy making and understanding the country's journey towards globalization through SMGF.

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[11] Anastas Vangeli, op.cit

[12] Zheng Xin and Hu Wenjia, "Belt and Road forges new path to inclusive globalization", *Xinhua*, available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/22/c_137998244.htm, accessed on 25 May 2020.

Although Min Ye gave her best effort, this book is not free from limitations. It is a strong attempt of Min Ye on examining China's policy making regarding state-mobilized globalization established on field-based empirical evidence. Although it offers many promising sides, there are scopes to conduct empirical research on the sustainability of China's SMGF and the outcomes of the latest strategy like BRI. Her research plan's aim was to capture the policy making process in the Chinese state system regarding SMGF. To support her plan, she conducted all interviews from government officials, scholars, researchers, and market actors. But this gave the one-sided perception of the SMGF. Min Ye did not capture what locals think about China's decades-long aspiration of embracing globalization. The mass perception regarding Chinese way of globalization can broaden the understanding[13] that might be resourceful and thought provoking for the readers. Min Ye may think of knowing the perception of BRI member countries about China's support and backing globalization regarding BRI. Since a country's domestic policy is influenced by external dynamics, the understanding of what others think about use of Chinese capitalism in backing globalization can help studying the future of power shift in the world politics. Therefore, an intense discussion might be considered to be included in the second edition on BRI member countries' views regarding China's practice of globalization in and outside of China.

In this book, Min Ye introduces the SMGF and uses this framework as an investigative tool to apprehend Chinese capitalism and the country's choice on adopting globalization. This Framework shows that all national strategies including the latest BRI helped in sustaining China's high-growth economy and social-political stability. But at the same time, these nationalist strategies also spark some political backlash. To overcome these, Min Ye suggests that this framework needs to adapt global circumstances appropriately. She suggests that China can turn back and see how it made its journey from crisis-ridden middle-income economy to an impressive global power. This example can also be replicated outside China.

As a final note, Min Ye's book *The Belt Road and Beyond—State-Mobilized Globalization in China: 1998–2018*, is certainly based on logically manifested arguments with appropriate empirical evidence except diminutive limitations. Therefore, her work can be recognized as a notable contribution in the discourse of understanding China's policy making and its journey towards globalization.

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[13] Francis L.F. Lee, Zhou He, Chin-Chuan Lee, Wan-Ying Lin and Mike Yao, "The Attitudes of Urban Chinese Towards Globalization: A Survey Study of Media Influence", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 2, 2009, pp. 211-230.

The Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) is a statutory institution established in 1978 under the administrative control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, for undertaking and promoting research and deliberation on international affairs, security and developmental issues.

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